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Most importantly, I am very thankful to my parents, Karina and Gerd, for their continuous
support over all the years and to my grandmother Hildegard, who has always been a






1 Lobbying and the International Fight Against Tax Havens 7
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.1 Third Stage: Firms’ Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2.2 Second Stage: Tax Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.2.3 First Stage: Pressure and Lobbying . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2.4 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Multiple Tax Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3.1 Third Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.3.2 Second and First Stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.3.3 Comparison to the Single Tax Haven Case . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.4 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.1 Positive Welfare Weight on Domestic Profits . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4.2 Tax Competition with Multiple Tax Havens . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2 Enforcement Focus Lists and Tax Evasion 33
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.2 Institutional Background and Policy Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
i
Contents
2.2.1 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.2.2 Enforcement Focus List Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3 Data Set and Sample Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.1 Generalized Difference-in-Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4.2 SUTVA and Substitution Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.4.3 Further Threats to Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.1 Direct Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.2 Total Effect on Taxable Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.3 Effects on Line Items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.5.4 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.5.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3 Optional (Non-)Filing and Effective Taxation 58
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
3.2 Institutional Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.3 Data Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.1 Prevalence of Non-Filing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4.2 Tax Over-Remittance through Non-Filing . . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.4.3 Effective Tax Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5.1 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.5.2 Persistence of Non-Filing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.5.3 Potential Drivers for Non-Filing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5.4 Tax Filing Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
ii
Contents
3.6 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.6.1 Implications for Equity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.6.2 Implications for Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Conclusion 98
Appendices 100
A Appendix to Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.2 Comparative Statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
B Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
B.1 Additional Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
B.2 Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
C Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
C.1 Additional Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
C.2 Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
C.3 Sample Restrictions - Optional Filers . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128




1.1 Setup of the Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.2 First Stage Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Distribution of Firms into the Different Profit Shifting Schemes . . . 24
2.1 OFD Districts in North Rhine-Westphalia (Municipality Level) . . . 38
2.2 Treatment Effects - Direct Effect (Income Categories) . . . . . . . . . 50
2.3 Treatment Effects - Total Effect (Taxable Income) . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4 Treatment Effects - Commuting Cost Deduction . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.1 Distribution of Filing Status in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.2 Prevalence of Non-Filing over Gross Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3 Non-Filing Share by Refund Potential . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
3.4 Effective Tax Payments of Optional Filers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.5 Effective Tax Schedule for Non-Filers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.6 Non-Filing Share Over Age in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.7 Tax Perturbations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.8 Hypothetical Tax System I: Abolition of the Basic Allowance in the
Statutory Tax Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
B.1 Enforcement Focus List Tax Year 2010 (First Page) . . . . . . . . . . 106
B.2 Treatment Assignment (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
B.3 Distribution of Income Category Means by Treatment Status (2009) . 108
B.4 Treatment Effects - OFD Rheinland Control Group . . . . . . . . . . 109
B.5 Treatment Effects - Neighboring Taxpayers Control Group . . . . . . 110
iv
Contents
B.6 Treatment Effects - All Non-NRW Taxpayers Control Group . . . . . 111
B.7 Treatment Effects - Entropy Balancing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
C.1 Average and Marginal Tax Rates for Single and Joint Filers in Germany 114
C.2 Prevalence of Non-Filing over the Income Distribution . . . . . . . . 115
C.3 Differences in Filing Behavior across Gender and Age . . . . . . . . . 115
C.4 Differences inFiling betweenMarried andNon-Married Taxpayerswith
and without Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
C.5 Prevalence of Non-Filing over Gross Income - Only Taxpayers with
Positive Tax Remittance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
C.6 Non-Filing Share by Refund Potential over Age . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
C.7 Statutory and Effective MTR under Optional (Non-)Filing . . . . . . 119
C.8 Effective Marginal Tax Rates Pre and Post Reform . . . . . . . . . . 120
v
List of Tables
2.1 Treatment Assignment Prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2 Descriptive Statistics (Tax Year 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3 Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Direct Effect (Income Category) 48
2.4 Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Total Effect (Taxable Income) 51
3.1 Descriptive Statistics - Final Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2 Taxes Over-Remitted through Non-Filing - Lower Bound Estimates . 76
3.3 Compliance Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.4 Potential Efficiency Gains from Reform - Full Sample . . . . . . . . . 95
B.1 Descriptive Statistics (Tax Year 2009) - OFD Rheinland and Other
German States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
C.1 Countries with Income Tax Non-Filing Options . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
C.2 Descriptive Statistics - Full Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
C.3 Descriptive Statistics - Optional Filers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
C.4 Declared Deductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
C.5 Different Inequality Measures for Different Income Concepts . . . . . 125
C.6 Taxes Over-Remitted through Non-Filing - Lower Bound Estimates
(2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
C.7 Efficiency Gains Hypothetical Tax System II - εy,1−τ = 0.3 . . . . . . 127
vi
Preface
In times of severe economic crises, firms and individuals rely on governments for help.
Throughout the last fifteen years, the world has seen two crises of such scope. Following
the financial crisis of 2007/2008, governments bailed out troubled banks to mitigate
the spread of adverse effects to the real economy. Likewise, in 2020, governments were
fast to set up relief programs for troubled firms and individuals following the SARS-
CoV-2 virus containment measures. This governmental assistance, mostly provided
through direct monetary transfers, is being funded by tax revenue. Either there are
funds readily available or governments issue bonds to implicitly borrow against future
tax revenue.
Even absent such dire circumstances, taxes play an important role in today’s
economies. Since the year 2000, the average tax-to-GDP ratio in OECD countries
has remained fairly stable while ranging between 32% and 34% (OECD 2020). Also
in non-OECD countries, taxes play a substantial role. As of 2015, the average tax-to-
GDP ratio across a sample of 16 African countries was 19.1%, while 25 Latin American
and Caribbean countries experienced an average ratio of 23.1% (Modica et al. 2018).
When governments or policymakers decide to levy a tax, they mainly do so for three
reasons. First, tax revenues finance governmental expenditures. Besides mitigating
adverse crisis effects, the tax revenue collected enables governments to perform their
core duties such as maintaining and enhancing infrastructure or providing public ed-
ucation. Second, taxes on income and wealth are the main tools to redistribute from
rich to poor taxpayers. In recent years, the debate about marginal and average tax
rates, especially for the top 1%, has renewed the interest in taxation as a tool to reduce
inequality (e.g. Saez and Zucman 2019b). Third, taxes are levied to correct for market
failure induced by externalities. Carbon emission taxes, as discussed in “Green New




While some taxes, like those on carbon dioxide emissions, are designed in a way
that taxpayers’ behavioral responses to them are desired, this is not universally
true. Nonetheless, taxes change taxpayers’ incentives and, thus, affect their economic
choices.
For example, when the infamous window tax was introduced by King William III in
17th century England, tenants, who faced the legal burden of the tax, simply avoided
tax payments by bricking up windows (Oates and Schwab 2015). Even today, English
houses are still sprinkled with bricked up windows, highlighting the long-lasting excess
burden that this particular tax, and responses to it, have had.
While avoiding taxes is considered the legal way of reducing the tax liability, taxpay-
ers might also respond to taxation by outright evasion. For example, to escape tax
payments on income and wealth, various citizens from developed countries (Alstad-
sæter et al. 2019) and developing countries (Londoño-Velez and Ávila-Mahecha 2020)
alike hide parts of their resources in offshore financial centers without reporting it to
the respective tax authorities.
Similarly, taxpayers might also decide not to file a tax return, thereby averting the
interaction with the formal tax system. While this is a concern in many developing
countries (see e.g. Figure 1 in Brockmeyer et al. 2019), recent evidence suggests that
this is also a sizeable issue in developed countries. For example, estimates suggest
that about 48% of taxpayers required to file a city tax return in Detroit did not do so
(Meiselman 2018).
These three behavioral responses to taxation – avoidance, evasion, and non-filing –
are at the core of this dissertation. Chapter 1 adds to the theoretical literature on
multinational firms’ tax avoidance and the measures taken by high-tax countries to
limit profit shifting. Specifically, this chapter discusses the implications of introducing
countermeasures by tax havens that limit the effectiveness of anti profit shifting poli-
cies. Chapter 2 contributes to the large literature on policy interventions to limit tax
evasion. By empirically evaluating the recent tool of enforcement focus lists, insights
on the usability and the optimal design thereof can be drawn. Chapter 3 examines
an optional filing system that offers taxpayers a legal way to abstain from filing an
income tax return. In this chapter, the consequences of this system for the distribu-
tion of non-filers and for effective taxation are presented. Additionally, two reforms
of the optional filing system are discussed that highlight potential gains for equity
or efficiency. All three chapters are based on individual essays and can therefore be
read independently. Chapter 1 is theoretical work, while chapters 2 and 3 use micro
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data on German taxpayers. In the following, I provide a brief overview of the relevant
literature that each chapter adds to before giving the most important results.
Chapter 1 adds to the ongoing discussion about multinational firms’ tax avoidance
and the countermeasures used by high-tax countries to limit profit shifting. In con-
trast to purely domestic firms, multinationals benefit from being located in multiple
jurisdictions. For instance, highly profitable intellectual property can be located in a
country with lower tax rates or prices for intra-firm trades can be adjusted such that
less profit arises in high-tax countries. Recent research suggests that tax havens play
a particularly large role in multinationals’ potential to avoid tax payments in high tax
countries (Tørsløv et al. 2018).
Both researchers and policymakers have been aware of tax havens’ role for at least two
decades. In 1998, the OECD published a report on Harmful Tax Competition (OECD
1998), which propelled the use of a number instruments, such as tax information
exchange agreements and blacklists, which are intended to limit the tax haven business
model. However, these tools seem to be rather ineffective. For example, when the
European Union’s list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions was first published in 2017,
a number of countries that were expected to end up on this list were put on a less salient
“greylist”.1
Previous research has focused mostly on the determinants under which the instruments
are likely to be effective (see e.g. Bacchetta and Espinosa 1995, 2000, for work on tax
information exchange agreements) or on the effects of general policies (e.g. Picard
and Pieretti 2011; Pieretti and Pulina 2017). However, these articles largely ignore
the possibility that tax havens could use countermeasures against onshore countries’
policies to limit profit shifting. This is surprising, given the fact that other work has
shown that tax havens are small but well-governed countries (Dharmapala and Hines
2009).
Chapter 1 starts from this observation. It incorporates responses by well-governed
tax havens in a theoretical two-country model. In this model, a high-tax country
competes with a tax haven for mobile profits. While the high-tax country can exert
pressure on its domestic profit shifting multinationals, the tax haven can lobby against
this and thereby reduce the effective pressure experienced by the multinational firms.
The results show that pressure exerted by onshore countries and offshore lobbying are
strategic substitutes. Thus, if high-tax countries would increase their efforts to close
1See https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42237315 (last accessed: 2021-02-23) for an exem-
plary news report about the initial publication of the EU’s list.
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down tax havens, there would be less lobbying against profit shifting rules. However,
there is an extensive margin incentive for tax havens to use these countermeasures.
Furthermore, contrary to intuition, when initially high costs for shifting profits de-
crease, less firms shift profits. This is because of the countries’ optimal tax responses.
For the high-tax country, this cost reduction can be thought of as an increase in the
elasticity of the tax base. Thus, tax rates on profits are reduced. For initially high
levels of shifting costs, this indirect effect of a reduced tax rate outweighs the direct
effect of less expensive profit shifting. Then, more firms stay onshore. Expanding this
model to incorporate a second tax haven demonstrates that the individual tax havens
reduce their lobbying effort, i.e. there is free-riding, but aggregate lobbying increases.
Chapter 2 discusses a second way to respond to taxation – tax evasion. The most
important form of tax evasion is under-reporting of income. According to recent
estimates, 80% of the United States’ tax gap is due to under-reported income (Internal
Revenue Service 2019). While tax evasion can be individually rational, especially in
environments with low detection probabilities, it leads to sizeable revenue losses for
governments.
Given the large empirical literature that evolved in recent years, there is a consensus on
the most effective interventions to reduce tax evasion. The larger the degree of third-
party reporting, the larger the detection probability of evasion and, consequently,
the higher tax compliance (e.g. Kleven et al. 2011). Also, sending taxpayers letters
with audit threats (e.g. Slemrod et al. 2001) and the audits themselves (e.g. Advani
et al. 2019) significantly reduce tax evasion. Yet, third-party reporting might not be
available for all income sources and audits, or the threat thereof, are often prohibitively
expensive when expanded to all taxpayers.
In chapter 2, I empirically assess the effectiveness of enforcement focus lists, a new
low-cost, population-wide tool to potentially reduce tax evasion and to complement
the effective but expensive measures mentioned before. The lists, published by local
revenue agencies, contain income categories, or particular line items, that are focal
points in the tax filing process. To examine whether this intervention reduces tax
evasion, I use the variation induced by the introduction of these lists in a German
state combined with a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Assuming that
enforcement focus lists shift the perceived detection probability, changes in reported
income in the treatment group can be interpreted as traces of tax evasion. I show
that, empirically, the introduction of the enforcement focus lists had a limited direct
effect and only increased reported income in three out of seven income categories.
4
Preface
Furthermore, total taxable income only increases significantly for those taxpayers
facing higher scrutiny with respect to capital income. One noteworthy exception is the
easily verifiable commuting cost deduction line item, which is explicitly mentioned in
the (first) enforcement focus list. Treated taxpayers immediately reduce their reported
deduction with a significant and stable effect for the remainder of the study period.
Chapter 3 examines the consequences that optional filing rules, i.e. tax systems with
a legal form of non-filing, have for effective taxation. Related to the introductory
example, more than thirty countries worldwide feature some form of optional tax
filing, explicitly exempting their wage earning individual taxpayers from the duty to
file an income tax return (see Table C.1). In the presence of third-party reporting and
automatic withholding, there is little worry for tax authorities to forgo tax revenue
from non-filers. For individual taxpayers, the benefits of such a system are unclear.
When expected refunds are small and filing costs are large, such systems can be an
improvement relative to a general tax filing duty. On the other hand, taxpayers might
not be aware of their expected refunds and forgo sizeable amounts of money.
Surprisingly, previous work in the realm of individual tax filing has mostly focused
on non-filers in the US. Researchers have characterized non-filers (e.g. Erard and Ho
2001; Fullerton and Rao 2019), analyzed interventions that increase tax filing (e.g.
Guyton et al. 2017), and examined the lasting benefits that go along with tax filing (e.g.
Ramnath and Tong 2017). Recently, Benzarti (2020) highlights that when deciding
about whether or not to itemize deductions, i.e. at the intensive margin of tax filing,
taxpayers exhibit rational behavior. However, none of these contributions explicitly
consider the effects for effective taxation when taxpayers have the legal right not to file
an income tax return. In this chapter, which is based on unpublished work conducted
in collaboration with Luisa Wallossek, a doctoral student at the University of Munich,
we aim to address this gap.
To do so, we exploit the optional filing system for wage earners in Germany using cross-
sectional micro data. We show that low income wage earners are overrepresented
among the set of non-filers, despite being hurt relatively hardest. Below the basic
allowance threshold, where the non-filing share is as high as 90%, non-filers with over-
remittances face an effective average tax rate of 5%, despite a statutory rate of zero.
In 2014, all over-remittances add up to a total of at least 949 millione, or 118e per
capita. Comparing these numbers to monetary filing cost estimates suggests that other
frictions are relatively more important. Consequently, we argue that policymakers
should automatically refund over-remitted taxes, or reduce informational frictions
5
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regarding filing as a second-best, if their aim is to realign statutory and effective
taxation. If, however, the effective taxation currently observed is the policymakers’
aim, we show that there would be a more efficient way to achieve the same effective tax
burden. In our hypothetical system, the same distribution of average tax rates could
be achieved by a different system of marginal tax rates. This would result in fewer
distortions and, under some assumptions, even create labor supply incentives.
6
Chapter 1
Lobbying and the International
Fight Against Tax Havens
This chapter is based on a single-authored publication. See Hauck (2019) for the full reference of
the published version.
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Lobbying and the International Fight Against Tax Havens
1.1 Introduction
In the past few years, revelations such as the Panama Papers and the Offshore Leaks
reinvigorated the discussion about the persistent existence of tax havens. Simulta-
neously, several studies highlighted the economic importance of tax havens. Tørsløv
et al. (2018) estimate the global tax revenue loss that is due to profit shifting to tax
havens at roughly e 200 billion. Furthermore, Alstadsæter et al. (2019) emphasize
the role that tax havens have in fueling wealth inequality in rich countries.
Efforts to fight tax havens can be traced back to as early as 1998, when the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published its report on
Harmful Tax Competition (OECD 1998). As a consequence, many actions, such as the
widespread introduction of tax information exchange agreements (TIEA), withhold-
ing taxes on interest payments (e.g. the EU Tax Savings Directive), or the Action Plan
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (OECD 2013a,b) followed suit. Most recently, the
European Union (EU) published the “EU list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions” in
December 2017. The publication of this list exemplifies the seemingly low effective-
ness of the measures mentioned above. Several countries, which were expected to be
on the EU’s blacklist, did not end up there.
For example, the British Virgin Islands (BVIs) were not part of this blacklist and were
only added to a less salient accompanying greylist several months later. This is despite
ample evidence that the BVIs have been among the most important centers for tax
avoidance. Most prominently, more than half of the offshore entities incorporated by
Mossack Fonseca, the firm whose records were at the center of the Panama Papers,
were in the BVI.1
The reason for this seemingly ineffective behavior can be found in offshore lobbying,
conducted either by politically or historically linked EU member states or by the
respective tax havens themselves. For example, several British Overseas Territories
hired public relation companies or approached politically relevant representatives to
make their case both in London and Brussels. More specifically, the Cayman Islands
hired a member of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords as their UK representative.2
A second example is given by the United Kingdom’s efforts to shield Bermuda, one of
1See https://www.icij.org/investigations/panama-papers/explore-panama-papers-
key-figures/ (last accessed: 2021-02-17) for more information.
2See https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-04-19/tax-havens-
boost-their-lobbying-efforts (last accessed: 2021-02-17).
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Google’s main profit hubs, from being put on the same blacklist.3 Sven Giegold, the
financial and economic policy spokesperson of the Green Parties in the European Par-
liament, summarized this as follows:
“In the shadow of the opaque Code of Conduct Group, Member States successfully
lobbied to get their own dependencies and overseas territories off the hook.”4
In this paper, I aim to explain the existence and the effects of offshore lobbying by em-
ploying a theoretical two country model with a three-stage game. The main argument
is that offshore lobbying, which has thus far not been considered in the literature, is a
reason for the empirical results and the anecdotal evidence presented.5 At the core of
this model are two simultaneous choices by the tax revenue-maximizing governments
which are in stage one and two of the game: The onshore and the offshore country de-
cide about their level of pressure and lobbying respectively, before setting tax rates;
then, firms with heterogeneous shifting costs decide whether to engage in profit shift-
ing or not.
The main results of the model are as follows. There exists an extensive margin incentive
for tax havens to engage in international lobbying when the onshore country is unable
to fully eliminate profit shifting. Generally, the usage of one country’s policy tool
decreases the effectiveness of the other country’s policy. Hence, onshore pressure and
offshore lobbying are found to be strategic substitutes.
Furthermore, when starting at high costs of profit shifting, a reduction in these costs
leads to a smaller number of profit-shifting firms. In this case, there are two counter-
vailing effects at work. First, there is the mechanical direct cost reduction for firms.
Second, the reduction in profit-shifting costs induces the onshore country to reduce
its tax rate. Consequently, the tax rate differential between the onshore and the off-
shore country shrinks. This second effect is larger in size when profit-shifting costs are
initially high and therefore more firms remain onshore.
3See https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jan/30/google-tory-battle-
protect-30bn-tax-haven-bermuda (last accessed: 2021-02-17) for more information.
4See https://sven-giegold.de/tax-havens-eu-finance-ministers-agree-on-
whitewashed-blacklist/ (last accessed: 2021-02-17).
5I deviate from lobbying in a common-agency model as established by Grossmann and Helpman
(1994). In this paper, I abstract from a microfoundation of lobbying and from potential lobbying by
multinational firms. However, as tax havens’ sole source of revenue is to provide shelter for profits,
I assume these countries have a genuine interest to protect their business model and ultimately do
so by engaging in international lobbying. In this paper, I consider this lobbying in a reduced form.
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When generalizing the model to allow for a second tax haven, the resulting equilib-
rium pressure level for the onshore country is higher, as the marginal benefit of apply-
ing pressure rises. Concerning the tax havens, the overall level of lobbying is higher,
whereas each country’s lobbying level falls. This is the case as one tax haven benefits
indirectly from the lobbying efforts of the other country, as lobbying reduces the ef-
fectiveness of pressure. Hence, both offshore countries will set less than their original
lobbying from the single tax haven case.
My analysis relates to two areas of research.6 The first one concerns the various mea-
sures used against profit shifting. Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000) are two seminal
contributions with respect to TIEAs that examine the conditions under which TIEAs
are more likely to form. Elsayyad (2012) examines the determinants for TIEAs in a
generalized Nash bargaining model with cost free onshore pressure. More recently,
Dharmapala (2016) analyzes the effects of the unilateral Foreign Account Tax Com-
pliance Act by the United States.7 Onshore pressure policies, that is, blacklisting and
“naming and shaming”, are additional tools in the fight against tax havens and have
also been discussed by other authors. Picard and Pieretti (2011) look at pressure con-
ditions under which offshore financial centers voluntarily comply to monitor their in-
vestment. A more general point is made by Elsayyad and Konrad (2012). They argue
why a big-bang-approach is more efficient than the sequential approach of closing down
tax havens when facing internationally mobile profits. Konrad and Stolper (2016)
stress the importance of individual beliefs in the fight against tax havens. Pieretti
and Pulina (2017) have introduced pressure policies as an additional instrument in the
fight against tax havens. They argue that real economic activity by onshore multina-
tionals can be sufficiently important for their home government, such that the efficient
level of pressure lies below the level that would eliminate profit shifting.
The present model builds on the approach by Pieretti and Pulina (2017) regarding its
use of onshore pressure but it differs in two important dimensions. First, Pieretti and
Pulina (2017) allow for real economic activity in the tax haven. This is not the case in
this model. Here, a tax haven’s only business model is to shield profits from taxation
for a lump-sum payment. Second, adding the lobbying policy allows the offshore
6There is also a literature on international taxation and interest groups (see e.g. Chu et al.
2015; Janeba and Schjelderup 2009; Lai 2010, 2019). In contrast to this study, these authors have
looked at domestic interest groups rather than offshore lobbying.
7Empirical contributions in this respect are from Ligthart and Voget (2009) and Bilicka and
Fuest (2014). The latter examines the determinants of TIEAs between countries, the former looks
at the determinants of information exchange requests from Dutch tax offices.
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country to directly counteract the onshore government’s pressure policy. In Pieretti
and Pulina (2017), there is no direct countervailing measure to onshore pressure.
A further related area of research concerns the welfare effects of tax havens.8 In con-
trast to the contributions such as Tørsløv et al. (2018), Alstadsæter et al. (2019),
and Slemrod and Wilson (2009), which highlight the negative effects of tax havens,
there are valid arguments against fighting tax havens. Hong and Smart (2010) find
that tax havens create a welfare-enhancing possibility for international tax planing.
Wilson (2005) argues more generally why competition for mobile capital can be wel-
fare improving. Rose and Spiegel (2007) find that offshore financial centers can have
procompetitive effects on onshore monopolists, and Picard and Pieretti (2011) find
positive effects for institutional competition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model,
its results, and the comparative statics. Section 1.3 adds a second tax haven to the
model. Section 1.4 examines two additional extensions before Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
The model contains two countries H and F , denoting the onshore and the offshore
country, respectively.9 Furthermore, there is a continuum of firms, all residing in
H. The firms differ in their propensity to conduct profit-shifting activity, which is
captured by the shifting cost parameter xi for firm i. This characteristic is uniformly
distributed over the [0, 1] interval with density dF (x).
A firm that wants to offshore profits faces transaction costs, for example, due to in-
ternal restructuring, amounting to kxi, where k > 0 represents an inverse measure of
international financial integration. The higher k, the more frictions are present in the
financial market.
If a given firm decides to offshore profits, these profits only face a fixed fee ft ≥ 0
offshore. This is set by the tax haven’s government and represents filing costs and the
like. In contrast, in the onshore country, there is a proportional tax rate t ∈ [0, 1] for
profits. There is no coordination between the two countries about their tax rates.
Furthermore, the domestic country decides about a level of pressure α > 0 that is
8Arguments that go beyond the tax competition literature are summarized by Schjelderup
(2016).
9Note that in this study I will use “offshore country” and “tax haven” interchangeably.
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applied to all firms that engage in profit-shifting activities. Examples for this pressure
are a “naming and shaming”10 approach or an increase in costs for shifting profits
offshore due to a TIEA between the onshore and the offshore country.
Pressure α causes quadratic costs in the amount of α
2
2
g, where g represents an inverse
efficiency parameter of pressure. The first time an onshore country publicly denounces
a tax haven, and thereby the firms that are active there, is effective. However, the more
denouncements an onshore country publishes, the costlier it gets to achieve the same
effectiveness. This is the case as economic agents update their expectations.11 This
makes a further increase of pressure more costly.
On the contrary, the offshore country decides about how much to lobby. In this context,
lobbying is mainly motivated by the anecdotal evidence presented in the introduction
and the disconnect between several measures used in the fight against tax havens and
their apparent ineffectiveness. One way to think about lobbying activities can be the
hiring of public relations agencies or lobbyists. Alternatively, lobbying can be thought
of as using historical or political ties to have other countries make a tax haven’s case.
I model lobbying as reducing the effective pressure to αγ, with 0 < γ ≤ 1. Hence, the




ρ, where ρ is an inverse measure for the efficiency of lobbying. These
convex costs for lobbying can be motivated by the increasing difficulty to conduct
successful lobbying. Although the costs for (temporarily) avoiding the status of a
blacklistedcountrymight indeedbe limited, lobbyingagainstbroaderandmoregeneral
measures, as for example laid out in the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS)
Action plan, are over-proportionally costlier.12
Thetimingof themodel canbe seen inFigure1.1. In thefirst stage, governments choose
pressure and lobbying, before deciding about tax rates in the second stage. Firms
decide in the last stage. This structure is intended to reflect the long-term dimension
of the decision to become a tax haven. International policies are more time-intensive
and are therefore more long-term in nature. Hence, the sequence of deciding about
national policies at a later stage seems sensible. Furthermore, assuming simultaneity
for the first two stages is a natural assumption. It remains questionable whether
10See, for example, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) for a study implicating that stock prices decrease
if a firm’s aggressive tax behavior is covered in a major news outlet.
11Following the argumentation by Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), once a firm’s tax haven usage
is public knowledge future denouncements should have no effect on the firm’s stock price.
12I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out a possible second interpretation. When onshore
countries renew their lists, it becomes increasingly difficult for tax havens to stay off such a list.
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economically relevant onshore countries move first and offshore countries react by
lobbying (or setting taxes) afterward or if well-organized tax havens anticipate the
offshore pressuring (tax rate).13
1.2.1 Third Stage: Firms’ Decisions
In the last stage of the game, firms take the policy parameters as given and only decide
whether or not to shift profits abroad. It is assumed that the gross income of any firm
is given by Π = sπx + hπx, where s represents the immobile share of profits and h the
mobile share of profits. Hence, it holds that s+ h = 1.
For the purpose of tax planing, the multinational firm compares the different payoffs.
When shifting profits abroad the net profit is V Fx = πx − ft − kxi − αγ. The effective
level of pressure diminishes the firm’s profit directly. The profit in the domestic country
is the profit net of the proportional tax: V Hx = (1− t)πx. Without loss of generality, I
assume that πx = 1.
Hence, equalizing the two net-profit functions V Fx and V
H
x yields the marginal profit-
shifting firm x, with
13See Stöwhase (2013) for a related case with Stackelberg competition.
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x =
t− ft − αγ
k
. (1.1)
As seen above, the number of profit-shifting firms is positively linked with the tax rate
differential t− ft. The higher it is, the more firms engage in profit shifting. For higher
levels of effective pressure αγ and for more frictions in the financial market k, fewer
firms shift their profits abroad.
It is noteworthy that reactions to changes in the tax rate differential and the effective
pressure are scaled by the financial market frictions k. The higher is k, the lower is
the reaction to a change in these parameters. Hence, the higher is k, the lower is each
firm’s elasticity with respect to changes in the tax rates and the effective pressure.
1.2.2 Second Stage: Tax Rates
In the second stage, both countries decide upon the respective tax rates t and ft. Given
that firms try to minimize their tax burden by shifting profits, which is associated with
tax revenue losses for the onshore country, I assume a Leviathan objective function for
the onshore government. Although this is a simplification, it implies that for the subset
of corporate profits shifted to other countries, the onshore country only cares about
repatriating these tax revenues.14 As there are no firms residing in the tax haven, I
also assume a tax revenue-maximizing strategy for the offshore country, as this is the
most important way to generate funds for this government.


















The tax revenue in equation (1.2) is dependent on the immobile share of profits s and
the mobile shares h that remain in the country. This is then multiplied by the onshore
country’s proportional tax rate t. Pressure is costly and has to be deducted from the
tax revenue.
Applying the uniform distribution property for x, plugging in the equilibrium value x
and taking the first-order derivative results in the best-response tax rate tbr as follows:
14For an extension taking into account domestic net firm profits, see Section 1.4.1
14















+ ft + αγ
)
. (1.3b)
The onshore country’s best-response function is positively dependent on the level of
financial frictions k. As lower levels of integration make profit shifting less attractive,
the onshore country moves closer to full taxation of profits. This is, however, scaled by
the mobile share of capital, h. For high levels ofh, that is, a high share of mobile profits,
the effect of frictions on the best-response tax rate is smaller compared with lower levels
of h. Hence, the onshore country cares about the size of mobile profits. As both the
offshore country’s fee ft and the effective pressure level αγ diminish the incentives to
shift profits offshore, the onshore country’s best-response tax rate increases.















The first part represents the income from the lump-sum tax for onshore profit-shifting
activity. The second term represents the convex lobbying costs that arise. Again,
applying the uniform distribution property for x and plugging in x gives the best-


















As is seen by equations (1.5b) and (1.3b), the tax rates are strategic complements.
When plugging one into another, the equilibrium values for both tax rates, t∗ and f ∗t ,
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The comparative statics for these results are quite intuitive. The offshore country’s
tax rate decreases with increasing effective pressure αγ to offset the negative effect
that an increase of pressure has on the number of profit-shifting firms. The opposite
holds for the onshore country. More effective pressure leads to higher levels of t. If the
marginal firm now stays onshore, due to higher αγ, there is some leeway to increase
tax revenue by increasing the tax rate.
The level of shiftable profits h negatively influences both tax rates. An increasing
amount of shiftable profits exerts downward pressure on onshore tax rates. This is
seen by inspection of equation (1.3b). When a large part of the possible tax base is
mobile, having a higher tax rate leads to more profits being shifted. Hence, the onshore
country reduces its tax rate.
Interestingly, for higher levels of financial frictions, both tax rates rise. This is due to
two effects. First, an increase in k increases every firm’s cost of shifting profits offshore.
Hence, the previously marginal firm now stays onshore. This leads to a pure positive
income effect on onshore tax revenue without a change in the tax rate. However, as
pointed out previously, an increase in k reduces the elasticity of firms with respect to
the policy parameters. Therefore, the onshore country finds it optimal to increase the
tax rate t further.
For the offshore country, the effect is the opposite. An increase in k reduces the number
of firms and leads to a mechanical decrease in tax revenues. However, as the onshore
country increases its tax rate, the offshore country can raise its fee as well, while
remaining attractive for onshore profit-shifting firms.
Finally, x can be simplified for further use by plugging in the values obtained in (1.6)







The nonnegativity constraint for the lump-sum fee in equation (1.6) and the require-
ment for a nonnegative number of profit-shifting firms in equation (1.7) give the upper
limit of pressure at αup = k
h
, for the maximum case of γ = 1.
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1.2.3 First Stage: Pressure and Lobbying
Turning now to the first stage of the game,15 by incorporating previous results the
















































For (1.9) and (1.11) to be the best-response equilibrium levels of pressure and lobbying,
two sufficient conditions have to be fulfilled: The costs of exerting pressure have to be
sufficiently large, that is, g > 2h
9k
. Similarly, the costs of offshore lobbying have to be
sufficiently large as well, ρ > 2k
9h2
. Appendix A.1 examines this in more depth. This
result is summarized in Proposition 1.1:
Proposition 1.1 There exists a Nash equilibrium for both policy parameters, with
the respective best-response functions given by (1.8) for onshore pressure and by
(1.11) for offshore lobbying, if the following two sufficient (but not necessary) con-
ditions are fulfilled:
(i) g > 2h
9k
, that is, using the pressure policy is sufficiently costly and
(ii) ρ > 2k
9h2
, that is, offshore lobbying is sufficiently costly.
This equilibrium constitutes an interior equilibrium with 0 < α∗ < αup = k
h
and
0 < γ∗ < 1, if pressure costs are sufficiently high such that
15For the more detailed analysis, please consult Appendix A.1.
17
Lobbying and the International Fight Against Tax Havens
(iii) g > 2h
3k
.
For cases in which (i) and (ii) are fulfilled, but not (iii) (2h
9k
< g ≤ 2h
3k
), a corner
solution with γ∗ = 1 and α = αup = k
h
results.
Proof. Appendix A.1 shows that if both sufficient conditions are fulfilled, there
exists an equilibrium. It further derives the condition for g to constitute an interior
equilibrium.
The assumption for high pressure costs is sensible, when following the arguments by
Schjelderup (2016). Tax havens provide secrecy services and therefore increase the
costs for onshore governments to tax onshore multinationals’ profits. It is a quite
regular phenomenon that multinationals adapt their profit-shifting tactics once a pre-
vious loophole has been found and closed by the onshore government.
The sufficient condition foroffshore lobbyingcosts couldbe rationalizedbythe inherent
complexity of finding a public relations firm or a spokesperson that is willing to make
a tax haven’s case. A second explanation could be a related complexity with which
historically or politically connected countries would be approached to speak on behalf
of a tax haven.
Intuitively, both sufficiency conditions can be linked to the ratio of shiftable profits h
to financial market frictions k. For condition (i), if the share of shiftable profits h (or
the financial market frictions k) becomes to large (small), then pressure needs to be
sufficiently costly to ensure an equilibrium. To arrive at an interior solution, the costs
of applying pressure have to be three times as large as for the sufficiency condition of
the existence of an equilibrium.
For offshore lobbying, the relationship is the opposite. The higher the share of shiftable
profits h, the lower the costs for lobbying can be while still achieving an (interior)
equilibrium.
Figure 1.2 depicts a numerical example for the best-response functions of pressure
(1.9) and lobbying (1.11). It is clearly visible that either in the case of no pressure at





no lobbying, that is, γ = 1. Also, high levels of lobbying, that is, low levels of γ, are
associated with low levels of onshore pressure.
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Figure 1.2: First Stage Equilibrium




















Parameters: financial frictions k = 1
4
, share of shiftable profits h = 1
2
, pressure efficiency parameter g = 2.5,
lobbying efficiency parameter ρ = 2.5. Own illustration.
1.2.4 Comparative Statics
As regards comparative statics, the change in financial integration (k) as well as an
efficiency change in the offshore cost-effectiveness (ρ) and the onshore costs (g) are ex-
amined. As the previous results are not given explicitly, the implicit function theorem
is applied.



























Throughout, I assume that direct effects outweigh indirect effects and thus |D| > 0.16
Onshore Cost Efficiency g As regards the onshore pressure costs, comparative
static results are in line with regular expectations. As seen in equation (1.13), an
increase in the cost of the pressure policy tool is associated with a decrease in the usage
of this policy instrument.
16See Appendix A.2 for more comments.
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< 0 . (1.13)
For the offshore country, the result is the opposite. An increase in the cost of onshore















< 0 . (1.14)
Offshore Cost Efficiency ρ The effect for an increase in the costs for offshore















> 0 . (1.15)
Remembering that the first cell in the top left corner is negative, it holds that the main
diagonal is positive. Hence, the overall effect is positive; that is, there is less lobbying.
Thus, if the policy instrument becomes more expensive, the government is reluctant









> 0 . (1.16)
An increase in the level of offshore lobbying costs increases the level of onshore pressure.
The onshore country anticipates the lower level of lobbying and therefore finds it
optimal to apply more pressure to keep more firms within its boundary.
To sum those two parts up, it is easy to see that the level of pressure and the level of
lobbying are strategic substitutes. If the cost for one policy parameter increases, the
respective measures are used less intensively. In turn, the other country’s measure
is used more intensively. Along the arguments from Bulow et al. (1985), a decrease
of the other country’s policy tool (due to higher costs) leads to an increase in the
marginal benefit for the country not affected by the cost increase. Hence, the latter
finds it beneficial to increase the use of its policy tool until the first-order condition
20
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holds again. In different words, an increase in one country’s cost of the policy tool is
directly affecting its own marginal benefit and indirectly affecting the other country’s
marginal benefit.
Financial Integration k The most interesting comparative statics result is found
by looking at a change in frictions in the international financial market, hence a change


















< 0 . (1.17)
Note that the equilibrium tax rate t∗ as given by equation (1.6) is an increasing function
in k. Therefore, if k increases, so does the onshore tax rate, which in turn increases
each firm’s incentive for shifting profits. This increase in t∗ for all firms outweighs the
cost increase in firm specific costs kxi that has made the marginal firm abstaining from

















< 0 . (1.18)
For the offshore country, the effect is the opposite. An increase in financial frictions
makes the offshore country relatively attractive, as the tax rate differential t − ft in-
creases. Hence, there are more incentives for onshore firms to shift profits. Nonethe-
less, the offshore country also increases its tax rate
∂f∗t
∂k
> 0, as seen in equation (1.6).
This increase in tax revenue releases further funds for increasing lobbying and thus
makes the offshore country even more attractive.
Obviously, the effects are reversed for reductions in k. This means that with a higher
degree of globalization, the onshore country intensifies its pressure ( ∂α
∗
∂−k > 0) and the
offshore country lobbies less ( ∂γ
∗
∂−k > 0). This is particularly interesting, when one
looks at the number of firms that are engaged in profit shifting and how this changes
with higher levels of globalization.
17Note that I consider an increase in financial frictions (increase in k), the opposite is true for
a decrease in financial frictions, a decrease in k. The latter is what people usually refer to as
economic integration.
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Number of Profit-Shifting Firms The effect of financial integration on the equi-
librium level of profit-shifting firms, that is, the total derivative of x with respect to





















Q 0 . (1.19b)
Asseenabove, the resultingeffect is cruciallydependentontheexisting leveloffinancial
market frictions k. Remember that there are two effects at work, when k decreases.
First, the elasticity of firms with respect to the tax rate increases, and thus the onshore
country sets a lower tax rate. Second, there is a mechanical cost reduction effect on the
firm level, as kxi falls. Although the first leads the firms to stay onshore, the second
one does the opposite. Hence, there exists a cutoff point k̂ below which a reduction in








Therefore, international integration need not necessarily be bad for the onshore coun-
try. When the indirect effect associated with international integration, namely a lower
tax rate, is sufficiently larger than the direct cost reduction for firms, then there is a
possibility for a lower number of profit-shifting firms. On the contrary, when the ef-
fect of a reduction in k on the firm level (via the heterogeneous costs) outweighs the
effect of the change in economic environment, there will be more profit shifting. This
is true for a reduction of low values of k. This is summarized in Proposition 2:
Proposition 1.2 If the level of international frictions is sufficiently large, that is,
k > k̂, a marginal reduction in frictions decreases the number of profit-shifting firms.
On the contrary, if k < k̂, more financial integration results in a higher number of
profit-shifting firms.
Proof. See equations (1.19) and (1.20) for the formal results.
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1.3 Multiple Tax Havens
1.3.1 Third Stage
In this section, I consider the case with two tax havens. The main question now is
whether the sum of the individual country’s lobbying levels is larger than the lobbying
effort in the initial setup. Furthermore, the second insight is to examine whether the
onshore country’s pressure level rises or decreases, relative to the case with one tax
haven.
To this end, I employ a generalized version of the previous model. Now, firm profits
are divided up between three countries. There is a fraction s that is immobile and two
shares h1 and h2 that are bilaterally mobile to the respective tax havens Fl and Fm,
m, l = (1, 2).18 It holds that 1 = s+ h1 + h2.






indicating the firm-specific costs of shifting parts of their profits to either of the two
tax havens.19 For the sake of simplicity, I assume that financial frictions are the same
worldwide. Furthermore, I assume that the pressure exerted cannot be varied on the
country level. Although this is a restricting assumption, there are valid reasons why
countries cannot discriminate between tax havens.20 The potential profits of each firm








(1− t)(s+ h1 + h1) if x1i ∈ (x1; 1] & x2i ∈ (x2; 1],
(1− t)(s+ h2) + (1− ft1 − αγ1 − kx1i )h1 if x1i ∈ (0;x1] & x2i ∈ (x2; 1],
(1− t)(s+ h1) + (1− ft2 − αγ2 − kx2i )h2 if x1i ∈ (x1; 1] & x2i ∈ (0;x2],
(1− t)(s) + (1− ft1 − αγ1 − kx1i )h1
+(1− ft2 − αγ2 − kx2i )h2
if x1i ∈ (0;x1] & x2i ∈ (0;x2] ,
(1.21)
where the cutoffs are given by
x1 =
t− ft1 − αγ1
k
, x2 =
t− ft2 − αγ2
k
. (1.22)
18For this part I abstract from fully mobile profits. Section 1.4.2 examines an extension with
two different cases of tax competition.
19I do not assume any form of correlation between the two cost parameters within a firm.
20When looking at countries on blacklists, such as the OECD’s, there is no way to discriminate
between countries that are within one category.
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No ShiftingShift to TH 1 only
Shift to TH 2 only
Notes: Distribution of firms into the different profit shifting schemes. Four outcomes are possible: Either no shifting,
complete shifting, or shifting to only one of the two tax havens (TH).
The intuition for the different profits in equation (1.21) is fairly obvious. As the profit-
shifting decision into one country is distinct from the shifting decision into the second
country, firms will face a choice set of four actions.
When the firm is neither efficient in shifting profits into haven one nor into haven two,
all profits will remain in the onshore country (first line). The second line describes the
case in which the firm finds it optimal to shift profits to F1 but not to F2. The third
line represents the opposite case. In the last case, firms shift all mobile profits to the
respective haven. Thus, only the immobile share of profits remains onshore. This is
summarized graphically in Figure 1.3.
1.3.2 Second and First Stage















There are now two different mobile parts of the onshore multinational’s profit that
have weights h1 and h2. For the individual tax haven l, the tax revenue function looks
very similar to the one seen in the previous part:
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Solving for the first-order conditions and inserting the equilibrium values into one
another yields the optimal onshore tax rate t̃∗ and the optimal offshore lump-sum fee

















The equilibrium onshore tax rate t̃∗ is still positively associated with higher levels of
effective pressure. It is easy to see that the individual offshore lump-sum fee for country
l now also depends on the actions by countrym. When assuming symmetric countries
in terms of their lobbying, that is, γm = γl, then the negative spillover on the fee by
country l prevails, as the interior bracket turns negative. However, when countries
are quite different and residing lobbying levels vary such that 3γl > γm, then there is
an overall positive effect from the other country.21 Put differently, the high lobbying
effort by country l allows tax haven m to increase its lump-sum fee.










For the equilibrium number of profit-shifting firms, there is again a spillover effect
of the other country’s lobbying. For the benchmark case of symmetric tax havens,
that is, γl = γm, the interior bracket remains positive. Hence, the positive effect of
the own lobbying prevails. However, when the difference in lobbying levels is rather
pronounced, γm > 3γl, the interior bracket becomes negative.
Note that this bracket is reversed to the interior bracket seen in equation (1.25). This
is quite intuitive. Assuming that γm > 3γl, that is, country l experiences a large
spillover effect for the lump-sum fee and thus finds it optimal to raise this fee. In
21For example, it might be the case that there is one tax haven which has significantly low costs
of lobbying and therefore lobbies quite intensively. The offshore country with high costs benefits
from this by being able to set a higher lump-sum fee.
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turn, this reduces the number of firms that shift profits to this country, as higher
fees make profit shifting to this shore less attractive. This last point is observed in
equation (1.27). Furthermore, note that equation (1.27) nests the single tax haven
number of profit-shifting firms as given by equation (1.7), assuming equal lobbying
levels (γl = γm) and h = hl + hm.
When turning to the first stage of the game, I assume symmetric offshore countries
for the sake of simplicity. Symmetry hereby refers to both countries enjoying the
same share of attainable profits, hm = hl, and the same cost-effectiveness of lobbying,
ρl = ρm. This in turn implies that both countries will set the same level of lobbying.
Hence, examining one tax haven is sufficient. Following the tax revenue-maximization
approaches given in equations (1.23) and (1.24), this yields the following level of off-





Furthermore, the equilibrium pressure level of the onshore country for the case of








1.3.3 Comparison to the Single Tax Haven Case
As the equilibrium values of pressure and lobbying in the presence of multiple tax
havens are given, a comparison whether these levels are larger or smaller in size is
insightful.















As is seen in equation (1.30), for a given level of lobbying, the level of pressure ap-
plied in the two tax haven case is higher than in the case with only one tax haven.
Mathematically, this is seen by the smaller denominator for α̃∗ relative to α∗.
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As onshore pressure and offshore lobbying are strategic substitutes, there is an incen-
tive for the onshore government to set a higher level of pressure when facing multiple
tax havens. This is the case because an increase in onshore lobbying now reduces the
marginal benefit of lobbying for more than one tax haven. Therefore, a higher level of
pressure relative to the case with only one tax havens remains.
Equilibrium Lobbying Level Equally interesting is how the equilibrium value of







= γ∗ . (1.31)
For a given level of pressure α, there is less lobbying per country, that is, γ̃∗ is larger,
in the case with multiple tax havens than in the case with one tax haven. However, it
can be shown that the aggregate level of lobbying still weakly increases (2(1 − γ̃∗) ≥
(1− γ∗)).
This result is due to a positive externality. For the case of one tax haven, γ∗ is optimal.
However, when a second tax haven enters the game, there is a positive externality
with respect to the other tax haven’s lobbying. Remembering that onshore pressure
and offshore lobbying are strategic substitutes, the lobbying effect of one tax haven
(partially) crowds out the lobbying effort of the second tax haven. Thus, both tax
havens lobby less than what was previously efficient, that is, γ̃∗ > γ∗. However, this
effect is of second order relative to the mechanical doubling of lobbying efforts.
This last result is summarized in Proposition 1.3:
Proposition 1.3 For a given level of onshore pressure and with two symmetric
offshore countries, there is less lobbying per country than relative to the case with
only one tax haven. However, aggregate lobbying increases.
Proof. See (1.31) for the respective comparison.
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1.4 Extensions
In the following, I incorporate two extensions into the model. In the first one, the on-
shore government considers onshore profits in its function. In the second extension,
two possibilities for the incorporation of tax competition are analyzed. These exten-
sions build upon one another and subsequently increase the level of tax competition.
The incorporation of domestic profits only changes the results quantitatively, whereas
the introduction of tax competition between the two tax havens significantly alters
the result when there are fully mobile profits.
1.4.1 Positive Welfare Weight on Domestic Profits
In Section 1.2, the objective function of the onshore government, given specifically
by equation (1.2), only takes tax revenue from firms into account. In the expanded
model, the onshore government’s objective function also reflects a valuation for net
domestic firm profits, as the firms are ultimately owned by onshore individuals.22 For
this analysis, the onshore net of tax profit of the firms enter the objective function with
a weight 0 ≤ λ < 1, wheras the implicit weight for tax revenue is one.
Note that if the government cares (more than) equally about net firm profits, that is,
λ ≥ 1, relative to tax revenue, it would be optimal to refrain from taxation.23 The




























As each firm’s individual decision to shift profits abroad has not changed, the number
of profit-shifting firms remains at x̄ as represented in (1.1). With no change in the
objective function of the offshore country, the equilibrium values for the tax rates
change to t̂, f̂t:
22Although the government could potentially also care about firm profits offshore, I abstract
from incorporating these profits into the onshore government’s welfare consideration.
23Intuitively, if the country cares equally about tax revenue and net of tax profits, it is optimal
to forgo taxation, thereby eliminating the incentives to shift profits offshore. Consequently, there
is no need to apply pressure and therefore α̂ = 0. This is also seen by (1.33) and (1.34).
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Ceteris paribus, the equilibrium onshore tax rate is lower than in the case without
the social valuation of profits. The higher the social valuation, that is, the higher λ,
the lower the tax rate. Consequently, the offshore country lowers its lump-sum fee to
remain competitive. For the first stage and hence the equilibrium level of pressure and











For the inclusion of profits into the onshore country’s objective function, lower levels
of equilibrium pressure result. Given the relatively low tax rates, more firms stay
onshore and the benefit from pressuring the remaining profit-shifting firms is not as
high. Hence, the level of equilibrium pressure will fall. In response, the offshore country
lobbies more as its benefit of doing so is higher.
Proposition 1.4 If the onshore government includes domestic firm profits in the
objective function, that is, λ ∈ (0, 1), both the resulting tax rate t̂ and the level of
pressure α̂ are lower than in the case in which the government does not incorporate
domestic firm profits (λ = 0).
Proof. This is proven by direct comparison of equation (1.33) with equation (1.6)
for tax rates and equation (1.34) with (1.9) and (1.11) for pressure and lobbying,
respectively.
1.4.2 Tax Competition with Multiple Tax Havens
So far Section 1.3 only considers bilateral mobility of profits and abstracts from in-
ternational mobility. To examine the effect of international tax competition in this
framework, two extensions that build upon each other are considered.
Mobile Profits with Bilateral Loyalty The first extension considers the case
in which there is no immobile share of profits anymore, that is, s + h1 + h2 = 1 with
s = 0. This means that there are only two bilaterally mobile shares h1 > 0 and h2 > 0
that are mobile between the onshore country and the respective tax haven.
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Although the individual firm’s decision whether or not to shift profits offshore has not
changed, there are some changes on the country level. In the second stage, there is an











2k + αγ1h1 + αγ2h2
]
. (1.35)
Intuitively, as there is no immobile share of profits anymore, the onshore country
reduces the tax rate to retain some mobile profits that were previously immobile. The





2k − 2αγ1 − h2α[γ1 − γ2]
]
. (1.36)
It is not possible to make a definite statement whether the derived offshore fee f̂tl is
larger or smaller than in the case with immobile profits, as the relative increase in h1
and h2 influences this fee. However, for the case of symmetric countries as discussed
in Section 1.3, f̂tl < ftl holds unambiguously.
Regarding the last stage of the game, it is again assumed that the offshore countries are
symmetric in important respects, such as lobbying cost-effectiveness and attainable
share of profits, that is, h1 = h2 = 0.5, in line with Section 1.3.










Relative to the case presented in Section 1.3, the level of onshore pressure is lower,
that is, α̂∗ < α̃∗. In contrary, the level of offshore lobbying increases, γ̂∗ < γ̃∗. This
is quite intuitive, as the position of the onshore country has worsened relative to the
initial case. There is no share of profit that remains onshore any more. Hence, the
domestic government has to react to the stronger level of international tax competition
and reduce its tax rate. This also leaves less funds for using the pressure tool. Given
that onshore pressure and offshore lobbying are strategic substitutes, the tax havens
use their tool more intensively.
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Mobile Profits without Loyal Profits One can further increase the level of tax
competition by making the previously loyal profits completely mobile, that is, h = 1.
This means that profits can remain in the onshore country or be moved to either of the
two tax havens. Following the previous part, there are no immobile profits anymore,
s = 0.
Because there is no certain base for any of the offshore countries anymore, there is
a Bertrand-style competition for the internationally mobile profits. Given that the
marginal costs for the service offered is zero, there will be a corner solution in which
both countries set a lump-sum fee of zero.24
Given an unchanged equilibrium for the number of profit-shifting firms x̄, there is a







; f̂tl = 0 . (1.38)
As the fee for the offshore country is zero, there is no benefit of inducing firms to
shift profits offshore. Hence, it is efficient for the offshore country to abstain from
using lobbying. Concerning the onshore country, there is a positive level of pressure






; γ̂ = 1 . (1.39)
To sum up, in the first case, when allowing for bilateral tax competition between
onshore country and each tax haven, there is downward pressure on the tax rate.
Furthermore, onshorepressure falls. Asaaconsequence, theoffshorecountries increase
their lobbying efforts. When further allowing for tax competition between the tax
havens, there is the corner solution of a zero fee. Because there are no funds available,
there is also no lobbying. In this case, the onshore country uses both a positive tax
rate and pressure to ensure that more firms remain onshore.
24As a tie breaking rule, one country gets all mobile profits. Analogous results hold for an equal
split rule.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I have emphasized the role of international lobbying in the fight against
tax havens. To this end, I used a three-stage, two country model in which the onshore
country and offshore country decide about pressure and lobbying before setting their
respective tax rates. Lastly, onshore multinational firms decide whether to shift profits
or not.
In this context, international lobbying is found to decrease the onshore country’s ben-
efit to apply pressure and is thus an important tool used by offshore countries to atten-
uate the negative effects associated with pressure. Only in rare cases, when onshore
governments are over-proportionally efficient and able to eliminate profit shifting,
there is no lobbying. If this is not the case, there is at least some lobbying.
This result helps to explain the puzzle that, despite the various measures used in
the fight against tax havens, there remains scope for international profit shifting by
multinational firms. This is the case, as the effective level of pressure endured by firms
is significantly below the level intended by the onshore governments.
Furthermore, I show that early stages of international integration might potentially
reduce profit shifting. Up to a threshold, general tax incentives change at a relatively
high pace compared with cost reductions in firm-level profit-shifting costs. Assuming
that this threshold has already been passed, further improving capital mobility within
Europe will fuel profit shifting. In this respect, accessions to the EU may give rise
to suitable setups to empirically examine a reduction in international frictions and to
confirm the theoretical predictions.
When generalizing the model to allow for a second tax haven, there is evidence that an
adding-up effect of lobbying takes place. Despite some intercountry spillovers among
tax havens, the overall lobbying that onshore countries face is higher than in the case
with only one tax haven. For an increasing number of tax havens, the onshore country
also increases its pressure level, as the marginal benefit of pressure is higher than in
the case with one haven only.
Starting from these new results, there is ample scope for future research. One exam-
ple could be an examination of a generalized model with offshore countries that are
heterogeneous in costs. This is left for future research.
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Chapter 2
Enforcement Focus Lists and Tax
Evasion
The idea for this chapter came up in discussions with Franz Reiter. The chapter is based on
single-authored work.
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2.1 Introduction
Personal income tax evasion is a concern to governmental revenue agencies all over
the world. According to the most recent estimates, 56% (or 245 billion US-$) of
the United States’ annual overall tax gap is due to under-reporting in the individual
income tax (Internal Revenue Service 2019). Similarly, 40% of the United Kingdom’s
tax gap comes from missing payments related to the income tax, national insurance
contributions, and capital gains taxes (HMRC 2018).
As a consequence, various policies to limit personal income tax evasion have emerged in
recent years. Most prominently, the growing access to third-party-reported data made
it less costly for tax revenueagencies to cross check reported income. For example, wage
earning taxpayers might have their salary directly reported to the tax administration
by their employer. As the detection probability for under-reporting wage income is
close to one, taxpayers’ expected costs of evading taxes are high. However, third-party
reporting is not available for all income sources.
In randomized control trials, researchers have shown that increasing the salience of
the potential punishment for tax evasion by sending letters, e-mails, or home visits
increases tax compliance.1 Similarly, announcing and conducting thorough audits is
an additional tool to increase compliance for all income sources (Kleven et al. 2011).
However, unlike the expansion of third-party reporting, rolling out personal visits or
thorough audits for the entire taxpayer population is prohibitively expensive.2
Thus, alternative low-cost interventions which increase tax compliance on a
population-wide scale are worthwhile to examine. One candidate policy is currently
conducted in Germany. Since 2011, the German state of North Rhine-Westphalia
(NRW) announces an annual enforcement focus list. At the beginning of each year,
the Ministry of Finance publishes income sources, and sometimes line items, which
are a focus in the enforcement process for personal income taxes.3 These focal items
are announced in one list and vary at the level of the local tax offices which are respon-
sible for the personal income tax enforcement of taxpayers living in their respective
1See Slemrod (2019) for a recent overview of the literature on tax compliance and enforcement
with a focus on empirical studies. Alm (2012) provides an earlier overview regarding the literature
on tax evasion.
2See Kuchumova (2017) for a theoretical analysis of the optimal information reporting and
auditing mix.
3Similar nationwide programs are conducted in the Netherlands (see e.g. Kastoryano 2015)
and in Sweden.
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district. Initially, the list was only rolled out in a part of the state, before being ex-
panded to a complete state-wide coverage in early 2014. The list can be found on and
downloaded from the Ministry’s website and has been discussed in various national
and local news outlets.4 For taxpayers who previously under-reported income, the
enforcement focus list increases the detection probability for this behavior. Thus, rel-
ative to a control group, affected taxpayers increase their reported income. This, in
turn, provides indirect evidence for tax evasion.
In this paper, I examine whether the introduction of the population-wide enforcement
focus list in North Rhine-Westphalia in early 2011 did in fact increase tax compliance.
To do so, I use the Taxpayer-Panel data set, a 5%-stratified random sample of all
German taxpayers provided by the Research Data Center of the Federal Statistical
Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States. As the data set contains information
about the residence of taxpayers, I am able to assign taxpayers in NRW to their
respective tax office and, thus, their respective treatment for the first list published in
early 2011, i.e. for the tax year 2010.
In my main estimation approach, I rely on taxpayers who were living in the policy
area in the tax year 2010 and employ a generalized difference-in-differences estimation
strategy. If a taxpayer’s tax office has a certain income category as a focus point,
this taxpayer is part of the treatment group. Taxpayers whose tax offices do not have
this income category on the enforcement focus list serve as the control group. To
ensure that my results are not biased by potential spillover evasion in other items,
three robustness checks are conducted. These robustness checks respectively consider
NRW’s later treated group, neighboring taxpayers in other states, and all German
taxpayers outside of NRW as the control group.
Overall, I find that the introduction of the enforcement focus list has limited effects
on tax compliance. Only three out of seven income categories (capital income, rental
income, and other income) experience significant positive direct effects, i.e. increases
in reported income, when included in the enforcement focus list. Out of these three
income categories, only capital income also experiences a significant increase in overall
taxable income.
Yet, when specific line items are mentioned in the enforcement focus list, taxpayers do
react strongly. To demonstrate this, I provide evidence for the line item “commuting
4One example for the list in 2019: https://www.focus.de/finanzen/steuern/steuertipps/
prueffelder-ruecken-jedes-jahr-in-den-fokus-vorsicht-bei-der-steuererklaerung-
wo-das -finanzamt-jetzt-genauer-hinschaut_id_10773972.html (last accessed: 2021-01-30).
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cost deduction” (labor income) which has been on the first enforcement focus list as a
single item. Taxpayers adjust these deductions immediately and persistently, leading
to lower deductions in the labor income category. Thus, instead of broadly mentioning
income categories, picking distinctive line items seems to be a more efficient approach.
This work relates to a large literature on tax evasion. The seminal work by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972), based on Becker (1968), gives a first theoretical foundation for tax
evasion. Allingham and Sandmo show that tax evasion can be a rational choice and
it depends on three parameters: The tax rate, the penalty on undeclared income, and
the detection or audit probability. Yitzhaki (1974) further shows that the important
trade-offsalsopersist if thepenalty is leviedonevadedtaxes rather thanevaded income.
Sandmo (2005) summarizes this theoretical literature on tax evasion.
As tax rates and imposed penalties are hardly ever randomized, most empirical re-
search on tax evasion has focused on the detection probability. One general result of
the literature is that sources of income that are characterized by a high detection prob-
ability, such as third-party reported wage income, experience low levels of tax evasion.5
In contrast, self-reported components of the tax return are more likely to be used to
evade tax payments. Kleven et al. (2011) show this using Danish data, whereas En-
gström and Hagen (2017) and Engström and Holmlund (2009) confirm the result for
Swedish data. When expanding third-party reporting, taxpayers increase reported
income but also reported costs (Carrillo et al. 2017; Naritomi 2019).
Starting with Blumenthal et al. (2001) and Slemrod et al. (2001), a large literature
using randomized control trials in the tax evasion context emerged. Mostly using
modified letters, researchers examine the effectiveness of different contents or modes
of communication. For example, Bott et al. (2020) sent various letters to Norwegians
that potentially under-reported foreign income. While the salience of the detection
probability leads taxpayers to start reporting foreign income, the moral appeal treat-
ment mainly increases the amount reported. Generally, moral appeals and social in-
formation seem to have limited effects (Fellner et al. 2013). Other recent work has
examined notification strategies for late-payers in the United Kingdom (Hallsworth
et al. 2017) or notification strategies with respect to local property taxes (Chirico et al.
2016). Recently, researchers have also looked at other forms of increasing tax com-
pliance with different modes of communication such as phone calls or personal visits
(e.g. Ortega and Scartascini 2017). The authors find that the more personal an in-
5Even in the absence of any detection probability, taxpayers are intrinsically motivated to pay
taxes, as shown by Dwenger et al. (2016).
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teraction with a taxpayer is, the larger the increase in tax compliance. Generally,
there are long-term increases in taxable income and tax revenue from one-time inter-
ventions as recently highlighted by Advani et al. (2019), DeBacker et al. (2018), and
Gemmell and Ratto (2012). I contribute to this literature by empirically assessing a
low-cost, population-wide tax enforcement policy. My findings suggest that general
enforcement announcements are less effective in increasing tax compliance than pre-
cise enforcement announcements, i.e. on the line item level. Thus, tax administration
officials should carefully consider how to design such enforcement focus lists.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives some institutional
background on tax enforcement in Germany and explains the enforcement focus list
policy in more detail. Section 2.3 introduces the data set, before the empirical strategy
is explained in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the results, provides a discussion, and
two robustness checks. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional Background and Policy Details
2.2.1 Institutional Background
To evaluate the policy of publishing enforcement focus lists, it is key to understand
the institutional background concerning personal income taxation in Germany.
The German personal income tax system only consists of one federal tax code. Unlike
many other countries, German taxpayers do not pay additional state taxes. Rather,
the revenue from the personal income tax is split between the different layers of gov-
ernment. The federal government and the state government each obtain 42.5% of the
personal income tax revenue while the municipality of residence receives the remain-
ing 15%. Changes to the tax code are passed by the federal legislature (Bundestag)
and have to be approved by a majority of the states (Bundesrat).
Generally, the German income tax code distinguishes seven different categories of
income: (i) Agricultural and forestry Income (AFI), (ii) business income (BIN), (iii)
self-employed income (SEI), (iv) labor income (LIN), (v) capital income (CIN), (vi)
rental income (RIN), and (vii) other income (OIN). Taxpayers whose single income
source is employment income can decide whether or not to file an income tax return.6
6See Hauck and Wallossek (2021) for a comprehensive introduction to the German optional
tax filing system for employees.
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Data: GeoBasis-DE/BKG (2018). Based on VG250, own illustration.
Notes: This map shows to which of the two intermediate layers of tax administration (Oberfinanzdirektion) in
North Rhine-Westphalia a municipality belongs in 2010. OFD Münster in red, OFD Rheinland in blue.
For those earning income in one of the other categories, filing is mandatory and has to
be done by May the following year.7 If taxpayers consult a tax adviser, the deadline is
prolonged until February the following year, i.e. February 2012 for the 2010 tax return.
Unlike legislation, the enforcement of personal income taxes in Germany is conducted
by the states. Based on their residence, taxpayers file an income tax return with their
local tax office. In 2016, there were 535 tax offices in Germany (Bundesministerium
der Finanzen 2018a), which are all under the supervision of the respective state’s
Ministry of Finance. As Germany has 401 counties (NUTS-3 level), the average tax
office district is smaller than the average German county. Given the above mentioned
revenue sharing quotas, the state and the municipality receive a combined 57.5% of
the income tax revenue, thereby providing strong incentives to enforce the personal
income tax.
As of 2017, eight of the sixteen German states had an additional intermediate layer
within the tax administration – so-called Oberfinanzdirektionen (OFD) (Bundesmin-
isterium der Finanzen 2018a). Most relevant for this paper, until June 2013, North
Rhine-Westphalia had two disjoint intermediate tax authorities, OFD Münster and
OFD Rheinland. In June 2013, both merged to form a single intermediate layer in the
tax administration – OFD North Rhine-Westphalia. Figure 2.1 shows the assignment
of municipalities to both OFDs in the state in 2010.
7For tax returns concerning the tax years 2018 and later, the filing deadline was prolonged by
two months. This is however outside of this paper’s time frame.
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2.2.2 Enforcement Focus List Policy
As of January 2011, OFD Münster, one of NRW’s intermediate tax authorities, started
publishing an enforcement focus list containing one or multiple income sources for
each tax office, sometimes even naming particular line items. Each year, a single list
is published which includes the name of the tax office, the tax office number, and
which income categories, or line items, are focal points. Figure B.1 in the appendix
shows the first page for the first list which was published in early 2011, i.e. for the tax
year 2010. For example, taxpayers residing in the tax office district Altena (tax office
number 302), were facing, among other things, more scrutiny with respect to their
rental income for the tax year 2010. It is possible that tax offices have more than one
income category as an enforcement focus point in a given year.
Since 2011, NRW’s tax authority publishes this list at the beginning of each year,
usually by the end of January. The latest version is published on the state’s Ministry
of Finance’s website and both local and national news outlets regularly report about
these lists, suggesting that taxpayers are aware of the policy.8
For the tax year 2013, following the merger of OFD Münster and OFD Rheinland,
all tax-offices in North Rhine-Westphalia are on the enforcement focus list and thus
all taxpayers in NRW are treated. For the purpose of this paper, I focus on the
variation in tax evasion detection probabilities induced by the introduction of the
enforcement focus list in 2011 (tax year 2010) in the OFD Münster region. This has
multiple benefits. As further discussed in subsection 2.4.3, using the introduction
alleviates concerns currently discussed in the empirical literature on biased estimates
in difference-in-differences settings with variation in treatment timing (e.g. Goodman-
Bacon 2020). Second, previous research has highlighted that one-time interventions
can have long-term effects (e.g. Advani et al. 2019). Focusing on the introduction of the
enforcement focus list allows me to capture these long-term effects. Third, arguably
the largest shock induced by an enforcement policy should be in the first year, rather
than in later years when taxpayers are accustomed to it.
Given the previous literature, especially Allingham and Sandmo (1972), an increase in
the perceived detection probability, as induced by the enforcement focus list, changes
the tax evasion incentives for taxpayers. For the relevant income source, the detection
8See for example https://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/steuern-recht/steuern/
serie-ratgeber-steuererklaerung-spickzettel-fuer-steuerzahler-wo-das-finanzamt-
2019-genauer-hinschaut/22597714.html?ticket=ST-5561966-CDh5fBR45pWZvuJpcbZU-ap5
(last accessed: 2021-02-12) for the list in early 2019.
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probability increases and thus marginal costs of evading taxes rise. Hence, I expect
taxpayers to report a larger share for this income category. For overall taxable income,
the comparative statics are less straightforward and depend on assumptions. For
example, substitution evasion in other income sources can take place, as theoretically
highlighted by Klepper and Nagin (1989). Cummings et al. (2006) show in a laboratory
experiment that this can even lead to overcompensation and ultimately less taxable
income.
Early empirical work, constructing line item audit probabilities by using post-
audit adjustments from the IRS, contradicts the laboratory overcompensation result
(Martinez-Vazquez and Rider 2005).9 Thus, the overall response of taxable income to
an increase in the detection probability for some income source remains empirically
unclear.
2.3 Data Set and Sample Selection
To causally analyze whether the first publication of the enforcement focus list had an
effect on reported income, I use a 5% stratified random sample of German taxpayers
for the tax years between 2005 and 2016, based on the German Taxpayer-Panel (TPP).
The TPP is an administrative panel data set, provided by the Research Data Center
of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Office of the Federal States. It is drawn
from the universe of German taxpayers who file an income tax return in at least five
years between 2001 and 2016, whereby the taxable unit is either a single taxpayer or
married couples if they decide to file jointly.10 If not indicated otherwise, all results in
this paper are estimated using the statistical weights provided by the statistical offices.
The data set includes a number of variables. Most interesting for this analysis, the
data set contains the levels of revenue net of expenses (or standard deductions) for
the seven different income categories as stated in the taxpayer’s final tax assessment.
Furthermore, it contains a limited number of line items, for example commuting cost
deductions for labor income, and overall taxable income.
To assign treatment and control group status to taxpayers, residence data is necessary.
The data set includes a unique eight-digit identifier (Amtlicher Gemeindeschlüssel) for
9Similar questions have been addressed in the context of firm taxation (Carrillo et al. 2017)
and import duties (Yang 2008).
10See Kriete-Dodds and Vorgrimler (2007) for a description explaining the sampling procedure
of the German TPP.
40
Enforcement Focus Lists and Tax Evasion
taxpayers’ municipalities of residence between the tax years 2012 and 2016. For years
prior to 2012, only information on a taxpayer’s state of residence is given. Thus, I im-
pute the taxpayers’ residence municipalities for prior years. Intuitively, if a taxpayer’s
state of residence in 2011 corresponds to the state of residence in the 2012 municipal-
ity information, I extrapolate the 2012 municipality information back to 2011. This
iterative procedure is done for as long as the 2012 state of residence is equal to the
respective tax year’s state of residence. Whenever taxpayers moved between states
before 2012, I don’t have sufficient information on their residence and the previous
years for this taxpayer are discarded.11
Administrative data on tax office districts, provided by the Federal Statistical Office,
is available from 2009 to 2016. By using the unique eight-digit identifier, I match
taxpayers to their respective tax office district. For taxpayers living in cities with
more than one tax office, the matching is imperfect and I attribute one common tax
office to all taxpayers living in this city.12 To match taxpayers to tax office districts
prior to 2009, I fix the oldest official tax office district data available (2009) and ascribe
it to the previous years used in this study (2005-2008).
Imputing residence and tax office district data does not influence the results strongly.
First, German citizens are moving less often than citizens of other countries. Accord-
ing to recent estimates, only about 3% of the population move beyond county borders
in Germany every year (Rosenbaum-Feldbrügge and Stawarz 2020). Second, as con-
cerns the tax office district imputation, the number of tax office districts, and their
composition, has remained fairly stable over time.
Since the tax year 2012, the Taxpayer-Panel started sampling legal non-filers, which
are mainly single employees with wage income only. As these taxpayers are not affected
by the publication of the enforcement focus list, these observations are excluded. Fur-
thermore, taxpayers with loss-carryforwards and loss-carrybackwards are excluded,
as they were also not sampled prior to 2012.
Lastly, I restrict the sample to taxpayers who have a standard filing status, excluding
widows and widowers in the year of their spouse’s death and the subsequent year as
they face a special tax scheme.
11The main results are stable to a (not-reported) robustness check where all between-state
moving taxpayers are excluded.
12For example, in NRW the city district determines the tax office. Unfortunately, residence data
is not available at such a detailed level. This leads to 475 unique tax office districts in Germany
in 2009.
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2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Generalized Difference-in-Differences
In order to assess the average treatment effect of introducing enforcement focus lists
on reported income, I use a generalized difference-in-differences estimation strategy.
For the main specification, only taxpayers residing in the OFD Münster area in 2010
are considered. This has two benefits. First, as discussed before, tax enforcement is
organized on the state level or the intermediate tax administration level. Thus, if the
treatment and control group are from the same enforcement environment, the general
enforcement regime is the same and other (orthogonal) changes to the enforcement
regime at this level affect both groups equally. Second, local control groups are more
likely to be similar in unobserved characteristics, too. When these characteristics
potentially change over time, and cannot be controlled for, similar groups mitigate
concerns of biased results. In a robustness check, see subsection 2.5.4, I also use three
additional control groups.
Whether a taxpayer is in the treatment or the control group for a certain income
category depends on the residence when filing. Based on the list list from early 2011,
FigureB.2 in theappendixpresents the treatmentassignments forall incomecategories
at the municipality level for the tax year 2010 visually. The intuition for the treatment
and control group assignment is as follows.
For example, rental income is listed as an enforcement focus in Dortmund in 2010.
Consider a taxpayer earning rental income in Dortmund in 2010. If this taxpayer
previously evaded taxes on rental income, an announcement on the enforcement focus
list shifts the perceived detection probability. Thus, the marginal costs of evading
taxes increase and the level of reported rental income should increase, as predicted by
Allingham and Sandmo (1972). Hence, these taxpayers constitute the treatment group
for rental income. Taxpayers in the tax office district Wiedenbrück, for example, did
not see rental income on the enforcement focus list. Thus, their incentives to under-
report rental income do not change directly and they serve as the control group.
Based on this treatment assignment, I employ a generalized difference-in-differences
estimation strategy. This allows me to estimate a common trend for the treatment
and the control group, while controlling for other covariates that might influence the
outcome (Jacobson et al. 1993). This yields the following baseline estimation equation:
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+ γi + δo + X ilt + εilt ,
(2.1)
where Yilt is the reported level of revenue net of expenses for income category l by
taxpayer i in tax year t. Dil,2010 is the binary treatment indicator whether taxpayer
i was subject to the treatment for income (line item) l in 2010 and Y eart is a year
dummy for year t, common for the treatment and the control group. Furthermore,
individual fixed effects (γi) and tax office fixed effects (δo) are considered.
13
Intuitively, α̂t estimates the common time trend that the treatment and control group
share. The β̂t estimates represent the deviation of the treatment group, relative to
the control group. In the absence of pre-trends between the treatment and the control
group, β̂2005 - β̂2009 should not be statistically different from zero. For the years after
2010, β̂2010 - β̂2016 identify the causal effect of income category l being part of the
first enforcement focus list in 2010 on reported income in the years 2010 to 2016,
respectively. For example, β̂2012 estimates the change in reported income in the tax
year 2012, causally induced by the enforcement focus list in 2010, conditional on the
control variables. To avoid multi-collinearity inαt andβt, the estimates are normalized
to the base year 2009, one year prior to the introduction of the policy.
Lastly, X ilt is a vector controlling for treatments in other income categories k 6= l in
2010 and for treatments in all income categories in the years thereafter. In line with the
current literature, standard errors are clustered at the level of treatment assignment,
i.e. the tax office level (Abadie et al. 2017).
In principle, there are other estimation strategies possible to assess the causal effect of
enforcement focus lists. However, using the introduction of the enforcement focus list,
rather than, for example, pooling all announcements after 2010 into a single treatment
dummy, hasmultipleadvantages. First, there is avery recentmethodological literature
on biased estimates in difference-in-differences analyses with twoway fixed effects and
differential treatment timing (Goodman-Bacon 2020). For a pooled treatment dummy
to represent an unbiased estimate, one key requirement is that treatment effects remain
13As the treatment assignment is fixed over the entire period, there is no benefit in including
the treatment group dummy on its own. It would be perfectly collinear with the individual fixed
effects.
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constant over time. In this particular setting, reactions to the first list would have to
be equal to reactions in all later years, which is likely a problematic assumption.
Second, in line with previous research on enforcement initiatives, one time interven-
tions can have long-term effects. For example, Advani et al. (2019) show for audits
in the United Kingdom that reported income, and therefore also tax revenue, is sig-
nificantly higher for at least five years after an audit. The difference-in-differences
specification here allows me to estimate such effects, while controlling for the content
of the lists concerning the tax years 2011 and later. Lastly, the shock induced by the
initial introduction of the enforcement focus list is probably larger relative to any later
year, as taxpayers are not yet accustomed to this tool.
2.4.2 SUTVA and Substitution Evasion
One criterion that ought to be met for an unbiased estimate of the causal effect is the
stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA). Put differently, the general policy
rollout in the OFD Münster area must not have spillovers to the control group, other-
wise this criterion is violated. One potential violation can be constructed as follows:
Taxpayers in Wiedenbrück, who serve as the control group in the rental income ex-
ample before, are treated for labor income. If these taxpayers have a fixed amount
of under-reported income that they aim for, or if they assume that the enforcement
budget is fixed and all other income categories are therefore screened less intensively,
substitution evasion might take place. It might thus be that the enforcement an-
nouncement for labor income increases reported labor income but induces taxpayers
to report less in other income categories, such as rental income. Then, the β̂t estimates
for rental income would be upwards biased. If, however, local spillovers lead to more
reported income, also in the control group, as suggested by Rincke and Traxler (2011),
then my estimates would be downwards biased.
To alleviate concerns about this problem, I conduct further robustness checks. In these
robustness checks, I use three different control groups whose reporting incentives are
not affected by the introduction of the enforcement focus list. These groups are (i)
taxpayers in the untreated part of NRW, (ii) taxpayers in neighboring districts outside
of NRW, and (iii) all German taxpayers living outside of NRW. The results for these
exercises are reported in the Appendix, subsection B.1, and are similar to the baseline
estimates. This suggests that substitution evasion is not a first order concern.
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2.4.3 Further Threats to Identification
Besides theaforementioned stableunit treatmentvalueassumption, additional criteria
have to be met for equation (2.1) to identify an unbiased causal estimate of the average
treatment effect. First, in the absence of the intervention, both the treatment and
the control group should have exhibited the same trend. While this common trend
assumption is ultimately untestable, I argue that this is not a concern here. The pre-
intervention treatment group differences are not jointly statistically significant from
zero for the majority of the income categories, as reported later in the Results, i.e.
Table 2.3 and Figure 2.2.
Second, other margins of response, specifically a selection out of treatment, must not
be relevant. While this is theoretically possible, it seems fairly unlikely that taxpayers’
moving decisions are causally influenced by these lists. This is especially true when
considering the fact that Germans are relatively immobile and only about 3% of the
German population move to other counties every year (Rosenbaum-Feldbrügge and
Stawarz 2020).
Furthermore, when using difference-in-differences settings, potential anticipation ef-
fects have to be taken into account. As the first list has been published in January
2011, i.e. after the end of the tax year 2010, there is no potential for real adjustments
ex-post and only reporting responses can take place.
A more general caveat however is that the treatment assignment could be the result of
negative selection and might bias the results. For example, if the tax authority in NRW
suspects that taxpayers in Dortmund are under-reporting rental income, taxpayers in
Dortmund might exactly be treated in this area. Unfortunately, the tax authorities
did not communicate the intent of the enforcement focus list.
However, if the tax authority was strategically targeting tax office districts where they
suspect evasion for an income source, this should be visible in the data. Tax offices
with lower averages in an income category should have a higher probability of ending
up on the 2010 enforcement focus list. Using a linear probability model, I am able to
provide suggestive evidence that treatment assignment was most likely not based on
this simple heuristic.
Table 2.1 summarizes these results, comparing treated tax offices in the OFD Münster
areawithallGermantaxofficesandwithall taxofficeswithin thestate. Eachcoefficient
represents the point estimate for the respective linear probability estimation, where
the outcome variable is the treatment status in 2010 and the explanatory variable
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Table 2.1: Treatment Assignment Prediction
Panel A: All German Tax Offices
AFI BIN SEI LIN CIN RIN OIN
Mean 2009 0.038* 0.017* -0.012 0.000 0.002 0.049* 0.012
(0.020) (0.009) (0.009) (0.000) (0.008) (0.029) (0.021)
Mean 2008 0.027* 0.001 -0.013* 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.008
(0.015) (0.005) (0.007) (0.000) (0.001) (0.026) (0.020)
Observations 462 462 462 462 462 462 462
Panel B: Only Tax Offices in NRW
AFI BIN SEI LIN CIN RIN OIN
Mean 2009 0.340** 0.025 -0.071** -0.007 0.015 -0.120 -0.129
(0.135) (0.033) (0.032) (0.007) (0.079) (0.170) (0.116)
Mean 2008 0.277** 0.016 -0.077** -0.006 -0.011 -0.259 -0.152
(0.113) (0.025) (0.036) (0.007) (0.011) (0.169) (0.122)
Observations 87 87 87 87 87 87 87
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-2016,
own calculations.
Notes: Dependent variable: Treatment assignment in one of the seven categories: AFI: Agricultural and Forestry
Income; BIN: Business Income; LIN: Labor Income; RIN: Rental Income; CIN: Capital Income; OIN: Other Income.
The difference in the number of tax offices reported (462) to the number of unique tax offices in Germany (475) is
due to incorrect residence information in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania as noted in the official data description.
Each coefficient represents the point estimate for a heteroskedasticity robust linear probability model, whereby the
outcome variable is the treatment status in 2010. Reading example: For a tax office in North Rhine-Westphalia,
an increase in the mean agricultural and forestry income in 2009 by 1,000e increases the likelihood that this tax
office is on the focus list by 34%. See Figure B.3 for a graphical representation of tax office level means in NRW in
2009. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, p*<0.1.
the respective income category’s mean in 2009 or 2008, respectively. Only for self-
employed income, a higher mean of reported income in 2009 is associated with a lower
likelihood to be treated in 2010, i.e. a negative selection. Surprisingly, there is a
positive selection for agricultural and forestry income, suggesting a specialization for
this income category. Tax offices which had tax returns with higher than average
income in this category were treated.
For the remaining five income categories, there is no significant selection on pre-
intervention means. Figure B.2 in the appendix visually illustrates for each income
category the means of treated and control group tax offices in NRW. Furthermore, a ro-
bustness check using entropy-balancing to match on pre-2010 income category means
yields similar results than the baseline results, see subsection 2.5.4. This suggests that
there was no treatment assignment on observables. Finally, Table 2.2 provides basic
descriptive statistics for all taxpayers in the OFD Münster area in 2009.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics (Tax Year 2009)
OFD Münster
Mean Median SD Observations (weighted)
Taxable Income 40,045.15 29,969 178,587 67,806 (1,644,623)
Agricultural Income 408.97 0 17,399 67,808 (1,644,696)
Business Income 5,551.13 0 174,673 67,777 (1,644,487)
Self-Employed Income 2,836.64 0 27,080 67,793 (1,644,227)
Labor Income 35,643.61 30,920 39,029 67,791 (1,644,216)
Capital Income 395.10 0 7,833 67,537 (1,642,037)
Rental Income 653.91 0 11,570 67,789 (1,644,478)
Other Income 1,415.46 0 7,806 67,484 (1,643,490)
Age 46.82 46 14.02 67,810 (1,644,698)
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-
2016, own calculations.
Notes: Basic descriptive statistics for various income sources and the age distribution in the treated OFD
Münster district in North Rhine-Westphalia, based on weighted data. SD = Standard Deviation. There is a
difference between the sum of all income categories and taxable income, as taxable income includes deductible
special expenses, while the first does not. Observations are given in absolute numbers and in weighted numbers.
See Table B.1 for the same descriptive statistics for OFD Rheinland and the remaining German states.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Direct Effects
Table 2.3 presents the direct effects of the enforcement focus list announcements. Each
column represents a distinct regression with the corresponding level of income as the
dependent variable. Column (1) for example, represents the effect that enforcement
focus announcements for agricultural and forestry income have on the level of reported
income in this category. The coefficients reported here are the generalized difference-
in-differences year dummies for the treatment group in 2010 and later years, i.e. β̂2010
- β̂2016. As can be seen, the initial publication of the enforcement focus list did not
have a clear and systematic effect on reported income.
For capital income and other income, there are, respectively, two and three years after
2010 with borderline significant point estimates, suggesting some prior tax evasion.
One reason for the time lag in the response couldbe that taxpayers adjust their reported
income gradually rather than instantaneously. However, the regression concerning
capital income has to be taken with a grain of salt. Starting in the tax year 2009,
automatic capital income tax withholding at source exempt the majority of German
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Table 2.3: Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Direct Effect (Income Category)
Dependent Variable : Income in the Respective Income Category
AFI BIN SEI LIN RIN CIN OIN
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dil,2010 · 2010 63.55 -1,084.38 74.12 -391.00 90.99 -75.07* 41.26
(99.32) (704.33) (139.62) (346.92) (59.08) (34.11) (31.79)
Dil,2010 · 2011 165.32 -758.57 -43.42 - 62.25 - 102.36**
(116.62) (550.67) (178.92) - (66.63) - (43.33)
Dil,2010 · 2012 198.40 -348.01 -89.17 135.30 54.11 10.01 51.58
(138.08) (721.26) (192.76) (219.67) (88.20) (54.40) (48.13)
Dil,2010 · 2013 481.66 -156.43 -138.22 -682.08 146.98* 131.59* 96.25*
(310.14) (1,248.62) (200.52) (514.27) (86.75) (70.97) (55.90)
Dil,2010 · 2014 -20.33 -633.15 33.37 -538.10 112.48 176.50 256.52**
(198.51) (1,207.88) (226.34) (413-23) (90.01) (120.76) (143.42)
Dil,2010 · 2015 -309.44 -1.286.08 18.64 33.90 341.13*** 227.25** 106.90
(300.68) (1,647.13) (257.52) (372.69) (97.90) (94.78) (80.67)
Dil,2010 · 2016 -2.72 88.19 120.61 -167.87 249.52** 147.66 78.00
(192.02) (1,428.99) (322.92) (410.94) (126.04) (127.64) (103.46)
Individual FE X X X X X X X
Tax Office FE X X X X X X X
Other Treatments X X X X X X X
F-value (Pre-2010) 0.26 1.93 0.62 1.25 2.93 4.11 1.04
p-value (Pre-2010) 0.91 0.11 0.65 0.29 0.02 0.00 0.39
Non-zero restriction X X X X X X X
Observations (absolute) 256,373 513,589 413,628 744,996 540,453 573,977 405,237
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-
2016, own calculations.
Notes: Dependent variables: AFI: Agricultural and Forestry Income; BIN: Business Income; LIN: Labor Income;
RIN: Rental Income; CIN: Capital Income; OIN: Other Income. Each column represents a separate regression.
Only observations with at least one year of non-zero values for the respective income category between 2005
and 2009 are considered. All treatment effects are in absolute e values. All regressions include individual fixed
effects and tax office fixed effects. All regressions use taxpayers in the OFD Münster area only. Treatments
in the same year and in later years are controlled for with dummies. F-value and p-value for the test that the
pre-2010 treatment group dummies β̂2005- β̂2008 are jointly different from zero. Standard errors are clustered
at the tax office level and given in parentheses. The enforcement focus announcements for labor and capital
income are perfectly collinear in 2010 and 2011. Given that I extrapolate residence information back from 2012
to 2010, all taxpayers that were treated in these categories in 2010 were also treated in 2011. Thus, these point
estimates cannot be calculated. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
taxpayers from the duty to report their capital income. Thus, responses in this income
category might be driven by a different adjustment speed following the 2009 reform,
as well. Additionally, the relevant tax office districts treated for capital income have
been at the center of Germany’s fight against capital tax evasion within the same time
period.14 Unfortunately, as the introduction of the enforcement focus list has the
same level of variation (the tax office-year level), controlling for these developments
14In early 2010, the Ministry of Finance in North Rhine-Westphalia purchased a
CD-Rom with data on German account holders at the Swiss bank Credit Suisse. See
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-germany-switzerland-tax-evasion/german-state-
buys-swiss-data-to-track-tax-frauds-ft-idUKBRE86D04820120714 last accessed: 2021-01-
12).
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is not possible. The strongest effects in terms of magnitude can be observed for the
rental income category, starting in 2013. Taxpayers who saw rental income on the
first enforcement focus list in 2010 on average increased their reported income in this
category by 341.13e in 2013, relative to the control group.
All generalized difference-in-differences estimates, β̂t, can be seen in Figure 2.2. With
the exception of the rental income category, there does not seem to be an apparent
pre-trend in the data, suggesting that also in the absence of the intervention, both
treatment and control group would have evolved similarly. The F-values and corre-
sponding p-values for the hypothesis that all pre-2010 dummies are unequal to zero
can be found in Table 2.3. For rental income, and for capital income, this test sug-
gests that the pre-2010 dummies are not jointly equal to zero. To alleviate concerns
regarding potential pre-trends, and thus violations to the common trend assumption,
subsection 2.5.4 discusses a robustness check using the entropy balancing re-weighting
method to account for initial (trend) differences. The results of this exercise, which are
visually summarized in Figure B.7, are similar in magnitude to the baseline results.
2.5.2 Total Effect on Taxable Income
While the effectiveness of the enforcement focus announcement seems limited for indi-
vidual income categories, taxable income ultimately matters for tax payments. Here,
taxable income is the sum of all income categories less a limited number of clearly de-
fined special expenses. Thus, whenever there is a positive direct effect, i.e. reported
income in the category increases, the question arises whether this also transmits to
higher taxable income and thus ultimately higher tax payments.
Table 2.4 reports the point estimates for this analysis. It shows the causal effects of
enforcement focus announcements on ultimate taxable income. In contrast to the pre-
vious table, here the dependent variable is always taxable income and each column
represents a different income category that is treated. For example, column (1) repre-
sents the effect of enforcement focus announcements in the agricultural and forestry
income category on total taxable income. Figure 2.3 illustrates the results graphically.
Overall, there is no significant effect for agricultural and forestry income, business
income, and self-employment income. Surprisingly, listing labor income in 2010 has
a strong one-time negative effect in 2013, while taxpayers treated for other income
in 2010 gradually report lower taxable income than the control group. For taxpayers
experiencing a higher scrutiny with respect to their rental income, the point estimates
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Figure 2.2: Treatment Effects - Direct Effect (Income Categories)
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Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statisti-
cal Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-
2016, own calculations.
Notes: Each graph shows the point estimate and the 95%-
confidence interval for β̂2005 to β̂2016: The difference in
the respective income category between the treatment
and control group. Furthermore, the estimates shown
here include individual, year, and tax office fixed effects
and control for treatments in all years of the policy. Stan-
dard errors are clustered at the tax office level. Until
2009, prior to the first enforcement policy, point esti-
mates should be zero, indicating no significant differences
between the two groups. Significant differences to zero in
2010 and later indicate immediate and long-term effects
of the 2010 enforcement focus list policy. See Table 2.3
for the β̂2010 - β̂2016 point estimates.
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Table 2.4: Difference-in-Differences Regressions - Total Effect (Taxable Income)
Dependent Variable : Taxable Income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dil,2010 · 2010 -409.12 -1418.19* -125.31 -588.30 189.29 780.29 -466.90
(425.80) (834.77) (532.49) (542.18) (572.19) (871.10) (527.88)
Dil,2010 · 2011 - -494.604 -447.41 - 910.97 - -1698.26***
- (932.07) (529.08) - (939.06) - (556.74)
Dil,2010 · 2012 256.69 -312.26 274.15 183.63 902.00 1269.46* -1483.43**
(1243.46) (1313.36) (743.91) (222.12) (681.67) (747.28) (611.31)
Dil,2010 · 2013 -403.71 -921.56 385.99 -1863.06*** 1261.70 964.53 1913.72**
(703.03) (1053.32) (880.73) (704.16) (779.65) (646.08) (840.41)
Dil,2010 · 2014 -475.45 -1125.88 5.98 696.05 1171.07 3823.83*** -2151.74***
(784.06) (1504.64) (866.81) (626.60) (756.20) (663.50) (829.21)
Dil,2010 · 2015 -1311.73 -1125.88 65.99 -492.70 627.09 3054.98*** 2476.76**
(1097.07) (1504.64) (925.32) (496.74) (880.15) (1064.97) (1003.75)
Dil,2010 · 2016 -421.27 -308.46 457.92 -484.73 1860.60* 181.29 - 2350.38**
(1183.08) (1651.47) (925.32) (642.86) (1082.06) (331.68) (1174.21)
Treated Category AFI BIN SEI LIN RIN CIN OIN
Individual FE X X X X X X X
Tax Office FE X X X X X X X
Other Treatments X X X X X X X
F-value (Pre-2010) 1.74 2.05 1.06 2.42 0.13 14.02 1.38
p-value (Pre-2010) 0.14 0.09 0.37 0.05 0.97 1.58 0.24
Non-zero restriction X X X X X X X
Observations (absolute) 256,372 513,802 413,718 745,079 540,555 593,148 409,037
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-2016, own
calculations.
Notes: Dependent variable: Taxable Income. Each column represents a separate regression in which one of the income
categories is on the enforcement focus list: AFI: Agricultural and Forestry Income; BIN: Business Income; LIN: Labor
Income; RIN: Rental Income; CIN: Capital Income; OIN: Other Income. Only observations with at least one year of
non-zero values for the respective income category between 2005 and 2009 are considered. All treatment effects are in
absolute e values. All regressions include individual fixed effects and tax office fixed effects. All regressions use taxpayers
in the OFD Münster area only. Treatments in the same year and in later years are controlled for with dummies. F-
value and p-value for the test that the pre-2010 treatment group dummies β̂2005 - β̂2008 are jointly different from zero.
As this is violated for capital income in the years 2006 - 2008, the corresponding p-value is larger than one. Standard
errors are clustered at the tax office level and given in parentheses. The enforcement focus announcements for labor and
capital income are perfectly collinear in 2010 and 2011. Given that I extrapolate residence information back from 2012
to 2010, all taxpayers that were treated in these categories in 2010 were also treated in 2011. Thus, these point estimates
cannot be calculated. Furthermore, the point estimate for agricultural and forestry income in 2011 cannot be estimated.
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
concerning taxable income are above zero and suggest a positive increase. However,
the point estimates are not statistically significant from zero at conventional levels. For
capital income, point estimates after 2010 are positive and significant, but larger in size
than the direct effects. These large effects, the pre-trend concerns, and the potential
selection issues as mentioned before lead to a cautious interpretation of these point
estimates. For the other six income categories, the point estimates obtained for the
direct effects (Table 2.3) are well within the 95% confidence intervals of the effect on
taxable income.
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Figure 2.3: Treatment Effects - Total Effect (Taxable Income)
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Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statisti-
cal Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-
2016, own calculations.
Notes: Each graph shows the point estimate and the 95%-
confidence interval for β̂2005 to β̂2016: The difference in
overall taxable income between the treatment and con-
trol group for treatments in an income category. Further-
more, the estimates shown here include individual, year,
and tax office fixed effects and control for treatments in
all years of the policy. Standard errors are clustered at
the tax office level. Until 2009, prior to the first enforce-
ment policy, point estimates should be zero, indicating
no significant differences between the two groups. Sig-
nificant differences to zero in 2010 and later respectively
indicate immediate and long-term effects of the 2010 en-
forcement focus list policy. See Table 2.4 for the β̂2010 -
β̂2016 point estimates.
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Figure 2.4: Treatment Effects - Commuting Cost Deduction
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Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-2016,
own calculations.
Notes: Both figures show the β̂2005 - β̂2016 of being treated in labor income related commuting costs in 2010.
Figure 2.4a shows deductible commuting expenses on the y-axis. Figure 2.4b shows the sum of all labor income
related deductions on the y-axis. Thus, levels below zero indicate (a) lower commuting deductions or (b) lower sum
of all deductions for labor income relative to the control group.
To summarize, these results suggest that enforcement focus list announcements are
rather limited in their effectiveness to significantly reduce tax evasion. One noteworthy
exception is rental income, where focus announcements lead to long-term increases the
income reported in this category and could increase taxpayers’ overall taxable income.
2.5.3 Effects on Line Items
So far, the analysis has concentrated on enforcement focus announcements on the in-
come category level. One apparent drawback of these broad announcements is that
they might not be distinctive enough to induce changes in taxpayers’ detection prob-
abilities. However, there are also a number of line items which are mentioned on the
focus lists and available in the data set.
One of these particular line items concerns the commuting cost deductions that Ger-
man taxpayers can use. For every workday at the office, taxpayers can report the single
distance between their residence and the office. The commuting cost deduction was
explicitly mentioned on the 2010 enforcement focus list.
Taxpayers who were treated for this deduction did react significantly to the policy.
On average, treated taxpayers report 50e less in deductible commuting costs in 2010
relative to the control group. Relative to the national average of taxpayers reporting
commuting costs in 2010, this represents a decrease of about 3% ( 48.98
1,585.15
). As seen in
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Figure 2.4a, this reduction is persistent over time and increases in the following years
to point estimates of about -100e. A general effect is also visible, albeit less clearly,
when looking at the sum of all deductions for labor income in Figure 2.4b. Thus, very
distinctive enforcement announcements of line items can have a significant, immediate,
and long lasting effect.
It should be noted that this is a line item with a high level of verifiability at low
costs. For taxpayers commuting with their car, the commuting cost deduction is
simply the product of days worked and the one-way distance between residence and
workplace. For taxpayers using public transportation, tickets could be requested
to verify expenses. Interestingly, over-stating commuting cost deductions does not
seem to be unique to the German context, as researchers in Austria have highlighted
(Paetzold and Winner 2016).
2.5.4 Robustness Checks
The results in the previous part are based on an analysis with taxpayers residing in the
OFD Münster area. For these results to be unbiased, the stable unit treatment value
assumption has to hold, i.e. no substitution evasion.
Different Control Groups. To alleviate concerns about violations of the SUTV
assumption, three additional control groups are considered for which this violation
is unlikely. These control groups have in common that they are not subject to the
initial enforcement focus list announcement for the tax year 2010 and thus see no
change in their tax evasion detection probability. First, I consider taxpayers residing
in the disjoint part of North Rhine-Westphalia (OFD Rheinland), as highlighted in
blue in Figure 2.1. While not being subject to the enforcement focus lists, taxpayers
in this control group are still within the same state. Thus, whenever there are state-
wide time-varying changes that can effect the evasion decision, this affects both the
treatment and the control group.15 As shown in Figure B.4, when using this control
group, the point estimates for the direct effects are zero for all income categories. One
explanation for this result could be that NRW taxpayers in the untreated part still
consider the rollout in the OFD Münster area as a general increase in their evasion
detection probability and thus increase reported income.
As a second alternative control group, I consider taxpayers residing in neighboring
15As the enforcement focus list was rolled out in the OFD Rheinland area starting with the
2013 tax returns as well, this control group is only available until including 2012.
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states’ districts that share a border with the OFD Münster area. As these taxpay-
ers are subject to a different state’s tax enforcement regime (Lower Saxony, Hesse, or
Rhineland-Palatinate), the policy in North Rhine-Westphalia does not contain any
information regarding tax enforcement. Nonetheless, these taxpayers might be simi-
lar in (time-varying) unobserved characteristics to those living just across the border.
Therefore, these taxpayers constitute a reasonable additional control group for tax-
payers residing in the OFD Münster area. The results for this robustness check are
in line with the baseline specification. Only capital income, rental income, and other
income experience positive direct effects following the introducing of the enforcement
focus list.
Third, I consider all taxpayers living outside North Rhine-Westphalia as a control
group. Relative to this control group, the treated taxpayers only significantly increase
their capital income as a result of the initial publication of the enforcement focus list.
All other income sources remain unaffected.
To summarize, when using alternative control groups the results are similar or slightly
weaker than those of the baseline specification, underlining that the initial announce-
ment of enforcement focus lists was rather limited in its effectiveness. Likewise, this
demonstrates that substitution evasion is likely not a first order concern in this setting.
Entropy Balancing. For the direct effect on rental income and capital income, both
the graphical inspection of Figure 2.2 and the p-values in Table 2.3 suggest a violation
of the common trend assumption.
To alleviate concerns with respect to the common trend assumption, I provide a ro-
bustness check using the entropy balancing reweighting method as proposed by Hain-
mueller (2012). Here, I match the treatment and control group on the pre-policy level
means such that pre-intervention differences are mechanically eliminated. However,
one assumption I have to make is that the likelihood of evasion is equal after reweight-
ing. The results of this exercise can be seen in Figure B.7 in the appendix. The results
are in line with the baseline direct results and suggest that announcing rental income
as a focus point did increase the level of reported income. Likewise, taxpayers treated
on capital income and other income report more in their respective category, following
the initial publication of the enforcement focus list.
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2.5.5 Discussion
As seen in the previous parts, publishing enforcement focus lists has little direct effects
on reported income and limited effects on total taxable income. Only for three income
sources, capital income, rental income, and other income, the introduction of the en-
forcement focus list leads to an increase in reported income, i.e. positive direct effects,
for a few years. This limited response is at odds with the theoretical predictions by
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) concerning increases in detection probability. Previ-
ous work, e.g. Kleven et al. (2011), highlights that changes to the detection probability
lead to changes in reported income, with relatively larger effects for income categories
with a low degree of third-party reporting.
One potential explanation for this pattern could be the that tax compliance is already
very high in Germany. Then, a change in the detection probability would lead only to
small changes in reported income - potentially not distinguishable from zero - as the
vast majority of income is already reported. This is however rather unlikely, given the
existing level of tax evasion detected as published in official statements. For example,
in 2017 about 62,000 criminal proceedings related to tax evasion where processed (see
Bundesministerium der Finanzen 2018b).
For taxpayers to react to the enforcement focus list, they have to know about the policy
to begin with. Unfortunately, data on the awareness of this policy is not available.
However, given that it has been discussed in local and national newspaper outlets (see
footnote 8), it is likely that informed taxpayers are aware of the list. Furthermore,
conditional on being aware of the policy, the list has to shift a taxpayer’s subjective
detection probability in order to react by reporting more income in this category.
Similarly, it might be that the very general income source announcements only lead
to within-income category shifts. For example, if the list only mentions the general
category of business income, taxpayers might potentially report higher revenue but
thenadjust costs accordingly, asprevious research in thefirmcontext suggests (Carrillo
et al. 2017). Unfortunately, besides the previously highlighted line items for labor
income, there is no data on individual line items. Thus, quantifying within income
category shifting is unfortunately not possible.
As discussed here, the null-result for the majority of income categories can be rational-
ized by a number of reasons. However, the fact that taxpayers adjust the commuting
cost line item when it is mentioned on the list suggests that taxpayers are aware of the
policy and that there is indeed a reaction to the policy. Therefore, the enforcement fo-
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cus list can potentially be a useful tool to diminish tax evasion if the items mentioned
are chosen carefully, i.e. distinctive enough, and rather easy to verify.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper evaluates the causal effects of introducing enforcement focus list announce-
ments in the context of the German taxation process. These lists represent a simple
and low-cost tool to potentially increase tax compliance that has not been thoroughly
evaluated thus far. Due to the enforcement focus list, taxpayers who previously under-
reported income now face an increase in their evasion detection probability and should
therefore increase their income reported, relative to unaffected taxpayers.
By exploiting the initial rollout of the enforcement focus list and using a generalized
difference-in-differences estimation strategy, I show that the effects of this policy are
limited. Only three out of seven income categories, capital income, rental income,
and other income experience statistically significant direct effects, i.e. increases in the
level of reported income, relative to the control group. Overall taxable income only
increases significantly for one treated income category (capital income). However,
for the distinctive and easily verifiable line item of labor income related commuting
costs, taxpayers immediately report less deductions as a response to the enforcement
focus list. These effects further increase in size in 2011 and remain stable for the years
thereafter.
Overall, this suggests that taxpayers do react to the enforcement focus list. If the
threat is specific enough, taxpayers adjust their deductions accordingly. Thus, more
research is necessary on determinants of the reaction strength. Then, enforcement
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3.1 Introduction
Progressive income taxes are a common feature of tax systems around the world. They
balance the desire for revenue and redistribution on the one hand and the inevitable
distortion of taxpayers’ labor supply decisions on the other hand (Mirrlees 1971; Saez
2001). While most research on optimal taxation concerns statutory tax rates, effective
and statutory taxation often diverge. Potential reasons can be tax evasion or, as
highlighted in this paper, features of the tax system.
Twenty-five countries worldwide use complete optional tax filing systems, exempting
their taxpayers from filing an income tax return if they only earn wage income.1 An
additional five countries, such as Luxembourg and Japan, do not require their tax-
payers to file if their wage income falls below a certain threshold. Even in the United
States, taxpayers can be exempt from the duty to file if their income falls below a
certain threshold.2
Despite the significant number of countries employing optional filing systems, little
is known about their effects for effective taxation. Intuitively, optional tax filing
systems induce yet another trade-off in the taxation process. If withholding works
well, taxpayers do not need to file. However, if over-withholding is likely, taxpayers
might want to incur the costs of filing an income tax return to obtain a refund, or
abstain from filing altogether. Thus, effective taxation is likely affected by optional
filing settings, even more so when the share of non-filing taxpayers is high.
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence that optional tax filing systems have
strong effects on effective taxation. To do so, we focus on taxpayers in Germany, as the
German income tax system is a textbook example for optional tax filing. Similar to
many other countries, it features only very limited tax filing duties, exempting most
employees from the obligation to file an income tax return. As seen in Figure 3.1, every
year about one third of the German taxpayer population does not file an income tax
return, while only 21% do so voluntarily. In other words, while 53% of all taxpayers
can decide whether to file (optional filers), a minority of about 47% is legally required
to file an income tax return (compulsory filers).
For our work, we use the most recent cross-sectional administrative data set on tax-
1See Table C.1 for more information on countries with optional tax filing systems.
2Different thresholds apply depending on individual characteristics such as marital status or
age. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) provides an interactive tax assistant that determines
filing requirements (https://www.irs.gov/help/ita/do-i-need-to-file-a-tax-return, last
accessed: 2020-12-01).
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Data: Lohn- und Einkommensteuerstatistik, 2007-2016; provided by the German Federal Statistical Office upon
request.
Notes: The data set is the same as the one used in the empirical analysis in this paper. Prior to 2012, this statistic
was published every three years. Since 2012, the statistic is published annually. Data prior to 2007 is not directly
comparable, as employers were only required to electronically submit income tax returns by 2006. Therefore, not
all non-filers are captured prior to 2007. Differences to 100% are due to rounding.
payers in Germany for the year 2014. As a key feature, this data set includes rele-
vant information on non-filers, originating from the taxpayers’ automatic income tax
withholding statement provided by their employers at the end of the year. This state-
ment contains basic demographic information, gross wages, and income taxes remitted
throughout the year. Based on this information, we can compute the statutory tax
liabilities as defined in the tax schedule and compare it to effective tax remittances
observed in the data.
We provide multiple important insights. The share of non-filers relative to all optional
filers falls over income. While the non-filing share is as high as 90% in the lowest income
bins, the share drops to about 30% for taxpayers in the highest percentiles. This is
despite the fact that, relatively, non-filing hurts most at the lower end of the income
distribution. Over-remitting non-filers with income within the basic allowance pay an
effective average tax rate (ATR) of about 5%, despite a statutory rate of zero. In 2014,
these over-remittances sum up to at least 949 millione. On average, over-remitting
non-filers paid 360emore than intended, while the average for all non-filers is 116e.
By using cross-sectional data from 2010, we show that these patterns are persistent
over time. Furthermore, repeated cross-sectional analysis suggests that the filing
patterns are rather persistent than a once-in-a-lifetime phenomenon. Using non-filers’
average over-remittances and conventional tax filing time estimates, we argue that
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either information frictions about potential refunds or non-monetary filing costs, e.g.
aversion to forms, have to be sizeable to explain the observed patterns.
These descriptive results lead to a number of implications. If policymakers are con-
cerned about the equity effects of optional filing systems, the implications of our study
are straightforward. Non-filers’ over-remitted taxes should be automatically refunded
at the end of the year. For the unlikely case that these governmental funds are indis-
pensable, we provide a reform proposal for the top (two) marginal tax rates (MTRs)
to refinance the refunds.
However, if preferences are such that the effective taxation observed under the optional
filing system is desired, we highlight that there are institutional arrangements that can
achieve the same effective outcome more efficiently. Currently, non-filing taxpayers
face higher average tax rates and, by the nature of the progressive tax system, also
higher marginal tax rates. However, following the intuition of the tax perturbation
approach, while these higher marginal tax rates distort the labor supply decision of
individual non-filers, there is no tax revenue gain from taxpayers with higher income.
Thus, in a first hypothetical tax system, we compute the tax revenue effects associated
with the abolition of the basic allowance. Instead, all taxpayers would then pay a
marginal tax rate of 1.87%, the current effective marginal tax rate, for the previous
basic allowance of 8,354e. While taxpayers in the basic allowance range are, on
average, not worse off, this tax change raises about 4.03 billione in additional tax
revenue from taxpayers with income exceeding 8,354e. Hence, in this first approach,
taxpayers beyond the basic allowance pay more taxes than before.
In the second hypothetical tax system, we add another building block. Now, also
taxpayers beyond the basic allowance, on average, should not pay more income taxes
than in the current situation. Since higher income taxpayers already pay taxes starting
from the first euro of taxable income, marginal taxes beyond the basic allowance can be
reduced. As the net-of-tax return for labor increases, taxpayers exert additional effort
and increase their taxable income. Overall, this reform, purely based on behavioral
effects while maintaining the status-quo effective taxation, could lead to an increase in
taxable income ranging from 670 millione to 1.4 billione and associated tax revenue
increases between 157 millione and 327 millione.
Our work relates to three broad strands of the literature. First, there is an evolv-
ing literature on tax filing. Especially for the United States, previous research has
characterized non-filing taxpayers, either in the cross-sectional dimension (Erard and
Ho 2001) or over time (Fullerton and Rao 2019; Heim et al. 2014). Additionally,
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prior work examines the determinants (Guyton et al. 2017) and the long-term conse-
quences of tax filing (Ramnath and Tong 2017). Most closely related, Benzarti (2020)
highlights on an aggregate level that filing taxpayers behave rationally when decid-
ing about whether or not to itemize deductions. We contribute to this literature by
showing on the individual level that taxpayers forgo sizeable refunds by not filing a tax
return at all. Here, our results also relate to the broad literature on social stigma and
low take-up of social welfare programs (Currie 2006). In the context of personal in-
come taxation, social stigmata should most likely not be present, yet taxpayers forgo
sizeable refunds.3 Furthermore, our results show that optional tax filing systems are
associated with distortions that lead to sup-optimal outcomes in both the equity and
the efficiency dimension of personal income taxation.
Second, we add to the literature on effective taxation over the income and wealth dis-
tribution. So far, this literature has mostly examined taxpayers at the upper end of the
income distribution. Prominently, Saez and Zucman (2019a,b) recently contributed
to the debate about the effective taxation of the very wealthy in the US. In a similar
vein, Advani and Summers (2020) document low effective average tax rates for UK’s
top income taxpayers. Roller and Schmidheiny (2016) show that high-income tax-
payers migrate to low-tax regions in order to reduce their effective tax burden. Our
work highlights that optional tax filing systems are a feature of the tax system that
over-proportionally increases the effective tax burden at the lower end of the income
distribution.4
Lastly, we add to the broader literature on how taxpayers perceive and react to taxes.
Abeler and Jäger (2015) highlight that taxpayers do not always make optimal decisions
when facing complex tax systems. Similarly, Aghion et al. (2017) show that taxpayers
seem to be trading-off complexity with forgoing tax savings. More generally, individ-
uals seem to use simplifying heuristics when interacting with taxes (Rees-Jones and
Taubinsky 2020), and are therefore likely to misperceive (marginal) tax rates (e.g.
Feldman et al. 2016). Our results suggest that taxpayers might also not be aware of
basic institutional features of a tax system, namely withholding throughout the year
and thus potential benefits from tax filing. We discuss policy implications that can
reduce compliance costs and thus alleviate these concerns.
3It should be noted that unlike the EITC in the United States, social welfare programs in
Germany are not administered via the tax code.
4Relatedly, in a recent report, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (2020)
describes that high-income non-filers in the United States are able to reduce their tax liability.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 explains the institu-
tional background for tax filing in Germany, before Section 3.3 introduces the data
set. Section 3.4 gives descriptive information about non-filers, provides estimates for
over-remitted taxes, and highlights that the effective tax progressivity is attenuated
due to non-filing. In section 3.5, we discuss our results before analyzing the result-
ing policy implications, from an equity and an efficiency perspective, in section 3.6.
Lastly, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Background
To evaluate the effects of optional filing systems, it is important to understand the
institutional background for personal income taxation in Germany, as outlined below.
A more extensive overview is relegated to Subsection B.3 in the Online Appendix.
Tax Schedule. The German tax system features a progressive income tax schedule.
In 2014, annual taxable income up to a threshold of 8,354e is tax free. Above this basic
allowance, marginal tax rates are linearly increasing from initially 14% up to 42% for a
taxable income of 52,881e. Taxable income above this cutoff is taxed at a flat marginal
tax rate of 42%, before the top MTR of 45% applies for all taxable income exceeding
250,730e. For joint filing spouses, their tax liability equals twice the amount of taxes
that correspond to their mean taxable income. Figure C.1 graphically shows marginal
and average taxes for single and joint filing taxpayers in 2014.
Tax Deductions and Tax Credits. Taxpayers can reduce their taxable income
through various deductions.5 In a given year, all taxpayers are entitled to a standard
deduction for special expenses (36e) with wage earners being entitled to an additional
standard deduction for work-related expenses (1,000e in 2014). As these standard
deductions are rather small and various expenses are deductible, many taxpayers
surpass the standard level when itemizing. For a significant share of wage earners,
simply itemizing commuting costs is sufficient to exceed the standard deduction.6
5See Doerrenberg et al. (2017) for a detailed introduction regarding deduction possibilities in
Germany.
6Data from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Devel-
opment (https://www.bbsr.bund.de/BBSR/DE/Home/Topthemen/2017-pendeln.html; last ac-
cessed: 2020-02-13) shows an average commute of 16.8 km in 2015. Only itemizing the average
commuting of about 15 km is sufficient to surpass the standard deduction in 2014.
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Furthermore, taxpayers can deduct social security contributions. This includes parts
of the public health insurance costs and parts of their contributions towards the public
pension insurance. Additional special allowances, e.g. for single parents or elderly
employees, also exist. While there are tax credits that reduce the tax liability directly,
they are rather limited in scope. However, these expenses include common household
related services, e.g. for cleaning or facility management.
Optional and Compulsory Filing. Taxpayerscanbedivided intotwomaingroups:
Compulsory filers, who have to file an income tax return, and optional filers, who are
free to choose whether to file. When optional filers decide to file an income tax return,
we call them voluntary filers, whereas non-filers abstain from filing an income tax
return.
Whether a taxpayer is an optional or a compulsory filer is determined by three broad
circumstances. First, when appropriate taxes are withheld throughout the year, which
is true for labor income and most of capital income, there is no legal need to file
an income tax return. However, if taxpayers have other income sources for which
taxes are not or only partially withheld, such as business income, tax filing is legally
required. Second, taxpayers receiving social benefits to replace income, for example
unemployment benefits, which exceed an annual threshold (410e) are required to file.
Third, for wage earners, alterations to the automatic withholding scheme trigger a
filing duty. Most prominently, joint filing spouses can allocate both basic allowances
to one spouse. In order to assure correct taxation, these couples have to file an income
tax return if both earn wages. However, newlyweds have to opt-in for this allocation
of allowances, otherwise the withholding schedule effectively remains as if both were
single.
Thus, optional filers are either single taxpayers or married taxpayers for whom taxes
are withheld as if they were singles. Overall, as seen in Figure 3.1, optional filers
account for roughly 53% of the taxpayer population in 2014, with 32% of all taxpayers
(or 60% of all optional filers) not filing.
Exact Automatic Withholding. Employers automatically withhold income taxes
for their employees. On a monthly basis, employers extrapolate the annual gross
income (usually by multiplying the monthly gross income with twelve) and obtain the
corresponding extrapolated taxable income. When doing so, they take into account
one twelfth of the basic allowance, one twelfth of the two standard deductions, and
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the corresponding deductible social security contributions. Then, employers withhold
income taxes according to the ATR applying to the extrapolated taxable income.
Thus, there are two main ways through which over-withholding can occur. First, due
to inflated annual income extrapolations, the applicable ATR can be too high. This
includes taxpayers who are employed for less than twelve months as well as those
who are employed for the entire year but with fluctuating income. As the income tax
schedule is progressive, once a taxpayer receives a pay raise, withheld taxes are too
high on an annual level. Consider a taxpayer experiencing a pay raise in July. From
then onward, the applicable ATR will be as if this taxpayer earns the post-raise income
for the complete year. Thus, at the end of the year, withheld taxes are too high.
As this problem has been considered by lawmakers, employers have to adjust the final
income tax withholding in a given year to correct these fluctuations. However, while
employers with ten or more employees are required to conduct this adjustment, it is
optional for firms with less than ten employees to adjust the final withholding.7
Second, less than full consideration of the standard deductions leads to over-
withholding. When withholding income taxes, employers consider standard deduc-
tions for income related expenses and social security contributions for the correspond-
ing paycheck period (i.e. usually monthly). If the total employment period is less than
a year, only a fraction of the standard deduction is considered. However, the German
income tax code allows employees to fully deduct both standard deductions (36e and
1,000e in 2014) as soon as they worked for at least one day in the respective year.
Likewise, only a fraction of the basic allowance (8,354e) is considered.
Taxpayers who are employed less than twelve months therefore face both adverse
effects. As their employment spell with their employer is less than the full year,
no annual adjustment can take place. Furthermore, while being entitled to the full
standard deductions and the full basic allowance, their employer only considers a
fraction of both.
Automatic withholding is thus exact in the sense that, each month, employers ap-
ply the correct schedule for the extrapolated yearly income. However, there is over-
withholding whenever the true annual income does not equal this extrapolation, lead-
7In 2010, 81% of German enterprises had 9 or less individuals employed, representing 19%
of all employees (https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online?sequenz=tabellen&
language=en&selectionname=48121-0001; last accessed: 2020-04-12). This suggests a limited
number of mandatory end-of-year adjustments. Unfortunately, according to the Federal Ministry
of Finance, there is no official data on the number or share of conducted end-of-year adjustments.
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ing to tax over-remittances for non-filers. Then, even taxpayers with an annual tax-
able income below the basic allowance may pay a significant amount of taxes. We
quantify the amount of tax over-remittances that occur from over-withholding in sub-
section 3.4.2.
Tax Filing. Generally, there are three ways to file an income tax return in Germany.
First, taxpayers can file taxes all by themselves. This can be done either digitally,
with a free online solution provided by the tax authority, or in paper. The forms can
be found in local administration buildings or downloaded from official websites. Self-
filing is fairly common in Germany, as a 2013 online survey finds that about 50% of
taxpayers file either on their own or with the help of friends or family.8
Second, there are various electronic filing solutions. Specialized websites or applica-
tions provide fairly user-friendly interfaces and usually guide through the filing process
at low fixed fees. These filing solutions regularly provide hints for deductible expenses.
As mentioned before, there is also a cost-free governmental e-filing solution, which is
however rather less intuitive.
Third, taxpayers can hire a tax adviser. While this facilitates filing significantly,
this is the costliest solution in monetary terms. Furthermore, there are non-profit
organizations in Germany, similar to the Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Program
in the US, which provide low-cost tax advising and filing services for wage earners
(Lohnsteuerhilfevereine). The applicable fee depends on the annual income but is
usually significantly smaller than for certified tax advisers.
When taxpayers file an income tax return, they are required to provide a general
cover form with basic demographic and social information (including date of birth and
current residence) as well as their unique lifetime taxpayer-ID number. Furthermore,
special expenses, such as the above mentioned household related services, have to be
filed in here as well. Similar to various other countries, each income category has a
different form that taxpayers have to fill out. Thus, the number of additional forms
depends on the number of income sources.
While filing options, refund potentials, and individual costs might be driving the deci-
sion to file an income tax return, the purpose of this paper is to document the aggregate
effects of optional filing. However, some potential mechanisms and suggestive expla-
8This was part of a survey by the market research firm YouGov (https://yougov.de/news/
2013/05/28/knapp-die-halfte-der-deutschen-hatte-unterstutzung/; last accessed: 2020-
05-17).
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nations for the observed filing behavior are discussed in section 3.5.
Minimal Tax Filing. If taxpayers simply want to obtain over-withheld taxes, the
filing requirements are limited. Figure B.8 in the Online Appendix shows the cor-
responding two-page form for what we call a minimal filing scenario (correcting for
over-withholding only, not itemizing further deductions). For minimal filing, volun-
tary filers simply have to fill out these two pages by filling in personal information and
copy-pasting six values from their wage tax certificate (Lohnsteuerbescheinigung) as
shown in Figure B.7 in the Online Appendix. All wage income taxpayers are entitled
by law to receive this nationwide standardized wage tax certificate from their employ-
ers. The overall nomenclature in the tax filing form and in the wage tax certificate is
very similar, some lines in the filing form even explicitly refer to lines on the wage tax
certificate.
The minimal filing scenario ensures that all standard deductions and the full basic al-
lowance are taken into account and that the annual adjustment of taxes takes place.
While this minimal filing scenario has rather small real compliance costs in terms of
collecting information and filling out forms, it ensures that over-withholding through-
out the year is corrected for. Hence, this serves as our benchmark for correct taxation
in subsection 3.4.2, where we compute forgone refunds for non-filing taxpayers.9
After filing the income tax return, it usually takes up to three months until taxpayers
receive their final tax assessment (Steuerbescheid) and their potential refund. This
represents the end of the personal income taxation process for this tax year.
3.3 Data Set
Theaimof thispaper is toexaminetheeffectsofoptional tax(non-)filingontheeffective
taxation and to understand its distributional consequences. To do so, we use the 10%
stratified random sample of taxpayers in Germany for the latest year available (2014),
provided by the Research Data Center (RDC) of the Federal Statistical Office and
Statistical Offices of the Federal States. This data set contains 4,017,600 observations,
9While we abstract from the possibility that taxpayers might also have sufficient deductible
expenses to benefit from itemizing for the main analysis, Subsection B.4 in the Online Appendix
provides a counterfactual with assumptions about deductible expenses for non-filers.
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including 400,000 non-filers.10 In our data set, an observation, i.e. a taxpayer or
a taxable unit, refers either to married couples filing jointly or to taxpayers filing
individually.
Information for filing taxpayers originate from their tax returns and final tax assess-
ments. Consequently, the data set includes a large variety of information for voluntary
and compulsory filers. This includes all kinds of income measures, such as wage income
and other income sources, standard or itemized deductions, and the corresponding tax
payments - withheld taxes, final tax liabilities, and potential refunds or additional tax
payments. Furthermore, the data set includes information on taxpayers’ states of res-
idence, as well as basic demographic characteristics such as gender, age, number of
children, and marital status.
For non-filers, the statistical offices collect information from the employer-provided
end-of-year wage tax certificate, as described in the previous section. Thus, the infor-
mation provided in the data set is limited to the information provided by the employer.
This includes basic socio-demographic characteristics, such as gender, age, the tax-
payer’s state of residence, and the number of children that are known to the employer
for tax purposes. Most importantly, we know the gross income the taxpayer earned
throughout the year and withheld taxes. Based on this rather basic information, we can
both analyze non-filing behavior over the wage income distribution (subsection 3.4.1)
and calculate the amount of over-remitted taxes for large parts of the population of
non-filers as described in subsection 3.4.2.
To be included as a filing taxpayer in this data set, the tax assessment has to be
concluded within 2 years and 9 months after the tax year, i.e. September 30, 2016
for the tax year 2014. More generally, this data set does not contain tax assessment
information for (i) taxpayers who are still waiting for their final tax assessment, (ii)
taxpayers who objected their tax assessment and still wait for the final decision, and
(iii) voluntary filers who plan to file a tax return later. Compulsory filers regularly
have to file a tax return within five months following the tax year, whereas optional
filers have up to four years to file. While this is a potential confounder to our results,
there is no administrative data available to estimate this. However, off-the-record
10Basic descriptive statistics for the full sample can be found in Table C.2. To show consis-
tency later on, we run the same analyses on the 10% stratified random sample for 2010 (see also
section 3.5).
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conversations with practitioners suggest that this number is rather low.11
Throughout our main analyses, our focus is on optional filers. Thus, in section 3.4,
we exclude all compulsory filers to construct a sub-sample of all optional filers. This
excludes, for example, taxpayers who altered the withholding schedule throughout the
year or taxpayers with income sources that trigger a filing duty, e.g. rental income.
Lastly, to be able to determine the amount of over-remitted taxes in subsection 3.4.2,
we restrict our sample to optional filers for whom we can impute taxable income. This
excludes civil servants and optional filers with wage income of more than 48,600e
(about the 90th percentile within the wage income distribution of optional filers) due
to social security contribution rules.
3.4 Results
This section is divided into three parts. First, we document the prevalence of non-filing
and provide basic descriptive statistics for non-filers. Second, we compute tax over-
remittances for non-filers that occur from automatic withholding. In the third part,
we analyze the result of optional tax (non-)filing for differences between statutory and
effective tax schedules. Various extensions to these results, including robustness checks
and evidence for persistence, are discussed in the subsequent section, section 3.5.
3.4.1 Prevalence of Non-Filing
As previously shown, a substantial share of Germany’s taxpayers does not file a tax
return, so-called non-filers. In this section, we investigate the prevalence of non-filing
in more detail. Based on the administrative data described in section 3.3, we shed some
light on how (non-)filing differs along the income distribution. In addition, we provide
some basic characteristics for optional filers in general as well as both subgroups, non-
filers and voluntary filers.
Since we aim to investigate the effects of optional (non-)filing systems, we first restrict
our sample to all optional filers. These are mainly non-married employees with wage
income only. Additionally, our sample also includes married spouses who do not choose
to reallocate allowances between them throughout the year.
11After fifteen months following the tax year, i.e. starting in April 2012, tax refunds start to
accrue 4.5% p.a. in interest. However, this level of interest payment has recently been struck down
in Germany’s Federal Tax Court for refunds accruing in the calendar year 2015 and later.
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Mean 95% Con!dence Interval
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Share of non-filers among optional filers over annual wage gross income. Dashed grey line: Average share of
non-filers (61.15%) across all gross income levels. Statistics refer to taxable units which may be either an individ-
ual or married spouses in case of joint filing. For jointly filing spouses, we consider the average gross income. See
Figure C.2 for non-filing shares over income percentiles.
In the Appendix, Table C.3 provides basic descriptive statistics for all optional filers
as well as for the two subgroups of voluntary filers and non-filers. In total, there
are 683,718 optional filers in the sample, representing about 14.9 million German
taxpayers. Non-filers account for 61.15% of the weighted sample.12
Most relevant forouranalysis, non-filershave significantly lower incomethanvoluntary
filers. The average annual gross wage income for non-filers is 18,047e, or only 52%
of the average for voluntary filers. Figure 3.2 visualizes the share of non-filers among
all optional filers over the income distribution, showing a substantial heterogeneity in
filing behavior across income. Overall, there is a negative correlation between gross
income and tax non-filing. While close to 90% of the optional filers with an annual
gross income of less than 10,000e do not file a tax return, this share sharply declines
for higher income levels. Yet, Figure 3.2 also shows that non-filing is not unique to low
income earners. The share of non-filers stabilizes at around 30% for taxpayers with
12Deviations from the entire population of taxpayers, as shown in Figure 3.1, come from the
fact that we focus on singles and single-like married taxpayers.
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an annual gross income of at least 50,000e. Figure C.2 in the appendix shows this
relationship as a function of income percentiles.
In addition to income, there is some heterogeneity in filing behavior across other
demographic characteristics (see again Table C.3). Compared to voluntary filers,
non-filers are younger (34 vs. 37), they are more likely to live in Eastern German
states (23% vs. 19%), they are less likely to have kids (15% vs. 21%), and less often
married (7% vs. 13%). Overall, the share of married individuals is rather low among
optional filers, since the majority of married spouses are taxed jointly throughout the
year which triggers compulsory filing. In the Appendix, Figure C.4 and Figure C.3
decompose the non-filing shares for different marital and family statuses and over age
and gender, respectively. The observed patterns can be squared with multiple theories
which we discuss in section 3.5.
3.4.2 Tax Over-Remittance through Non-Filing
In subsection 3.4.1, we document that large parts of the taxpayer population are non-
filers and that non-filing occurs mainly, though not exclusively, at the lower end of
the income distribution. However, non-filing is not harmful if withholding works well
and there are no tax over-remittances. In this section, we compute non-filers’ tax
over-remittances occurring from automatic (over-)withholding and their choice not to
file an income tax return. To do so, we define a tax over-remittance as the difference
between the effective tax remittance of individual i (T effi ) via employer-withholding
and statutory tax payments that apply to her taxable income yi according to the tax
schedule (T schedule(yi)).
As discussed in section 3.2, taxes withheld are greater or equal than taxes according
to schedule, T effi ≥ T schedule(yi), under automatic employer withholding - a feature
common to most progressive income tax systems. Taxpayers with constant income
over the entire year have a difference of zero, i.e. T effi = T
schedule(yi), while there are
over-remittances in all other cases, T effi − T schedule(yi) > 0.
To obtain T schedule(yi), we proceed as follows: Starting from the annual gross wage
income, we construct the taxable income yi by subtracting the standard deductions
and special allowances for single parents or elderly employees, if applicable. Based on
demographics, we then determine social insurance contributions which are partly tax
deductible and subtract the corresponding deductions. This leads us to yi, the annual
individual taxable income (without taking into account any additional or itemized
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics - Final Sample
Optional Filers Voluntary Filers Non-Filers
Income mean+ 19,137.60 27,192.55 15,243.17
p25 6,513.00 18,930.00 4,185.00
p50 17,820.00 28,444.00 11,614.00
p75 30,407.00 36,338.00 24,300.00
p90 38,713.00 42,388.00 34,735.00
p99 47,186.00 47,903.00 46,218.00
Age mean+ 33.72 35.22 33.00
p50 30 32 29
Married share+ 4.61 0.63 6.53
East share+ 21.99 17.98 23.92
Children share+ 15.20 16.50 14.57
N absolute 429,069 220,818 208,251
weighted 12,016,340 3,916,260 8,100,080
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und
Einkommensteuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Individual taxpayers with gross income up to 48,600e only. No civil servants. Statistics are
based on weighted data if not indicated differently. Income: Annual gross wage income in e. Married :
Share of married taxpayers. This includes only individually filing spouses. East : Share of taxpayers
that live in Eastern states of Germany. Children: Share of taxpayers with at least one child that is
relevant for the tax authority. + indicates mean/share difference between voluntary filers and non-filers
significant at the 0.1% - level (two-sided t-test).
deductions). Following the statutory tax schedule, we then compute T schedule(yi)
which is equivalent to the tax payment in the event of minimal tax filing.
This simulation corrects for over-withholding through employers by smoothing fluc-
tuating incomes, i.e. it performs the annual adjustment of wage tax and considers
both the full standard deductions and the full basic allowance. Put differently, we
simulate the effects from minimal filing, as described in section 3.2. Under correct
withholding, for constant income over twelve months, yi equals the employer’s extrap-
olation of the annual taxable income and T schedule(yi) = T
eff
i . As this measure of tax
over-remittance does not take into account any additional itemized deductions, it can
be interpreted as the lower bound for benefits from filing. In Subsection B.4 of the
Online Appendix, we provide a range for potential gains when considering potential
additional deductions.
To determine the amount of over-remitted taxes, we have to restrict the sample to
taxpayers for whom the taxable income is imputable. Since we infer social insurance
contributions based on annual gross income, we have to exclude taxpayers for whom
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this cannot be done. This excludes taxpayers with an annual gross income above
48,600e in 2014 as well as civil servants. Both groups are free to choose whether or not
to enroll in the public health insurance and there is no information on the enrollment
status for non-filers. Additionally, we exclude joint filing married spouses and restrict
the sample to the working age population (16 ≤ age≤ 64).
The sample restrictions are explained in more detail in the appendix, subsection C.4.
The descriptive statistics for this final sample, which we will use for the remainder of
this section, are shown in Table 3.1.
In a first step, we decompose the share of non-filers by their tax over-remittances to
better understand the monetary impacts of non-filing. The black line in Figure 3.3
indicates the share of non-filers among all optional filers over the income distribution.
The stacked bars indicate the amount of over-remittance among the non-filers. For
each income bin, Figure 3.3 shows the share of taxpayers who over-remit 50e or more,
as well as the share of those who over-remit little or nothing. Put differently, the figure
highlights how tax over-remittance through non-filing is distributed over the income
distribution.
At first glance, it is apparent that automatic tax withholding works quite well for
the majority of non-filers. In each income bin, the share of non-filing taxpayers with
precise withholding (no over-remittance) is the largest. However, equally striking,
a significant number of non-filers substantially over-remit taxes through automatic
withholding and can expect refunds exceeding 50e from minimal filing. The share
of these taxpayers is particularly large at the lower end of the gross income distribu-
tion. This includes taxpayers who, following the statutory tax schedule, should not
pay any income taxes, i.e. individuals with an annual taxable income yi ≤ 8,354e,
T schedule(yi) = 0. Depending on the taxpayer’s situation, a taxable income of 8,354e
roughly corresponds to a gross income of about 10,000e when applying standard de-
ductions. Put differently, taxpayers in the first nine income bins should not pay any
taxes following the tax schedule. Further along the income distribution, the share
of taxpayers who do not file although they can expect a positive refund decreases, in
absolute and in relative terms. Thus, automatic withholding works increasingly well
along the income distribution.
Figure 3.4a shows the average (lower-bound) over-remittance for non-filing taxpayers
within each income bin. As documented in Figure 3.3, non-filers over-remit taxes at all
income levels. In absolute terms, the average over-remittance for all non-filers (solid
red line) is increasing with income until it reaches its maximum of about 270e for
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Share of Non-Filers Minimal Refund: 50+ !
Minimal Refund: up to 50! Minimal Refund: None
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Decomposition of the non-filing share (black line) over income by refund potential of the non-filers. Individ-
uals are grouped in 1,000-e-bins. Minimal refund : Lower bound for taxes over-remitted through non-filing. None:
No refund from minimal filing because taxes are withheld correctly. This is allowing for a range of 0 +/- 5e. Up
to 50e (50+e): Minimal refund of up to (more than 50e). Reading example: 64% of optional filers with an an-
nual gross income of 20,000e are non-filers. In this income bin, 17% of all optional filers have a minimal refund
potential of at least 50e.
the gross income bin around 16,000e. For higher income non-filers, the average over-
remittance is decreasing. There are two intuitive explanations for this pattern. First,
the increase in the average over-remittance for low income earners is likely driven by a
mechanical effect. Assuming that the extrapolated annual taxable income correlates
with the annual gross income, absolute over-remittance is increasing with gross income
because employers apply a higher average tax rate for a higher (extrapolated) taxable
income. Second, automatic withholding produces particularly high over-withholding
when the overall employment period within a given tax year is very short. In these
cases, the annual income is presumably low.
Conditional on over-remittance, the pattern is similar but the amount of over-remitted
taxes is significantly higher. Over-remitting non-filers with an annual gross income
of 16,000e effectively pay, on average, 570emore than they should according to the
statutory tax schedule.
Aggregated numbers for over-remitted taxes are shown in Table 3.2. On average,
non-filers over-remit 118e which is equivalent to 0.7% of their average annual gross
income. Conditional on over-withholding, non-filers over-remit 360e on average. In
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Figure 3.4: Effective Tax Payments of Optional Filers
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Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Individuals are grouped in 1,000-e-bins. See Figure B.6 in the Online Appendix for the same figure with
100-e-bins. Voluntary filers only. Figure 3.4a shows over-remitted taxes (positive) for non-filers and refunds
(negative) for voluntary filers, both relative to the statutory tax schedule by gross income. Figure 3.4b is the
observation-weighted combination of both graphs from Figure 3.4a.
aggregate, this leads to an overall sum of over-remitted taxes of at least 949 millione.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 3.2 show that much of the over-remitted taxes occur at the
very bottom of the income distribution. Overall, individuals with an annual gross
wage income below the basic allowance threshold over-remit 317 millione or 33.5% of
the total over-remittance even though the statutory tax payment for taxpayers with
taxable income yi ≤ 8,354e is T schedule(yi) = 0.13
It is important to recall that we only show the minimum amount of tax over-remittance
here. We exclude civil servants as well as employees with an annual wage income
greater than 48,600e from our analysis. Since non-filing behavior is also present in
these groups, this is likely to further increase the overall amount of over-remitted
taxes through limited filing requirements. Furthermore, our estimates for tax over-
remittance include standard deductions only. When taxpayers can make use of item-
ized deductions, refunds are higher. Additionally, we abstract from advantages for
joint filing married spouses here. For married non-filing individuals, we calculate their
filing counterfactual assuming individual filing. However, married spouses can typi-
13For our main analysis, we exclude taxpayers for whom too little taxes (∆ ≤ -5e) were
withheld relative to the tax schedule. We hypothesize that this may be driven by either changes
in tax relevant characteristics throughout the year which are not captured in yearly data or by
mistakes in withholding or reporting. When including these taxpayers, our results remain fairly
robust: The sum of over-remittance in 2014 is 805 millione instead of 949 millione.
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Table 3.2: Taxes Over-Remitted through Non-Filing - Lower Bound Estimates
(A) (B)
All Non-Filers With Over-Remittance
All y < threshold All y < threshold
Over-
Remittance
total 949,512,506 317,948,477 951,685,618 317,774,299
mean 118.66 79.41 360.04 247.40
p25 -0.40 0.00 42.00 45.00
p50 0.00 0.00 182.90 137.00
p75 40.09 38.00 518.60 348.00
p90 425.28 277.00 959.56 639.00
p95 760.16 498.00 1,265.00 846.00
N absolute 205,678 103,761 68,138 33,350
weighted 8,001,646 4,004,070 2,643,277 1,284,469
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und
Einkommensteuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Over-Remittance is defined as the difference between the the automatically withheld income
taxes and the income tax that applies according to the tax schedule. Over-remittances are listed in e.
(A): All non-filers in the sample. (B): Only those non-filers with over-remittance, defined as a deviation
of more than 5e from the statutory tax schedule. y < threshold : Individuals with an annual gross wage
income below the basic tax allowance threshold.
cally reduce their tax liabilities by filing jointly. As we lack information on married
non-filers’ spouses, we cannot compute this here.
3.4.3 Effective Tax Schedule
To better understand the redistributional consequences of the optional (non-)filing
system, we evaluate effective tax payments. In a first step, we combine the effective tax
payments of non-filers (including over-remittances) and the effective tax payments of
voluntary filers (including refunds from deductions beyond the standard deductions)
to highlight adverse effects of optional tax (non-)filing. In a second step, we define the
effective tax schedule for non-filers and highlight the deviation from the statutory tax
schedule.
Figure 3.4 displays taxes remitted by non-filers and optional filers relative to the
minimal filing scenario. Hence, the zero intercept represents T schedule(yi), the case of
minimal filing. As discussed before, due to over-withholding, non-filers pay more than
foreseen by the schedule and are found above the zero intercept. Voluntary filers, who
might be able to report further itemized deductions and ultimately reduce their tax
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liability, relative to the minimal filing scenario, are below the zero.
In Figure 3.4a, non-filers and voluntary filers are analyzed separately. While non-filers
over-remit taxes at all income levels, the opposite is true for voluntary filers. They
always reach at least the minimal filing situation or can reduce their tax liabilities
by itemizing deductions. Naturally, voluntary filers with income below the basic
allowance, i.e. around 10,000e in gross income, pay no income tax. As there is no
way to reduce the tax payments below zero here, voluntary filers remain on the zero
line. Above the allowance threshold, tax refunds are almost linearly increasing with
income. The maximum refund is reached for individuals with an annual gross wage
income of 47,000e and is as high as 813e for this group. Put differently, in addition to
correcting for over-remitted taxes through automatic withholding, voluntary filers in
this income bin report deductions which lead to an additional average refund of 813e.
In the appendix, Table C.4 shows that voluntary filers achieve these refunds primarily
through two channels, by itemizing special expenses (declared by 64% of voluntary
filers) and income related expenses (declared by 58%). In monetary terms, income
related expenses are the most relevant with an average value of 1,716e above the
standard deduction of 1,000e. Especially low income voluntary filers are good at
reducing their tax liability, as the share of filing taxpayers receiving a full benefit is
large.14 Intuitively, for these employees, obtaining higher refund shares is much easier
as their withheld taxes are relatively low in absolute terms. Significant shares of lower
income earners manage to get a full tax refund. For higher incomes, the refund share
stabilizes at around 10%, indicating that absolute refunds are strongly correlated with
gross income.
Figure 3.4b is a combination of both solid lines from Figure 3.4a, each weighted
by the corresponding number of observations in each income bin. Combining over-
withholding by non-filers and refunds by voluntary filers leads to the overall effective
tax payments for the population of optional filers. There is a clear relationship be-
tween the effective tax payment and annual gross income. On average, very low in-
come earners lose due to non-filing, while medium and higher income earners are more
likely to be voluntary filers. Voluntary filers benefit from two channels: Potential
over-withholding is corrected when filing and, additionally, itemized deductions lead
to further tax reductions. In aggregate, optional filers with an annual gross income of
up to 19,000e over-remit taxes relative to the schedule. Higher income optional fil-
14Schächtele (2019) shows that filing taxpayers bunch with their taxable income at the basic
allowance threshold in the German system. However, he abstains from examining non-filers.
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Figure 3.5: Effective Tax Schedule for Non-Filers
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Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Individuals are grouped in 1,000-e-bins. See Figure B.5 in the Online Appendix for the same figure with
100-e-bins. ATR based on taxes remitted over the year through automatic withholding by the employer. Tax
schedule: Statutory ATR that corresponds to the respective gross income in the income tax schedule. Figure 3.5b
shows the absolute difference between the red lines and the black line in Figure 3.5a. This is equivalent to the lower
bound for gains from filing/minimal filing.
ers, on average, claim more than the standard deductions and thus pay less than under
minimal filing.
Figure 3.5 displays the effective tax schedule in terms of the average tax rate for non-
filers and mirrors the results of Figure 3.4 in relative terms. As in Figure 3.4, the
black line in panel A and the horizontal intercept at zero in panel B correspond to
T schedule(yi). It is clearly visible in Figure 3.5a that taxpayers below the basic allowance
have positive effective average tax rates, despite facing a statutory ATR of zero and
thus not being liable to pay any income tax. Overall, non-filers whose statutory ATR
is zero face an effective ATR of about 2%. This already includes non-filers for whom
automatic withholding works well. Conditional on over-remittance, the effective ATR
is close to 4.5% for these taxpayers.
It is important to stress that non-filers in this income range would receive a full tax
refund for all taxes remitted throughout the tax year when filing a minimal tax return
(see section 3.2 for minimal filing). Furthermore, Figure 3.5b highlights again that,
whenmovingalong the incomedistribution, theabsolutedeviationof the effectiveATR
from the tax schedule is decreasing and automatic withholding works increasingly well
for higher income levels. The absolute difference between effective and statutory ATRs
as depicted in Figure 3.5b can also be interpreted as the monetary costs of non-filing
relative to the annual gross income. Non-filers in the lowest income bins thus forgo
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nearly 2% of their annual gross income due to non-filing. These relative monetary
costs of non-filing are much lower for higher incomes. For non-filers with an annual
gross income of 30,000e or more, their average over-remittance amounts to less than
0.5% of their gross income.
There are two factors driving the high effective ATRs at very low income levels. First,
as shown in Figure 3.2, low income earners are very likely to be non-filers. Second,
automatic withholding has its strongest shortcomings at the lower end of the income
distribution, as over-withholding is particularly likely for very low income earners.
Interestingly, a similar pattern can be found in the US, where over-withholding is very
common among all taxpayers but especially likely for low income earners (Jones 2012).
So far, we have shown that non-filing is very common, with the highest non-filing shares
at the lower end of the income distribution. Overall, non-filers substantially over-remit
income taxes, especially low income non-filers. Thus, the optional (non-)filing system
leads to an effective taxation that does not match the statutory taxation as defined by
the tax schedule. Since mainly low income earners face higher effective ATRs compared
with statutory tax rates, effective redistribution is weakened. Consequently, optional
(non-)filing also affects the income inequality of after-tax income. We document the
effect of optional (non-)filing on income inequality in Table C.5, by comparing the
Gini-coefficient and percentile ratios for pre-tax income as well as for after-tax income
pre and post filing.
If legislators want the effective taxation to match the statutory tax schedule, this could
be attained by refunding taxpayers in case of tax over-remittance. However, this comes
at the cost of reducing the governmental budget. Implications and potential budget
neutral reforms are discussed below in subsection 3.6.1.
It is also possible that behavioral responses to the optional (non-)filing system have
been taken into account by legislators and that the effective taxation matches the
intended effective tax schedule. In this case, legislators may not want to refund over-
remittances. However, we can show that the optional (non-)filing system cannot be the
optimal tax system for obtaining the observed effective taxation. In subsection 3.6.2,
we examine such an alternative approach. This reform would preserve the current
effective taxation (T effi ) over the income distribution but allows for lower MTRs in
certain income ranges and thus potential efficiency gains.
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3.5 Discussion
In this part, we do multiple things. First, we provide two robustness checks to validate
our results from the previous section. Second, we provide suggestive evidence on
the persistence of non-filing before, third, discussing potential drivers of non-filing.
Fourth, we provide an analysis of tax filing incentives.
3.5.1 Robustness Checks
While Figure 3.1 provides evidence that non-filing is constant over time on an aggre-
gate level, we provide micro-level evidence that the observed patterns in the previous
sections are stable over time. We do so by running the same analyses on the 10% strat-
ified random sample for 2010. All results are qualitatively similar, yet smaller in size.
The average over-remittance for non-filers is 102e in 2010, compared to 118e in 2014.
This is equivalent to a 15% increase from 2010 to 2014, which is proportional to the
overall economic development over the same time period.15 We estimate that non-
filers in 2010 over-remitted at least 603 millione through automatic tax withholding,
about 346 millione less than in 2014. While the deviation is relatively small in per
capita terms, the number of non-filers in our sub-sample is significantly smaller in
2010, leading to a larger aggregate deviation. Descriptive statistics concerning filing
shares and refund potentials are similar to those found in 2014. All figures and tables
for this robustness check can be found in Subsection B.1 of the Online Appendix.
When examining non-filing shares at the lower end of the income distribution, see
Figure 3.2, we included all taxpayers, irrespective of whether they had any tax pay-
ments withheld throughout the year or not. However, for taxpayers who had no taxes
withheld, there is no immediate monetary benefit of filing an income tax return. Ex-
cluding this group decreases the non-filing share below the basic allowance threshold
by roughly ten percentage points. Nonetheless, the non-filing share in these income
ranges remains at about 80 percent (see Figure C.5).
15Following data from the Federal Statistical Office (https://www-genesis.destatis.de/
genesis/online?sequenz=tabellen&language=en&selectionname=81000-0003; last accessed:
2021-01-17), the German gross national income increased from 2,616 billione in 2010 to 2,986
billione in 2014 which constitutes a 14% rise.
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3.5.2 Persistence of Non-Filing
While tax non-filing and over-remittances are consistent over time on the aggregate
level, it is equally interesting whether these patterns persist on the individual level, too.
It might be that over-remittances occur only in distinct circumstances that happen
very rarely or maybe only once.16 The prime example is a young employee entering
the labor market mid-year. Since vocational training cycles and academic education
programs regularly end throughout the year, these employees typically work less than
twelve months in their first job post graduation. Thus, employers will typically over-
withhold taxes for those entering the labor market, as these taxpayers do not qualify
for the annual adjustment. In addition, one may assume that knowledge about the
institutional details of the tax filing system is relatively small for young employees who
pay income taxes for the first time in their life. These taxpayers would thus be overly
prone to non-filing.
In order to assess whether non-filing is a once-in-a-lifetime phenomenon or persistent
over time, individual level panel data is necessary. Unfortunately, the corresponding
administrative data set, the German Taxpayer-Panel, only recently started sampling
non-filers. Therefore, conclusive inferences on the persistence of non-filing cannot be
drawn yet. However, we can exploit the repeated cross-sections to shed some light
on the question whether over-remittance is a one-time phenomenon or a persistent
pattern.
Figure 3.6 illustrates that the share of non-filers relative to optional filers is indeed
highest among taxpayers in their early twenties. This pattern also holds when ex-
amining the share of non-filers relative to all taxpayers (see Figure 3.6b). Figure 3.6
furthermore shows how this same cohort has evolved four years later. While young
taxpayers under the age of thirty in 2010 see a reduction in non-filing shares, i.e. an
increase in tax filing, older cohorts do not seem to change their behavior.
The combination of Figure 3.6a and Figure 3.6b also illustrates that the older taxpayers
are, the more likely it is for them to be compulsory filers. While the share of non-filers
relative to all optional filers remains fairly constant starting at age 30, the share of
non-filers relative to all taxpayers declines with age.
In additional work, presented in the appendix (Figure C.6), we illustrate that over-
remittance is common over the entire age distribution. While there are slightly more
16See Fullerton and Rao (2019) for a related analysis of taxpayers who do not owe federal
income taxes.
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Figure 3.6: Non-Filing Share Over Age in 2010
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Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2010 and 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Repeated cross sections. Individuals are grouped by their age in 2010. Figure 3.6a shows the share of
non-filers among the optional filers in the final sample. After age 30, non-filing relative to all optional filers is a
persistent phenomenon. Figure 3.6b shows the share of non-filers relative to all taxpayers (with mean age for mar-
ried taxpayers). Within a cohort, tax filing increases up until age 30. As older taxpayers become more and more
likely to be compulsory filers, due to e.g. marriage and additional income sources, the share of non-filers relative
to all taxpayers decreases beyond the age of thirty.
tax over-remittances for taxpayers in their early twenties, there is no strong variation
for older age groups. In 2014, more than 10 percent of optional filers within each age
cohort are non-filers with over-remittances of more than 50e. For teen aged taxpayers,
substantial over-remittances are least prevalent which can be explained by their low
income levels. Employees in this age span are often apprentices whose income, even
on an annual level, is within the basic allowance.17
Based on this repeated cross-sectional analysis, we conclude that over-remittance is
likely not a one-time phenomenon that occurs for labor market entrants only, but a
rather persistent behavior over time. The optional (non-)filing system thus systemat-
ically leads to over-remittance for taxpayers at various stages of their lives.
3.5.3 Potential Drivers for Non-Filing
As non-filing is persistent over time, it remains important to understand potential
drivers for this. Given the limited socio-economic data available for non-filers, we can
17Following data from the Federal Institute for Vocational Education and Training, the average
monthly income of apprentices in 2014 is 802e in West German States and 737e in East German
States (https://www.bibb.de/de/12209.php; last accessed: 2020-11-25). These values refer to
apprenticeships covered by social agreements. The overall average is likely to be lower.
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Table 3.3: Compliance Costs
Compliance Time Implied Net Hourly Wage
(A) Statistisches Bundesamt (2012)
Basic forms 1.69 213.04
All forms 4.52 79.65
(B) Blaufus et al. (2014)
Lower bound ylow 3.90 92.32
Upper bound ymed 9.76 36.89
(C) Benzarti (2020)
Form 1040 9.40 38.30
Notes: On average, non-filing can be rational if the implied net hourly wage, i.e. the average lower
bound refund (360.04e) divided by the respective time estimates above, is higher than the average net
wage. Time is measured in hours, wages are measured in e. (A): Based on interviews, the German
Federal Statistical Office directly measures the average compliance time for tax filing in Germany in
2009 to be 4.52 hours for a typical employee. The estimate includes time spent for filing (3.83 hours)
as well as for preparation and follow-up work (0.69 hours). Out of the 3.83 hours, 1 hour results from
three basic forms that require information similar to the minimal filing form which leads to a total of
1.69 hours. (B): Blaufus et al. (2014) find that compliance time increases with income. They estimate
the compliance time to be at least 3.9 hours for non self-employed taxpayers whose taxable income y is
≤ 22,000e and at most 9.76 hours for taxpayers with y ∈ (22,001e, 42,000e). (C): Benzarti (2020) in
Table 1, Panel b, column (1), he mentions that filing hours for a standard 1040 as surveyed by the IRS
amount to 9.40 hours. We assume this to be the closest substitute for our minimal filing counterfactual.
only draw cautious conclusions. Generally, if expected refunds are smaller than filing
costs, non-filing can still be rational. These costs to file consist of monetary and non-
monetary costs. The former can be thought of as the time required to collect necessary
forms and to fill them out. In contrast, non-monetary costs are diverse in nature and
include, for example, aversion to fill out tax forms. When using conventional monetary
filing cost estimates from the literature and related studies, we find that they are, on
average, rather unlikely to exceed refunds.
Conditional on tax over-remittance, the average forgone refund in our sample is 360e
for non-filers (see Table 3.2). For non-filing to be individually rational, compliance
costs thus have to be higher than 360e. For each of these time estimates, we calculate
the implied net hourly wage that is required to result in non-filing as the rational
decision, given the average forgone refund of 360e. The results are shown in Table 3.3.
For the compliance time, we use estimates from three different sources (Benzarti 2020;
Blaufus et al. 2014; Statistisches Bundesamt 2012).
The estimated compliance times in Table 3.3 originate from different filing situations
(see table notes for more details) and thus vary largely in size. As a consequence, the
implied net hourly wages differ equally. We consider the filing time estimate of 1.69
hours from the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012) to
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be closest to our minimal filing situation. To fill out three forms that lead to the same
result as in the minimal filing situation, an employee needs on average 1.69 hours. Yet,
this does not necessarily imply that 1.69 hours is a good approximation for the average
non-filer’s compliance time. If we assume positive selection into filing based on tax
literacy, non-filers are likely to need more time for the same filing requirements than
filers.
Importantly however, for the entire range of compliance times, the implied net hourly
wages are significantly larger than the average hourly gross wages of about 21e in
2014.18 Even the smallest implied net hourly wage is nearly twice as large as the av-
erage gross hourly wage. Therefore, we conclude that non-filing, on average, cannot
be explained by monetary filing costs alone. Therefore, non-monetary costs and in-
formation frictions are likely to be significant.
Here, our results also shed some light on the puzzling pattern that especially low
income earners often exhibit incomplete take-up rates for the EITC or other social
welfare benefits (see e.g. Currie 2006). In these situations, individuals forgo large
sums of money, often larger than in our study. However applying for the EITC or social
welfare benefits often comes with a certain degree of social stigma. These stigmata
are often seen as a driver for low take-up albeit more widespread eligibility. We argue
that for the case of non-filing no such stigmata exists. However, even in the absence
of social stigma, take-up of refunds is low, suggesting that other frictions, inherent
to tax filing and welfare take-up, seem to be important too (see also Finkelstein and
Notowidigdo 2019; Linos et al. 2020).
One likely explanation are informational frictions. A representative survey in 2014,
conducted at the request of a non-profit organization assisting with filing, revealed
that on average respondents could only answer 5.2 out of 9 basic questions about the
tax system correctly. Interestingly, 29% of the respondents think that deductions are
only applicable up until the value of the standard deduction.19 Hence, it seems very
likely that non-filers are also not aware of their individual potential refund. In line
with previous evidence related to benefit take-up, e.g. Chetty et al. (2013) and Bosch
et al. (2019), we conclude that informational frictions are likely to play an important
role in the filing decision as well.
18The Federal Statistical Office provides quarterly data for gross earnings. In 2014,
those ranged from 20.54e to 20.99e (https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/online?
sequenz=tabellen&language=en&selectionname=62321-0001; last accessed: 2020-11-25).
19See https://www.vlh.de/presse/pressemitteilungen/umfrage-so-viel-wissen-die-
deutschen-ueber-steuern.html (last accessed: 2021-02-24) for more information.
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As concerns gender, Figure C.3 in the appendix highlights that the difference in filing
rates between gender are limited. At older ages, female taxpayers seem to be more
likely to voluntarily file an income tax return. However, generally, gender does not
seem to be driving tax filing.
3.5.4 Tax Filing Incentives
As previously outlined, both filing costs and informational frictions concerning the
filing process and refund potentials influence the tax filing decision. As tax filing rates
correlate with some socio-demographic characteristics, this suggests that tax filing
incentives do also play a role in the tax filing decision.
In the appendix, Figure C.4 illustrates non-filing shares over income split up along
two dimensions: Marriage and children. Generally, both single and married taxpay-
ers with children are more likely to be tax filers. Single taxpayers without children
have the highest non-filing share for close to all income levels. We suggest that a po-
tential explanation for this difference can be found in different filing incentives: While
opportunity costs are likely to be higher for single taxpayers with children, they still
exhibit a larger share of filers, conditional on income. Similarly, both single and mar-
ried parents have higher deduction potential (e.g. childcare expenditures) and might
be more liquidity constrained. Therefore, these taxpayers might view tax filing as an
opportunity to obtain a refund.
More generally, as seen in Figure 3.2, tax filing is more likely the higher a taxpayer’s
income is. This might be driven by differences in institutional knowledge about the
filing system and deduction possibilities. Additionally, their incentive to file an income
tax return is also higher, as marginal tax rates increase with income.
When voluntary filing an income tax return, a the majority of taxpayers is able to
declare deductions beyond the standard values of 1,000e and 36e for work-related
expenses and special expenses, respectively. We provide specific numbers on this in the
appendix (Table C.4). While only a limited number of taxpayers declare extraordinary
burden, e.g. due to severe illnesses, about 21% of all voluntary filing taxpayers in 2014,
are able to report expenses qualifying as tax credits. This number is however relatively
low, given that household related services, e.g. for cleaning or facility management,
and home improvement costs for craftsmen are included in this category. Thus, both
homeowners and renters are likely to benefit from this regulation.
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3.6 Policy Implications
We have shown that, due to tax over-withholding and limited tax filing obligations,
statutory and effective income taxation do not coincide. Especially low income tax-
payers are hurt as they are more likely to be non-filers and to over-remit taxes.
Our results have tangible implications for policymakers and the design of the tax
system. A general take-away concerns behavioral responses which have to be taken
into account when designing (tax) policies. Effective outcomes are not only shaped by
legal institutions but also by individual decisions. In related tax settings, Roller and
Schmidheiny (2016) show that high income taxpayers reduce their effective tax burden
by moving to low-tax regions. Furthermore, Saez and Zucman (2019b) show that, in
the US, very wealthy individuals are able to substantially decrease their effective tax
rates on wealth. Importantly, our findings stress that there also exist policy settings
that affect taxpayers at the lower end of the income distribution.
For the specific setting that we study, policy implications depend on the intended de-
gree of income redistribution. Two alternatives are possible. In the first alternative,
the statutory tax schedule mirrors the intended degree of redistribution. Put differ-
ently, the assumption is that policymakers strive for the effective taxation to reflect
what is written down as the statutory tax schedule. In particular, this implies that
the basic allowance threshold for low income taxpayers is considered. This seems
rather likely for two reasons. First, a basic allowance is included in the statutory tax
code. Second, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 1992 that a minimum
amount of income may not be taxed.20 In this alternative, the status quo is concern-
ing in terms of equity because there is less income redistribution than desired. Here,
the intuitive policy recommendation is to refund over-remitted taxes to non-filers. We
discuss this scenario and potential practical challenges in subsection 3.6.1.
A second possible alternative is that policymakers take taxpayers’ non-filing behavior
into account when designing the tax system. In this case, the effective taxation may
mirror the intended degree of redistribution. In other words, non-filing and tax over-
remittances, mostly by low income taxpayers, are taken into account when desigining
the tax schedule. In subsection 3.6.2 we analyze the current effective taxation from this
perspective. Providing two hypothetical tax systems, we show that the current system
20The decision is based on the premise that income should only be taxed when surpassing the
amount that is required to meet existential needs. The full ruling can be found here: http:
//www.bverfg.de/e/ls19920925_2bvl000591.html (last accessed: 2021-02-06).
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exhibits sizeable efficiency deficits. The same effective taxation can be achieved while
simultaneously increasing tax revenue.
First, we implement the current de-facto taxation below the basic allowance into the
statutory tax system, rather than obtaining it through over-remittances of low income
non-filers. This leads to a mechanical increase in tax revenue from higher income tax-
payers without imposing additional distortions in terms of higher MTRs. Building on
the intuition from the first hypothetical tax system, we then provide a more sophisti-
cated approach for demonstrating that optional (non-)filing cannot be considered an
efficient tool for reaching the effective income taxation. In this second approach, we
show that even without mechanically increasing tax revenue, implementing the ob-
served effective taxation as statutory tax schedule would increase tax revenue because
of behavioral responses. Put differently, we show that the same effective redistribu-
tion over income can be obtained in a more efficient way, i.e. with less distortions in
terms of effective MTRs.
3.6.1 Implications for Equity
Due to non-filing, the effective tax progressivity observed is lower than the statutory
tax progressivity. Thus, if we assume that the statutory tax schedule reflects societal
preferences for redistribution, this attenuation of redistribution is sub-optimal from
an equity perspective. The coherent policy implication in this case is to automatically
refund any over-remittance to non-filing taxpayers. This ultimately realigns statutory
and effective taxation.
Intuitively, one can think of automatic refunds for non-filers as equity gains without
efficiency losses. On average, non-filing taxpayers currently face higher average and
marginal taxes than intended by the schedule. A tax refund would reduce their effective
average tax rate and the applicable marginal tax rate, increasing their net-of-tax rate
and thus generating welfare gains for low income taxpayers. In terms of labor supply
incentives, this would, if anything, lead to efficiency gains as formerly over-remitting
non-filers would now face lower effective MTRs.
Clearly, automatically refunding over-remittances to non-filers reduces the govern-
mental budget relative to the current situation. However, while substantial in abso-
lute terms, the relative importance of tax revenue collected through over-remittances
is limited. The sum of all over-remittances (950 millione) accounts for about 0.15% of
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Germany’s overall tax revenue in 2014 (644 billion e).21 For the case that automatic
refunds, nevertheless, jeopardize the governmental budget, we provide two back-of-
the-envelope calculations for budget neutral reforms. We approximate the required
increase in the (two) top marginal tax rates that would levy sufficient funds to finance
automatic refunds for non-filers. Abstracting from income effects, we show that for
conventional elasticity of taxable income estimates, today’s top marginal tax rate of
45% would have to be increased by about 2.9 to 4.9 percentage points. This change
raises the required tax revenue of 950 millione only from taxpayers in the highest in-
come tax bracket. When considering the top two MTRs (45% and 42%), both would
have to be increased by 0.8 to 1.1 percentage points to around 46% and 43%, respec-
tively. We provide more details for the approach and results of this computation in
Subsection B.5 of the Online Appendix.
If automatic refunds are not feasible due to administrative or legal reasons, tax au-
thorities could provide pre-populated forms for taxpayers exclusively earning wage
income. Automatically sending out pre-populated forms is a policy that is already in
place in other countries, for example in Norway.22
These pre-filled forms can address two potential drivers for non-filing. First, they
might provide information about over-remittances that may not be salient to non-
filers in the current system. Second, they reduce the (expected) compliance costs
of filing. Providing pre-populated forms is considered a rather cost-effective way to
reduce compliance costs of tax filing (Benzarti 2021). For the US, Benzarti (2021)
estimates that 70% of Schedule A could be pre-populated which would lead to a 70%
reduction in compliance costs (from $ 24 to $ 7 billion).
Both automatic refunds and pre-populated forms would increase the degree of effective
income redistribution. In addition, both measures would also be beneficial for a large
set of currently filing taxpayers. Automatic refunds would benefit voluntary filers who
only file to obtain their over-withheld taxes. Filing an income tax return would no
longer be necessary for those taxpayers. For automatically provided pre-populated
forms, all taxpayers with wage income can benefit, assuming that this would reduce
21Data from the Federal Statistical Office (https://www-genesis.destatis.de/genesis/
online?sequenz=tabellen&language=en&selectionname=71211-0001; last accessed: 2020-11-
26).
22Information on pre-populated tax forms in Norway is provided by the Norwegian Tax Admin-
istration (https://www.skatteetaten.no/en/person/taxes/, last accessed: 2020-11-30). Right
now, pre-populated forms in Germany are available upon request for taxpayers that are already reg-
istered for online filing (https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/display/CEFDIGITAL/2019/
07/31/German+pre-filled+tax+return, last accessed: 2020-11-30).
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the compliance costs for filing. In 2014 for example, this would have benefited about
23 million taxable units, single filing individuals and joint filing spouses, that received
some wage income.
3.6.2 Implications for Efficiency
So far, we have focused on the redistributive effects of optional tax (non-)filing in
terms of effective ATRs or total tax remittances. However, higher average tax rates
inextricably imply higher effective marginal tax rates. Tax over-remittances occur due
to incorrect extrapolations of the annual taxable income ỹi as described in section 3.2.
Given the progressive nature of the tax system, a taxpayer’s effective ATR is, at best,
equal to the statutory ATR, i.e. ATRschedule(ỹi) ≥ ATRschedule(yi). Consequently,
the same intuition applies to the effective MTR defined as τ effi = τ
schedule(ỹi) ≥
τ schedule(yi). Thus, over-remitting non-filers also face higher effective MTRs than
intended by the tax schedule, as illustrated in the appendix (Figure C.7).23
While higher marginal tax rates increase tax revenue for a given level of income, they
also entail efficiency costs. If the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the
(effective) marginal tax rate is positive, an increase in the marginal tax rate decreases
the incentives to work. Consequently, the taxpayer’s labor supply decision and income
are affected. This conflict between raising more tax revenue to support lower income
taxpayers and the efficiency costs of distorting labor supply decisions is known as
the equity-efficiency trade-off and has been at the core of the decade-long research
regarding optimal income taxation (e.g. Mirrlees 1971; Saez 2001). Thus, even if the
status quo effective taxation represents the societal preferences for redistribution, i.e.
there are no equity concerns related to the optional (non-)filing system, the system may
not be optimal in terms of efficiency. Building on the intuition of the tax-perturbation
approach introduced by Saez (2001), we analyze the efficiency properties of effective
income taxation under optional tax (non-)filing.
Intuition Tax Perturbation. Consider an increase in the MTR τ by dτ > 0 for the
taxable income range y ∈ [y∗, y∗ + dy∗] as described by Saez (2001). Two groups of
taxpayers are affected by this perturbation. First, taxpayers with y ∈ [y∗, y∗+dy∗] face
23This is true as long as the MTR at the extrapolated income (ỹi) is larger than the MTR
at the statutory income (yi), τ
schedule(ỹi) > τ
schedule(yi). As the German tax system features
linearly increasing marginal tax rates in the first three brackets (see Figure C.1), this applies to
the majority of taxpayers in our main analysis.
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Figure 3.7: Tax Perturbations
a: Change in Statutory MTR
y∗ y∗ + dy∗
y − T (y)
y
1 - τ
1 - τ - dτ
1 - τ
dy∗dτ
b: Change in Effective MTR
y∗ y∗ + dy∗
y − T (y)
y
1 - τ
1 - τ - dτ
Notes: Simplified visualization of the effect of increasing the marginal tax rate τ for the income range [y∗; y∗ +dy∗]
by dτ > 0. Panel (a) refers to an increase in the statutory MTR as defined in the tax schedule and follows closely
Saez (2001). Panel (b) refers to an increase in the effective MTR, leaving the tax schedule unchanged. y: taxable
income; T (y): taxes paid on taxable income; y − (Ty): net-of-tax income. Slopes are indicated in the graphs.
higher tax liabilities as their MTR increases. Second, for taxpayers with y > y∗+dy∗,
tax liabilities increase by the change in the MTR, dτ , times the width of the affected
range, dy∗, while their MTR does not change. This is illustrated in Figure 3.7a,
following closely Saez (2001).
Assuming a positive elasticity of taxable income with respect to the marginal net-




∂(1−τ) > 0, taxpayers in the directly affected range,
y ∈ [y∗, y∗+dy∗], face an increase in tax remittances for a given income and, at the same
time, a decrease in their labor supply incentives. For taxpayers with income above the
directly affected income range, y > y∗+dy∗, tax payments increase. When abstracting
from income effects, there are no distortionary labor supply effects.24 However, there
is a negative welfare effect for this group as they have less income available than before
the MTR increase.
Importantly, a change in the MTR for y ∈ [y∗, y∗ + dy∗] affects taxpayers with higher
income, y > y∗ + dy∗, only if the change concerns the statutory MTR. Increasing the
effective MTR in a given income range without changing the statutory MTR has no
effect on higher income taxpayers. We illustrate this in Figure 3.7b. Thus, increasing
the effective MTR for certain income groups imposes distortionary effects on these
groups without raising additional tax revenue from anyone else.
24Following Saez et al. (2012), abstracting from income effects can be considered reasonable
given that there is no compelling evidence for income effects.
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The same intuition applies to the optional tax (non-)filing setting. In any given in-
come range, the average effective MTR for over-remitting non-filers is higher than the
statutory MTR. However, all other taxpayers are not affected, since their statutory
MTRs remain unchanged. Based on this intuition, we argue that optional (non-)filing
is an inefficient way to achieve the effective taxation currently observed.
To show this, we design two hypothetical tax systems in which the current effective tax
liabilities are obtained through tax schedules rather than through non-filing behav-
ior. First, we compute tax revenue gains that would arise when abolishing the basic
allowance and replacing the current statutory MTR of zero with the current effective
MTR of about 1.87%. Building on this first tax system, we propose a second measure
of inefficiency. We show that implementing the effective taxation across all income
levels as statutory schedule allows to reduce marginal tax rates for the taxpayers be-
yond the basic allowance. In this second hypothetical tax system, while maintaining
the same effective taxation, the behavioral responses to reductions in the marginal
tax rates lead to increases in tax revenue. These increase can then be interpreted as
an inefficiency measure for the current system. Given, among other things, the legal
constraints outlined previously, we do not understand these policies as implementable
but rather as a theoretical thought experiment and as a benchmark for quantifying
the inefficiencies of the current system.
For both alternatives, the estimated effects on tax revenue stem from stylized back-
of-the-envelope calculations with some assumptions. Relative to the main analysis
in section 3.4, we broaden the scope and use the full data set for this analysis. For
those non-filers that were previously excluded, as we could not compute their precise
taxable income, we now rely on the slightly imprecise taxable income reported by the
tax authority.
Hypothetical Tax System I: Abolition of the Basic Allowance. As non-filing
and over-remittances are especially common among low income earners, we observe an
effective ATR of around 1.87% for all taxpayers with income up to the basic allowance
threshold of y0 = 8,354e. The tax liabilities of (filing) taxpayers with y > y0 are not
affected, such that they pay no taxes for their first 8,354e.
In this first approach, we set up a hypothetical tax system to provide a back-of-the-
envelope calculation for the mechanical increase in tax revenue that would follow the
abolition of the basic allowance for both non-filers and filers. The idea is as follows:
We design a tax schedule that matches the existing statutory tax schedule but includes
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Tax Schedule 2014 Hypothetical Tax Schedule I
Notes: Tax Year 2014. Figure 3.8 shows the hypothetical marginal tax rate schedule that the abolition of the basic
allowance would entail. Then, the previous MTR τ0 = 0 for income below the basic allowance y ≤ y0 = 8,354e
would be replaced by the effective flat tax τhyp0 = 0.0187.
a flat tax τhyp0 > 0 for the income below the basic allowance threshold. This flat tax
τhyp0 is defined such that it matches the average effective tax liability of taxpayers
with income below the basic allowance in the current system of optional (non-)filing,
i.e. τhyp0 = 0.0187. The resulting tax schedule is depicted in Figure 3.8. The pivotal
feature of this hypothetical tax system is that all taxpayers effectively pay a flat tax
for income below the previous basic allowance threshold, 8,354e. A stylized version
of the associated effects is characterized by switching from Figure 3.7b to Figure 3.7a.
The results are an approximation and require a few assumptions. First, we assume
that all taxpayers with income above the basic allowance did not pay taxes on this
basic allowance. However, for some non-filers this may not be true, even if they earn
(slightly) more than the basic allowance. Second, for this analysis we use all taxpayers
in the data set, including compulsory filers. While this allows us to quantify the ag-
gregate effect on tax revenue, information on taxable income is not fully accurate for
non-filers. Furthermore, for taxpayers with income below y0 = 8,354e, we abstract
from the fact that although the average effective taxation is kept constant, this is not
necessarily true for individual tax liabilities. We also abstract from potential behav-
ioral responses that follow a change in the effective ATR and consequently also in the
effective MTR. Taxpayers with income above the previous basic allowance threshold
92
Optional (Non-)Filing and Effective Taxation
do not exhibit behavioral responses, if we abstain from income effects, as their MTR
remains unchanged.
Taxpayers with income y <8,354e will, on average, not be worse off, since the tax
schedule is defined such that the average effective taxation is kept constant for the
whole income range 0 ≤ y ≤8,354e. Taxpayers with income above the previous
basic allowance, y > y0, face an additional tax liability of 0.0187×8,354e= 156.49e.
Aggregating over the universe of taxpayers above the previous basic allowance, this
flat tax leads to a total increase in tax revenue of 4.02 billione relative to the existing
tax schedule.
Put differently, if the effective ATR of 0.0187 for taxable income up to 8,354e was
not obtained via non-filing and tax over-remittances of very low income earners but
through implementation in the tax schedule, tax revenue could be increased by around
4 billion e. Clearly, an abolition of the basic allowance for taxpayers would likely come
with negative welfare effects since a large share of taxpayers would pay more taxes than
in the current system. Furthermore, it would likely be unconstitutional given that the
German Federal Constitutional Court decided that a minimum amount of income is
not to be taxed, as described before. While not implementable in practice, calculating
tax revenue gains in this hypothetical tax system shows that implementing positive
taxation for income up to y0 through non-filing is likely not efficient.
Hypothetical Tax System II: Effective Taxation as Tax Schedule. In the
first hypothetical tax system, we have shown that implementing the observed effec-
tive tax rates below the basic allowance threshold into the statutory tax system would
mechanically increase overall tax revenue. Now, we take a slightly more sophisticated
approach to assess the efficiency of the effective income taxation under optional (non-
) filing. In this second hypothetical tax system, the observed effective taxation for
all income levels (rather than for income below the basic allowance only) is reached
through a new tax schedule instead of non-filing behavior. Again, the intuition follows
the tax perturbation approach and is closely related to the intuition of the first hypo-
thetical tax reform. In contrast to the first reform, we now abstract from mechanical
increases in tax revenue from higher income earners. Thus, only behavioral responses,
i.e. adjustments to labor supply, lead to increases in tax revenue.
We define this new tax schedule such that for each income level, the tax liability
equals the average effective tax payment that we observe under the current system.
As in the first approach, we implement a statutory MTR of 1.87% instead of 0% for
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income up to y0 = 8,354e. However, now, this has also implications for the tax
schedule for y > y0. Since taxpayers with income above the basic allowance now
already pay taxes on their first 8,354e of income, marginal tax rates further up in
the income distribution can be reduced while keeping the effective average tax rates
constant. Assuming positive elasticities of taxable income with respect to the MTR,
this leads to increases in taxable income and consequently increases in tax revenue.
Put differently, as the same effective taxation can be obtained with less distortions,
while simultaneously increasing tax revenue through behavioral effects, optional (non-
)filing cannot be considered efficient. Thus, the additional tax revenue that can be
generated in this new systems serves as our measure for inefficiency.
This approach builds on some assumptions. First, we only consider taxpayers’ aver-
age tax payments at a given income level. This implies that, while the effective tax
liabilities T eff (y) are kept constant, some individuals with income y will pay more and
others will pay less. Second, we only consider behavioral responses at the intensive
margin, assuming that taxpayers can adjust their income without frictions. Thus, no
individual will enter (leave) the labor market because of lower (higher) effective MTRs
but only increase (decrease) their taxable income. Third, interactions with the social
security and transfer system are disregarded. Lastly, an implied assumption is that the
financial authorities are able to automatically refund over-remitted taxes to non-filers
and that they would do so to align effective taxation with the statutory tax schedule.
To quantify the increase in tax revenue that follows from implementing this hypothet-
ical tax system, the following steps are required. First, we define T eff (y), a smoothed
function of observed tax liabilities. Second, we derive the effective MTR in the new
hypothetical system τ effnew(yi) as the derivative of T
eff (y). Third, for each individual,
we can then compare the new effective MTR to the old effective MTR yielding an




i . Fourth, we calculate
individual behavioral responses in taxable income dyi and the corresponding changes




As non-filing introduces sizeable volatility in effective taxation, we smooth the effective
tax liabilities to obtain T eff (y). Otherwise, there would be extreme fluctuations in the
corresponding marginal tax rates. Effective tax liabilities are smoothed separately for
each tax bracket to account for the kinks between tax brackets. Two approaches for
smoothing T eff (y) are considered, a linear approach using an ordinary-least-squares
(OLS) regression and a spline interpolation to allow for a more flexible functional form.
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Linear 41.23 1,416,984,425 7.62 261,936,774
Non-linear 39.67 1,363,195,406 9.52 327,319,967
(B) Different Elasticities for Filers and Non-Filers
(εFy,1−τ = 0.2, ε
NF
y,1−τ = 0.0)
Linear 20.24 695,455,088 4.59 157,834,870
Non-linear 19.43 667,592,843 6.66 228,880,727
Notes: The table shows the effect of the proposed hypothetical tax reform in terms of changes in taxable
income and tax revenue (both in e) for the full data set, including all taxpayers. Panel (A) shows results
for an elasticity of taxable income εy,1−τ = 0.2 for all taxpayers, both filers (F ) and non-filers (NF ).
Panel (B) shows results for εFy,1−τ = 0.2 for filers and ε
F
y,1−τ = 0.0 for non-filers. Results forεy,1−τ = 0.3
are shown in Table C.7. Linear : Effective individual tax liabilities T effi (yi)) are smoothed by fitting
a quadratic function (OLS) for each tax bracket b to derive T effnew,b(yb) = β0 + β1yb + β2yb
2. β0 = 0
for the first bracket, to make sure that T effnew,1(y1) ≥ 0. The resulting τ
eff
new(y) is a linear function of y
within each tax bracket. This design follows the current design of the German Income Tax Schedule (see
Figure C.1). Non-linear : Effective individual tax liabilities are smoothed by interpolating a restricted
cubic spline function (5 knots) within each tax bracket. This allows for more flexibility within a given
tax bracket and leads to a non-linear function τeffnew(y). Compared to a higher order polynomial fit,
spline interpolations exhibit less oscillation, making it more suitable for defining T eff (y). dyi: Average
change in individual taxable income in e.
∑
dyi: Aggregate change in taxable income in e. dT
eff
i :
Average individual change in tax remittance in e.
∑
dT effi : Aggregate change in tax revenue in e.
In this hypothetical tax system, the effective MTR decreases for two different rea-
sons. First, after implementing the average effective taxation for the previous basic
allowance, the effective MTR for taxpayers with income above 8,354e has to decrease.
Figure C.8 in the appendix offers a graphical representation, which highlights that de-
viations are largest for taxpayers in the second and third income tax bracket. Second,
and potentially less intuitive, the effective MTR also decreases for the first tax bracket
with y ≤ y0. To understand this pattern, one has to recall that the lowest positive
MTR in the German tax schedule is 14%. Consequently, as soon as the effective ATR
is larger than zero, this implies an effective MTR of at least 14%. If the effective taxa-
tion is obtained through the tax schedule rather than through non-filing, the effective
MTR will be close to the observed effective ATR in the lowest tax bracket, leading to
a sizeable decrease in the average effective MTR.
Panel A of Table 3.4 shows the average and the aggregate responses to these changes
in marginal tax rates for taxable income and tax revenue when assuming an elasticity
of taxable income εy,1−τ = 0.2. Although the two approaches to construct the new
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marginal tax rates, linear OLS and spline smoothing, lead two different functional
forms for the tax schedule, the results are within the same magnitude. Individual
responses are rather small with an average increase in the annual taxable income of
39e to 41e. Consequently, average changes in effective tax liabilities are also rather
small, between 7e and 9e for both approaches. Aggregating over the universe of all
taxpayers leads to a total increase in tax revenue of 261 millione to 327 millione. This
effect is sizeable given that it stems only from behavioral responses. The estimated
increases in tax revenue can be interpreted as efficiency gains from the hypothetical
tax system absent changes in real effective taxation. Likewise, it can be interpreted as
an approximation for the efficiency losses in the current optional filing system.
Estimates for the elasticity of taxable income typically do not differentiate between
filing and non-filing taxpayers. However, it is possible that the two groups differ
systematically in their responsiveness to changes in their effective MTRs. In order
to react to a higher effective MTR, taxpayers have to be aware of the increase in the
first place. If, for instances, over-remitting non-filers abstain from filing their taxes
because they are inattentive and not aware of their over-remittances, they may also
be inattentive towards changes in their effective MTR. In Panel B of Table 3.4, we
account for this possibility and introduce heterogeneity in the elasticity of taxable
income based on the filing status. While the elasticity for filers remains unchanged
(εFy,1−τ = 0.2), we assume ε
NF
y,1−τ = 0 for all non-filers. Under this assumption, the
hypothetical tax system would lead to an increase in tax revenue ranging from 157
millione to 228 millione. Given that these values are computed under the strong
assumption that non-filers do not react to changes in their effective MTRs at all, this
is still a sizeable effect.
Summarizing the results outlined above, we conclude that the current effective in-
come taxation induced by the optional tax (non-)filing system cannot be considered
optimal. If the statutory tax schedule reflects societal preferences for redistribution,
then the effective tax burden of low income non-filers leaves room for significant eq-
uity improvements. If, however, the effective tax liabilities observed reflect societal
preferences for redistribution, we show that there are more efficient ways to achieve
the same outcome.
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3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the effects of optional tax (non-)filing for effective taxation.
We show that non-filing is particularly prevalent at the lower end of the income distri-
bution. Taxpayers in these income ranges are hurt most by optional filing rules. Below
the basic allowance threshold, over-remitting non-filers face an average tax rate of
about 5% relative to a statutory rate of zero. Furthermore, on average, over-remitting
non-filers paid 360emore than intended by the schedule in 2014, adding up to a total
of at least 949 millione.
We show that the results are persistent over time. Additionally, we provide sugges-
tive evidence that conventional filing costs estimates cannot explain these patterns.
Rather, informational frictions about potential refunds or non-monetary filing costs
have to be sizeable to explain these patterns.
Therefore, if policymakers want to realign statutory and effective taxation, automatic
refunds or, at least, pre-populated returns should be used. However, if the current
effective taxation is considered equitable, we provide a hypothetical tax reform that
demonstrates that the same outcome can be obtained while simultaneously provid-
ing larger labor supply incentives. This could ultimately increase tax revenue while
preserving the same effective taxation as today.
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Three behavioral responses to taxation have been at the core of this dissertation.
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on avoidance and evasion, while the third chapter relates to
non-filing of personal income tax returns.
Both the theoretical essay in chapter 1 and the empirical analysis in chapter 2 highlight
that policies which aim to limit the avoidance and evasion potential must be distinctive
to be effective. The first chapter argues that tax havens will use countermeasures,
modeled as lobbying, to reduce high-tax countries’ pressure directed at profit shifting
multinational firms. As a result, the effective pressure endured by multinational firms
is smaller than intended by high-tax countries and the firms keep shifting profits
offshore. Only in extreme cases, when the exerted pressure is prohibitively high, tax
havens forgo the possibility to use countermeasures. Similarly, as seen in chapter 2,
announcing broad income categories as the enforcement focus has very limited effects
for personal income tax reporting. Ultimately, for the policy analyzed in chapter 2,
broad audit announcements only lead to more overall taxable income in one out of
seven income categories. However, when enforcement announcements are distinctive,
i.e. on the line item level, taxpayers react significantly and permanently.
Complementary to the active responses to taxation, chapter 3 highlights that inactiv-
ity, in the form of non-filing, is equally relevant. Optional tax filing systems take this
into account and explicitly exempt wage earners from the mandatory duty to file an
income tax return. As presented in chapter 3, this has strong effects for effective tax
rates, as low income taxpayers are more likely to be non-filers and to over-remit taxes.
Consequently, automatic refunds could realign effective and statutory taxation. How-
ever, if the current distribution of effective tax rates reflects social preferences for
redistribution, chapter 3 also shows that there are more efficient ways to achieve the
status quo effective taxation.
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To conclude, this thesis has shed more light on three behavioral responses to taxation
– avoidance, evasion, and non-filing. These responses are highly relevant for tax
policy design, as they lead to a divergence of statutory and effective taxation. While
taxpayerswhoavoidor evade taxesdo so toultimately reduce their effective taxburden,
taxpayers who do not file an income tax return are likely to end up remitting more than
intended by the tax schedule. Thus, when policymakers want to assess the effects of
a particular tax policy, understanding the behavioral responses, to which this thesis
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
To demonstrate that the best-response functions given by (1.8) for onshore pressure
and by (1.11) for offshore lobbying constitute an interior Nash equilibrium, three
conditions have to be fulfilled for both policy tools:
1) The objective functionsWH andWF are continuous in the respective policy tool.
2) Each objective function ought to have (strictly) concave curvature to ensure an
optimum, that is, the second-order derivative has to be (strictly) negative.
3) The best-response functions (1.8) for α∗ and (1.11) for γ∗ have to lie within their
respective boundaries, that is, 0 < α∗ < αup = k
h
and 0 < γ∗ < 1.
While 1) and 2) ensure the existence of an equilibrium, 3) ensures that this equilibrium
is an interior equilibrium.























































1) As is clearly visible from (A.2), the objective function WH is continuous in α.
2) To ensure the (strictly) concave curvature, it has to hold that (A.5) is (strictly)
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To have the maximum level for the sufficient condition, one can insert the maximum
value for γ, γ = 1. Hence, the sufficient condition can be simplified to g = 2h
9k
.
3) Because 2) ensures the concave curvature of the objective function, for α∗ to be an
interior best-response function, it has to hold that ∂WH
∂α
|α=0 > 0 and ∂WH∂α |α=αup= kh < 0.
Put differently, there has to be a positive slope for the policy tool at the lower boundary































Hence, there is a positive slope at the lower boundary for values of γ ∈ (0, 1), that
is, for all interior values of γ. Given that the additional condition for g is fulfilled,
the slope at the upper boundary is negative. Again, taking the maximum value for
offshore lobbying, that is, γ = 1, the condition simplifies to g = 2h
3k
. This implies,
together with the concave curvature, that (1.8) is an interior Nash equilibrium. If the
sufficient condition is fulfilled, but not the additional condition, that is, 2h
9k
< g ≤ 2h
3k
,
the boundary solution of α∗ = αup = k
h
remains.
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= 0 , (A.11)
⇔ γ∗ = 9khρ− 2αk
9khρ− 2α2h




1) As is visible in (A.10), the offshore country’s objective function is continuous in γ.
2) Again, to ensure the strict concavity of the objective function WF , the second










Hence, ρ > 2α
2
9k
ensures the strict concavity of the offshore country’s maximization






3) To avoid a potential corner solution, it has to hold that ∂WF
∂γ























< 0 ∀ α < k
h
. (A.15)
This second line is the condition for an interior solution of onshore pressure. Hence,
as long as the level of pressure is below the upper boundary, there is an incentive for
the onshore country to lobby, that is, γ is at least marginally smaller than 1. For the
case of upper limit pressure, γ = 1, that is, there is no offshore lobbying.
As concerns the derivative at the lower boundary, ∂WF
∂γ
|γ=0, it can be shown that the
sufficient condition nests the condition that ensures an interior equilibrium: For this















2αk ≤ 2α2h , (A.17)
k
h
≤ α . (A.18)
The last line is the condition for the upper limit of pressure. Hence, the sufficient
condition for the maximum nests the condition to avoid the corner solution. This
concludes the proof for Proposition 1. 
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A.2 Comparative Statics
As the equilibrium values of γ∗ and α∗ are only implicitly given, the implicit function
theorem is necessary to evaluate the comparative statics for the given equilibrium




























































T 0 . (A.20)




. The second part has to be negative. Assuming that one starts at the
equilibrium value of γ, an increase in γ leads to a negative first-order condition, as





, that is, if the effective pressure component on the firm relative to financial
market frictions is smaller in size than 1
2h
. The last term is unambiguously positive.
Assuming that direct effects are larger in size than indirect ones, |D| > 0 is used for
further computations.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Figures






FA Bezeichnung Prüffeld 
Gewinneinkünfte § 13 EStG 
Liebhaberei 
Nutzungsumfang/Nutzungsänderungen/Veräußerungen von LuF Flächen 
Gewinneinkünfte §§ 15/18 EStG 
Branchenspezifische Untersuchung 
Gewinneinkünfte § 15a EStG 
Gewinneinkünfte § 16 EStG 
Gesellschafterwechsel bei vorhandenem Sonderbetriebsvermögen 
Überschusseinkünfte § 21 EStG 
Erstmalige Vermietung 
Gewerbesteuer 
§ 10a GewStG: Gewerbeverlust 
301 Ahaus 
Gemeinnützigkeit 
Umsatzsteuerjahreserklärungen mit Erstattungsüberhängen 
Wegfall der steuerbegünstigten Zwecke 
Wirtschaftlicher Geschäftsbetrieb 
Gewinneinkünfte § 17 EStG 
Anteilsveräußerung 
Überschusseinkünfte § 21 EStG 
Vermietung und Verpachtung 
302 Altena 
Gemeinnützigkeit 
Steuerabzug § 50a EStG 
Gewinneinkünfte §§ 15/18 EStG 
Arbeitszimmer 
Schuldzinsenabzug § 4 Abs. 4a EStG 
Gewinneinkünfte § 15a EStG 




Unterstützung naher Angehöriger 
Notes: First page of the first enforcement focus list as announced in January 2011 (Tax Year 2010). The full PDF
can be found online (e.g. http://files.vogel.de/iww/iww/quellenmaterial/dokumente/110399; last accessed:
2021-02-17). All lists (2010-2016) are also available from the author.
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Figure B.2: Treatment Assignment (2010)



































Data: GeoBasis-DE/BKG (2018). Based on VG250, own
illustration.
Notes: Each map highlights the treatment assignment of
a particular income category on the municipality level in
North Rhine-Westphalia for the tax year 2010. Treated
municipalities are highlighted in red. Municipalities
which are in the OFD Münster area but not treated, i.e.
the control group, are highlighted in blue. Municipalities
belonging to the OFD Rheinland area are represented in
white.
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Figure B.3: Distribution of Income Category Means by Treatment Status (2009)


























































































1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500
Treatment Control
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statisti-
cal Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-
2016, own calculations.
Notes: Each histogram represents the distribution of an
income category’s mean value across all tax offices in
North Rhine-Westphalia in the tax year 2009. Observa-
tions are binned into 25-e-bins. In each income cate-
gory, an observation in red indicates that this tax office
was treated in this income category in 2010, whereas an
observation in the blue indicates that this tax office was
not treated in this income category in 2010.
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Figure B.4: Treatment Effects - OFD Rheinland Control Group
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Treatment Group 95% Con"dence Interval
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statisti-
cal Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-
2016, own calculations.
Notes: Each graph shows the point estimate and the
95%-confidence interval for β̂2005 to β̂2012: The differ-
ence in the respective income category between the treat-
ment and control group. Here, the control group con-
sists of taxpayers living in the second OFD district in
North Rhine-Westphalia. As taxpayers residing there
were treated starting in 2013, this control group is only
available until 2012. The estimates shown here include
individual, year, and tax office fixed effects and control
for treatments in all years of the policy. Standard errors
are clustered at the tax office level. Until 2009, prior
to the first enforcement policy, point estimates should
be zero, indicating no significant differences between the
two groups. Significant differences to zero in 2010 and
later respectively indicate immediate and long-term ef-
fects of the 2010 enforcement focus list policy.
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Figure B.5: Treatment Effects - Neighboring Taxpayers Control Group
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Treatment Group 95% Con"dence Interval
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statisti-
cal Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-
2016, own calculations.
Notes: Each graph shows the point estimate and the 95%-
confidence interval for β̂2005 to β̂2016: The difference in
the respective income category between the treatment
and control group. Here, the control group consists of
taxpayers living in neighboring districts to NRW. The
estimates shown here include individual, year, and tax
office fixed effects and control for treatments in all years
of the policy. Standard errors are clustered at the tax
office level. Until 2009, prior to the first enforcement
policy, point estimates should be zero, indicating no sig-
nificant differences between the two groups. Significant
differences to zero in 2010 and later respectively indicate
immediate and long-term effects of the 2010 enforcement
focus list policy.
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Figure B.6: Treatment Effects - All Non-NRW Taxpayers Control Group
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Treatment Group 95% Con"dence Interval
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statisti-
cal Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-
2016, own calculations.
Notes: Each graph shows the point estimate and the 95%-
confidence interval for β̂2005 to β̂2016: The difference in
the respective income category between the treatment
and control group. Here, the control group consists of
all taxpayers residing outside of North Rhine-Westphalia.
The estimates shown here include individual, year, and
tax office fixed effects and control for treatments in all
years of the policy. Standard errors are clustered at the
tax office level. Until 2009, prior to the first enforcement
policy, point estimates should be zero, indicating no sig-
nificant differences between the two groups. Significant
differences to zero in 2010 and later respectively indicate
immediate and long-term effects of the 2010 enforcement
focus list policy.
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Figure B.7: Treatment Effects - Entropy Balancing
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Treatment Group 95% Con"dence Interval
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statisti-
cal Offices of the Federal States, Taxpayer-Panel, 2001-
2016, own calculations.
Notes: Each graph shows the point estimate and the 95%-
confidence interval for β̂2005 to β̂2016: The difference in
the respective income category between the treatment
and control group. Here, the treatment and the control
group are re-weighted with the entropy-balancing proce-
dure (Hainmueller 2012), using all pre-2010 levels of the
respective income category. Only taxpayers residing in
the OFD Münster area in 2010 are considered. The esti-
mates shown include individual, year, and tax office fixed
effects and control for treatments in all years of the pol-
icy. Standard errors are clustered at the tax office level.
Until 2009, prior to the first enforcement policy, point
estimates should be zero, indicating no significant differ-
ences between the two groups. Significant differences to
zero in 2010 and later respectively indicate immediate
and long-term effects of the 2010 enforcement focus list
policy.
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C.1 Additional Figures


















MTR single MTR joint
ATR single ATR joint
Notes: Statutory average (ATR) and marginal tax rates (MTR) in Germany in the tax year 2014 as a function
of taxable income. Tax rates are calculated based on the tax schedule for single taxpayers and joint taxpayers
respectively. The x-axis is cut at 110,000e for illustrative purposes.
114
Appendix to Chapter 3





















0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percentile of Annual Gross Income
Mean 95% Con!dence Interval
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Share of non-filers among optional filers along the income distribution. Dashed grey line: Average share of
non-filers (61.15%) across all income percentiles. Statistics refer to taxable units which may be either an individ-
ual or married spouses in case of joint filing. Percentiles are based on the annual gross wage income of optional
filers. For jointly filing spouses, we consider the average gross income. Figure 3.2 shows the non-filing share over
gross income.





















20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
Female Male
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Share of non-filers among optional filers for women and men over age. The sample is restricted to individuals
with age ∈ [16; 64]. Dashed grey line: Average share of non-filers (61.15%) across all age and gender.
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Figure C.4: Differences in Filing between Married and Non-Married Taxpayers


































Single Parents Standard Taxpayers - no Kids
Standard Taxpayers - Kids Married - no Kids
Married - Kids
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Individuals are grouped in 2,000-e-bins. Share of non-filers over income for five groups: (i) Standard sin-
gle taxpayers, (ii) married taxpayers, (iii) single parents, (iv) single taxpayers with children but no single parents,
(v) married taxpayers with children. Dashed grey line: Average share of non-filers (61.15%) across all groups and
gross income levels.
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Mean 95% Con!dence Interval
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Sample restricted to taxpayers with a positive tax remittance. Thus excluding taxpayers below the basic al-
lowance threshold for whom no taxes were withheld. Individuals are grouped in 1,000-e-bins. Share of non-filers
among optional filers. Dashed grey line: Average share of non-filers (52.62%) across all gross income levels. Statis-
tics refer to taxable units which may be either an individual or married spouses in case of joint filing. For jointly
filing spouses, we consider the average gross income.
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20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
Minimal Refund: 50+ ! Minimal Refund: up to 50!
Minimal Refund: None
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Decomposition of the non-filing share over age by refund potential for non-filers. Minimal Refund : Lower
bound for taxes over-remitted through non-filing. None: No refund from minimal filing because taxes are withheld
correctly. This is allowing for a range of 0 +/- 5e. Up to 50e (50+e): Minimal refund of up to (more than 50e).
Reading example: 64% of optional filers aged 50 are non-filers. In this age cohort, 13% of all optional filers have a
refund potential of at least 50e.
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Statutory MTR - old E!ective MTR - old
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Final sample with optional filers as defined in subsection 3.4.2. Individuals are grouped in 1,000-e-bins.
Comparison between the effective MTR that correspond to the extrapolated annual taxable income and the statu-
tory MTR as defined in the tax schedule. Over-remitting non-filers face an effective MTR of at least 0.14, which is
the smallest possible positive MTR (see Figure C.1 for the tax schedule). Consequently, effective MTRs below the
basic allowance threshold are higher than effective ATRs for that income range as shown in Figure 3.5a.
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Figure C.8: Effective Marginal Tax Rates Pre and Post Reform





























E!ective MTR - old E!ective MTR - new





























E!ective MTR - old E!ective MTR - new
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und Einkommen-
steuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: All taxpayers included. X-axis is cut at 100,000e. Linear : Effective individual tax liabilities T effi (yi)) are
smoothed by fitting a quadratic function (OLS) for each tax bracket b to derive T effnew,b(yb) = β0 + β1yb + β2yb
2.
β0 = 0 for the first bracket, to make sure that T
eff
new,1(y1) ≥ 0. The resulting τ
eff
new(y) is a linear function of y within
each tax bracket. This design follows the current design of the German Income Tax Schedule (see Figure C.1).
Non-linear : Effective individual tax liabilities are smoothed by interpolating a restricted cubic spline function (5
knots) within each tax bracket. This allows for more flexibility within a given tax bracket and leads to a non-linear
function τeffnew(y). Compared to a higher order polynomial fit, spline interpolations exhibit less oscillation, making
it more suitable for defining T eff (y).
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Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und
Einkommensteuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Statistics refer to taxable units which may be either an individual or married spouses in case
of joint filing. Statistics are based on weighted data if not indicated differently. Income: Annual gross
wage income in e. For jointly filing spouses, the average gross income is taken into account. Married :
Share of married taxpayers. East : Share of taxpayers that live in Eastern states of Germany. Children:
Share of taxpayers with at least one child that is relevant for the tax authority.
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Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics - Optional Filers
Optional Filers Voluntary Filers Non-Filers
Income mean+ 24,447.75 34,524.08 18,046.71
p25 8,231.00 22,624.00 4,479.00
p50 21,951.00 32,559.00 13,023.00
p75 35,465.00 43,225.00 27,200.00
p90 48,539.00 56,855.00 40,063.00
p99 86,952.50 97,373.00 75,206.00
Age mean+ 34.92 37.12 33.62
p50 32.00 34.00 30.00
Married mean+ 9.28 12.79 7.05
East mean+ 21.54 18.99 23.17
Children mean+ 16.88 20.62 14.51
N absolute 683,718 425,579 258,139
weighted 14,863,136 5,773,958 9,089,178
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und
Einkommensteuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: Statistics refer to taxable units which may be either an individual or married spouses in case
of joint filing. Statistics are based on weighted data if not indicated differently. Income: Annual gross
wage income in e. For jointly filing spouses, the average gross income is taken into account. Married :
Share of married taxpayers. East : Share of taxpayers that live in Eastern states of Germany. Children:
Share of taxpayers with at least one child that is relevant for the tax authority. + indicates mean/share
difference between voluntary filers and non-filers significant at the 0.1% - level (two-sided t-test).
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Table C.5: Different Inequality Measures for Different Income Concepts
Gini Percentile Ratios
p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10
Pre-Tax Gross Income 0.4079 18.0384 2.1793 8.2772
After-Tax Income Pre Filing 0.3832 15.4307 1.9632 7.8599
After-Tax Income Post Filing 0.3897 15.6391 2.0403 7.6650
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und
Einkommensteuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: We report two different measures for inequality for three different income concepts for the
final sample used in section 3.4. Gini : Indicates the Gini-coefficient. Percentile Ratios: Indicates the
ratio between two income percentiles. For instance, p90/p10=18.0384 indicates that the 90th income
percentile is 18 times larger than the 10th income percentile. Gross Income: Gross wage income before
taxes. After-Tax Income Pre Filing: Gross income minus taxes withheld through the employer, before
potential tax filing. After-Tax Income Post Filing: This is the final after tax income that optional filers
realize. For voluntary filers, this is their taxable income after filing. For non-filers, this is their gross
income minus taxes withheld.
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Table C.6: Taxes Over-Remitted through Non-Filing - Lower Bound Estimates
(2010)
(A) (B)
All Non-Filers With over-remittance
All y < threshold All y < threshold
Over-
Remittance
total 603,046,641 240,758,764 604,502,377 240,584,508
mean 102.26 81.12 318.89 238.33
p25 0.37 0.00 41.90 48.00
p50 0.00 0.00 164.00 139.00
p75 34.34 52.00 441.54 331.00
N absolute 168,805 83,296 55,399 29,741
weighted 5,897,323 2,967,949 1,895,650 1,009,474
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und
Einkommensteuerstatistik, 2010, own calculations.
Notes: Over-Remittance is defined as the difference between the the automatically withheld income
taxes and the income tax that applies according to the tax schedule. Over-remittances are listed in e.
(A): All non-filers in the sample. (B): Only those non-filers with over-remittances, defined as a deviation
of more than 5e from the statutory tax schedule. y < threshold : Individuals with an annual gross wage
income below the basic tax allowance threshold.
126
Appendix to Chapter 3








(A) εFy,1−τ = 0.3, ε
NF
y,1−τ = 0.3
Linear 61.85 2,125,476,638 11.48 394,538,427
Non-linear 59.50 2,044,793,109 13.38 459,655,161
(B) εFy,1−τ = 0.3, ε
NF
y,1−τ = 0.0
Linear 30.36 1,043,182,632 6.94 238,385,571
Non-linear 29.14 1,001,389,265 9.08 311,996,301
Data: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the Federal States, Lohn- und
Einkommensteuerstatistik, 2014, own calculations.
Notes: The table shows the effect of the proposed hypothetical tax reform in terms of changes in taxable
income and tax revenue (both in e) for the full data set, including all taxpayers. Panel (A) shows results
for an elasticity of taxable income εy,1−τ = 0.2 for all taxpayers, both filers (F ) and non-filers (NF ).
Panel (B) shows results for εFy,1−τ = 0.2 for filers and ε
F
y,1−τ = 0.0 for non-filers. Results forεy,1−τ = 0.2
are shown in Table 3.4. Linear : Effective individual tax liabilities T effi (yi)) are smoothed by fitting
a quadratic function (OLS) for each tax bracket b to derive T effnew,b(yb) = β0 + β1yb + β2yb
2. β0 = 0
for the first bracket, to make sure that T effnew,1(y1) ≥ 0. The resulting τ
eff
new(y) is a linear function of y
within each tax bracket. This design follows the current design of the German Income Tax Schedule (see
Figure C.1). Non-linear : Effective individual tax liabilities are smoothed by interpolating a restricted
cubic spline function (5 knots) within each tax bracket. This allows for more flexibility within a given
tax bracket and leads to a non-linear function τeffnew(y). Compared to a higher order polynomial fit,
spline interpolations exhibit less oscillation, making it more suitable for defining T eff (y). dyi: Average
change in individual taxable income in e.
∑
dyi: Aggregate change in taxable income in e. dT
eff
i :
Average individual change in tax remittance in e.
∑
dT effi : Aggregate change in tax revenue in e.
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C.3 Sample Restrictions - Optional Filers
Besides filing and non-filing single taxpayers, we also include married taxpayers if
they fulfill one of the following three criterion. First, spouses who did not choose to
reallocate allowances between them over the year, but still file jointly, are considered.
Hence, for tax withholding purposes, each spouse is treated like a single taxpayer. For
these couples, we consider their average refund and their average income to be able to
compare them to single taxpayers. Second, married individuals that filed their taxes
individually, and third, married individuals who are non-filers are considered.
C.4 Sample Restrictions - Over-Remittance Sample
In general, contributions to the health insurance, to the nursing care insurance, and
to the pension insurance are tax deductible up to a threshold for both private and
public insurances. However, while contributions to the public social insurances are
a function of gross income and can thus be computed with the data set at hand,
this is not the case for private insurances. Unfortunately, the data set does neither
include information on the contribution fees remitted for private insurances nor on the
enrollment status (public or private) if not declared in the tax return. Hence, we cannot
calculate the contribution payments for non-filers enrolled in private insurances and
thus cannot derive their taxable income. The same is true for filers who do not claim
their contributions in their tax returns. Therefore, we restrict the sample to those for
whom it is certain that they are enrolled in the public insurance.
It is important to note that, for employees with an annual income up to 48,600e
in 2014, enrollment in all public social insurances is compulsory. By restricting the
sample to this group, we thusexcludeall observationswithanannualgrosswage income
above 48,600e, which is close to the 90th percentile of gross wages. Additionally, we
exclude civil servants who do not contribute to the public pension insurance and who
are free to choose whether to enroll in a private health insurance even at lower income
levels. Additionally, for voluntary filers, we focus on individually filing taxpayers here,
including married individuals that do not file jointly with their spouses. We do so as
for joint filing spouses not all relevant variables are available at the individual level.
We further restrict the sample to individuals for whom the calculated statutory tax
liability is less than the withheld taxes, allowing for a 5-e-inaccuracy. This means that
we exclude non-filers for whom the minimal refund potential is significantly negative.
There are several reasons for why we observe optional filers who pay too little taxes
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through automatic withholding. First, it might be that employers may make mistakes
when calculating and withholding the wage taxes for their employees. Second, there
may be cases in which the tax schedule we apply to a taxpayer’s income is imprecise
because one or several of her individual characteristics changed within the tax year.
Since the data set only contains yearly information, no such changes are observable.
Additionally, some of these unobservable changes trigger an obligation to file. A third
potential explanation is that some information in the data is incorrect.
Since for none of the above cases, we can correct for the shortcomings, we exclude
these cases. We replicate all findings with a sample without any restrictions regarding
the refund potential. Since we include negative refunds, this consequently reduces the
lower bound for over-remitted taxes. However, the effects are comparable in size. In
section 3.5, we show that including this group does not change our results significantly.
It is noteworthy that voluntary filers do not have to pay more taxes than withheld by
their employers. If, after voluntary filing, the taxes due are higher than the taxes
withheld, taxpayers can withdraw from filing.
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auch noch nicht veröffentlicht. Sofern ein Teil der Arbeit aus bereits veröffentlichten
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